

*Kosara Stevanović**

Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Abstract

The connection between terrorism and organized crime is one of the most prevalent threats to global security since the end of the 20th century, which is most visible in the cooperation between terrorist groups and drug trafficking groups. The main theoretical problem in the research of this relationship is how to explain the difference in the motivation for terrorism, on one hand, and organized crime, on the other. The motivation for terrorism is always ideological, and it is oriented to make some profound political and social change. On the other hand, the motivation for organized crime is material gain it derives from its illegal actions. The question that stems from this conceptual difference is – how do these groups, which are so different in their orientations and goals, manage to make successful cooperation? In this paper, the author will try to offer the answer to that question from the position of rational choice theory. From the rational choice perspective, the actors behave in such a way, which will bring them the most benefits, with as little costs as possible. Therefore, the author finds that the members of terrorist and organized crime groups also make their decisions based on the cost-benefit analysis. To test this hypothesis, the paper is primarily concentrated on deconstructing the concept of ideology and highlighting its main functions in rationalizing and motivating actors to actions. Ideology is a controversial term, its meaning varies from the set of beliefs in a general sense to a false consciousness which goal is to propel the interests of a ruling social class. Our goal here is to shed a light on these functions of ideology and to show that ideology has always been, and stayed, the tool for pursuing the interests of some social group, whether it be a ruling group or a group that represents some political minority. On the other

* stevanovic.kosa@gmail.com

hand, organized crime is seen as an illegal activity conducted by rational actors, to gain material benefits by using illegal methods like violence, the threat of violence, and corruption. After analyzing the concepts of ideology and organized crime, the paper highlights the nature and types of connections between terrorist and organized crime groups in reality. The author finds that both of these groups, seen as rational actors, have many reasons and interests in cooperation, like sharing knowledge and goods, as well as shared trafficking routes.

Keywords: ideology, organized crime, terrorism, rational choice theory, interests, cooperation

INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the 21st century was marked by a terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, after which followed several terrorist attacks in Europe. These attacks shocked the international community and brought to light the growing problem of terrorism. Besides that, it was observed that organized crime was also getting stronger, primarily illegal trafficking of drugs, arms, and people. However, something that especially concerns us is the growing connection between terrorism and organized crime.

This connection is very interesting for the academic community because of the difference in the motives between terrorist groups and organized crime groups. On the one hand, terrorist groups are motivated by ideological and political goals, while the organized crime groups are motivated by profit, without any ideological background. With that in mind, the following question arises – why then these differently motivated groups cooperate? This main difference in their motivations represents the biggest problem for academic researchers. For this reason, the main purpose of this paper is to try to explain why these groups cooperate, regardless of their different goals and motivations.

The paper explains this by pointing out the mutual foundation of ideologically and profit-oriented groups, which is the rational choice of their actors. The author will try to show that ideology is a tool used by rational actors, which helps them to achieve their goals and interests, by rationalizing and justifying their actions, but also by motivating them to act. That is why the paper explores the concept of ideology, as well as its main functions, and the reason why we find that the terrorists are rational actors who act in a way that will further their interests by

the most efficient means. The members of organized crime groups are also seen as rational actors, who make their decisions based on their preferences to achieve material goals.

A bit more detailed deconstruction of the concept of ideology is offered in the beginning, since the author finds that its rational background is more hidden than the rationality of organized crime. After that, we will also try to define organized crime from the rational choice perspective, so we can uncover how terrorism and organized crime are based on the same decision-making process. We find that this is a very important precondition for their cooperation. At the end of the paper, the author will make a synthesis of concepts of ideology and organized crime, by reviewing how terrorism and organized crime cooperate in reality. We will see the similarities and differences in the operations of terrorist groups and organized crime groups, so we could better understand their relationship. Besides their main difference in goals, these groups share many traits, like the use of violence, kidnappings, murders, and money laundering. Both groups also share the same decentralized network structure, in which the nodes operate secretly and independently from one another.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IDEOLOGY

In the beginning, we analyze the concept of ideology and the way its meaning changed through time, after which we make an overview of the main functions that make ideology a powerful foundation for practically all political actions. The concept of ideology was studied by many experts in the fields of political science, sociology, and psychology, which implies that ideology is a very important part of social and political life, but also an important subject of research in social science.

First, we have to notice that the term ideology was, from the very beginning of its use, very controversial and had a dual meaning. The term “ideology” was first time used after the French revolution in 1796, by Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who wanted to establish the science about the origin of all ideas (Simeunovic 2009a, 115). This science about the ideas would make ideology the most important science of all and the starting point for all other sciences since every scientific discipline is made of a combination of ideas (Kennedy 1979). Napoleon, the political enemy of De Tracy, laughed at the philosophers gathered around De Tracy and called them “ideologists” in a pejorative manner. Napoleon discredited the ideologists and accused them of undermining the foundations of French society and state.

By the mid-19th century, the word “ideology” already got a negative connotation, which was in large part because of Marx. He thought about ideology as a set of ideas that represented the interests of a ruling class and as a false or distorted view of the world (Simeunovic 2009a, 115). However, it is not surprising that Marx interpreted ideology as a tool for legitimizing the interests of a ruling class in society if we look at some of De Tracy’s ideas. De Tracy thought that the private property or “conventional” property is the consequence of “natural” property, or someone’s faculties and needs; even concepts of justice, rights, and duties are intervened and can’t exist without property. He didn’t see the social conflict as class conflict, but as a “universal struggle”, since he thought that we couldn’t talk about propertied and unpropertied classes, as even the poorest people have a property in the form of their faculties (Kennedy 1979, 367). That is why Marx thought that ideologists universalize ideas and social distribution, to show that capitalism is a necessary and inevitable social and economic system (Parekh 2015, 136).

Some authors think that Engels is the true architect of the meaning of ideology like false consciousness since he wrote more directly about it than Marx. Engels wrote the following about ideology: “Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him to remain unknown to him; otherwise, it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces” (Pines 1997, 1). We can see that Engels defined ideology as a thought process that is based on false consciousness, while the subject is not aware of that. Even the actions, since they are guided by ideas and thoughts, are also based on false presumptions and hidden motives. Mannheim also studied ideology and saw it as “the whole outlook of a social group”, which is conditioned by the political orientation of that group and its location in the historic process (Mullins 1972, 500).

Most conceptions of ideology begin with defining it as a set of ideas, or a belief system (Van Dijk 2006, 116). These definitions of ideology as a set of beliefs about the right social system are concentrated on the element of existence of some sort of belief system, without telling us what is the structure and the content of those beliefs (Jost, Federico, Napier 2009, 309). The second element in defining ideology is that it is a belief system that is shared between members of some social group and represents the social display that defines the social identity of that group, and the shared beliefs about the fundamental social conditions and the right way of living and reproduction of society (Van Dijk 2006, 116). This offers individuals the tools to navigate their way in a social environment and face uncertainties. Similarly, in his economic

analysis of democracy, Downs also pointed out that the individuals use ideological backgrounds of political parties to navigate through a large amount of information and to quickly decide for which party to vote (Downs 1957, 97-100).

Van Dijk thinks that, since the ideology is not just any belief system, but fundamental or axiomatic, it controls and organizes all other social beliefs (Van Dijk 2006, 116). He adds that one of the cognitive functions of ideology is to provide coherence to the beliefs of the group, and therefore facilitate their use in everyday situations (Ibid.). Gerring also points out the strong influence of ideology on behavior and finds that, since ideology directs one's behavior and actions, it can't be perceived only at an abstract level (Gerring 1997, 967).

INTERESTS AND IDEOLOGY

Ideology doesn't represent only rationalization and systematization of certain ideas, but it is also a powerful tool in motivating people to act to achieve their interests. As Simeunovic (2009a, 117) says: "the main power of ideology is in creating beliefs, and the people who are convinced in the correctness of their ideas they follow, are far more willing to act than the ones who are forced to act". He highlights four main functions of ideology: 1) motivating, 2) homogenizing, 3) explanatory, and 4) justifying.

The link between ideology and the ruling class, in the sense Marx thought about it, is not very prevalent today, and therefore the ideology is thought to represent the ideas of any social group, regardless of its position in society. Today ideology is in the spotlight mainly when talking about extreme right and extreme left organizations, since it was noticed that these groups have the sets of ideas and beliefs which are the most coherent and stable (Gerring 1997, 971). This can be seen when it comes to terrorist organizations, which are sharply in opposition to the social and political systems. Terrorist groups are connected to ideology in three ways: 1) existence of belief system that motivates a terrorist act, 2) directing the choice of goals, methods, and content of terrorist as political action, 3) justifying their actions (Simeunovic 2009b, 123).

It is very important to stress that ideology is the set of ideas that represent the *interests* of some social group. The purpose of ideology in that regard is to help and motivate individuals to act according to their goals, so it is a very important tool for maximizing one's utility. This is complementary with the *rational choice theory*, which presumes that the individuals and groups will always act selfishly in a way to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs since they are driven by

their interests. Even though the people who act ideologically will often act as if they behave against their interests, ideology serves them for confirmation of their self-worth, even it is based on false presumptions. For example, a poor white male who justifies his position by alleged privileges that women and minorities have, is building his system of ideas on false presumptions, but that exact system provides him the rationalization for his position (Warren 1990, 609).

As Warren (1990) puts it, ideology maximizes *something* for the individual, whatever that something is. That is why we use the expanded version of rational choice theory, as it allows us to interpret interests in a wider context. In some situations, the greater interest for someone would be an internal rationalization, and lowering the cognitive dissonance, than achieving some visible external gain. If we define ideology as “false consciousness”, with the functions of keeping and justifying the present social system, in that case, the ideology maximizes utility for those who propagate it. However, the question arises, does ideology always maximize utility for those who are not aware of their false consciousness.

It depends on how we define utility. Rational choice presumes that individuals will act in a way that they *think* will bring the most benefits, even if that behavior doesn't create beneficial outcomes in reality. Since we can't directly observe utility, according to rational choice theory, we presume that any behavior is maximizing utility for its actor, and therefore from that behavior we conclude what is the concrete utility for that actor (Herrnstein 1990, 356). For example, people who consume alcohol, drugs, or cigarettes, objectively act against their interests, since their actions jeopardize their health. However, the *subjective* utility for those actors is probably a feeling of pleasure in the moment of consuming those substances, which is greater than their estimation of potential harm. In the same way, we can try to explain the actions of suicide bombers, who maybe assess that the fame and prestige of being the martyr is greater gain than living as an anonymous soldier (Ricolfi 2006, 113-114).

The purpose of ideology is not only to describe the world, but also to shape it, because one of the main functions of ideology is to motivate individuals and groups to act, and therefore it is directed to a large audience (Gerring 1997, 972). Ideology is oriented on mass political mobilization to create efficient political influence on governmental authority, either to keep the power or to get it (Simeunovic 2009b, 118). Based on these presumptions, the author also finds that terrorist group leaders use ideology as a tool for recruiting and motivating the members, to strengthen the position of that group and their positions

within it. On the other hand, for the lower ranks members, ideology provides navigation in the world by lowering the uncertainties and offering the interpretation of the world (Jost, Amodio 2011, 55).

Besides, psychological theories point out the role of ideology in facing the fear of death by rationalization, and by offering the feeling of comradeship and belonging when sharing the social belief systems (Jost, Amodio 2011, 56). Therefore, the individuals that become members of terrorist groups confirm their identity by identifying with the goals and interests of the groups and their leaders. In that case, the utility those members have from a coherent system of ideas is great, since it makes the very foundation of their personality, and since their identities are confirmed by following that specific ideology.

This utility from the rationalization that ideology provides is that powerful *something* we mentioned, that motivates people to act. We can make a parallel between the psychological theory of rationalization and Marx's definition of ideology as a tool for legitimizing the capitalistic class divisions in society. The main difference between these conceptions is in scope, as psychological theory is based on personal motivations and self-delusions of the individuals, while Marx's historical materialism is based on the influences that social and historical circumstances have on actors' thoughts and actions (Pines 1997, 9). In this social sense, ideology has the function of motivating and bonding members of groups and organizations, like terrorist organizations and organized crime groups.

The author thinks that the set of ideas that makes the ideology of some group always represents the interests of that group. Furthermore, terrorist groups use their ideology as a psychological tool for achieving their goals. This is best seen in the cases when terrorist organizations switch their activities from political to criminal activities. In those cases, the goals of terrorists become so oriented on profit, that their ideological rhetoric serves merely as a tool for mobilization and homogenization. That is how ideology *provokes* the motivation in members of the terrorist group, which makes them act according to the goals of their organization. On the other hand, group members calculate that the gains from glory, martyrdom, and their help in achieving the goals of their organization, is higher than the potential costs of their actions.

Psychological theories presume that ideology offers individuals the rationalization of living conditions and actions, which allows them to connect with the social environment (Minar 1961, 322). By taking these theories into account, we can see that even in this narrow scope, in the interaction between an individual and a group, ideology provides the tools for achieving the interests of the individual. By accepting a certain

ideology for socialization, the individual accepts the set of ideas that makes that ideology. The acceptance of that set of ideas is followed by the internalization of political attitudes, based on which the individual becomes politically active in pursuing the interests of his social or political group. In that case, ideology becomes the foundation of someone's personality, and guarding that ideology becomes crucial for guarding the identity itself, which makes it hard to change ideological basis in a rational way (Warren 1990, 612).

The connection between the ideology and interests is best described by the term *elective affinities*, which was first used by Goethe, and later picked by Weber to refer to the link between ideas (or belief systems) and interests (or needs), or the "selective process" by which "ideas and their publics...find their affinities" (Jost, Federico, Napier 2009, 308.). This concept represents the idea that not only that people choose ideas, but also ideas choose people, and that there are "forces of mutual attraction that exist between the structure and contents of belief systems and the underlying needs and motives of individuals and groups who subscribe to them" (Ibid.). This concept is very useful in understanding how ideology works. Following the idea of elective affinities, we also think that ideology is a sort of connection between ideas and interests, so in that regard, it is indeed *rational*.

DEFINING ORGANIZED CRIME

Organized crime is a phenomenon that fascinates people around the world, but about which there isn't much data, due to its secretive and organized nature. What best indicates the elusive nature of the concept of organized crime is the fact that there is no consensus about its definition. We will, therefore, make an overview of some definitions and elements of organized crime, so we could make the best possible understanding of this concept, and the way it is connected with ideology.

Ignjatovic says that organized crime could be defined as "a type of property crime, which is characterized by the existence of a criminal organization which is doing a continuous economic activity, while thereby using violence and corruption of the people in power" (Ignjatovic, Škulic 2010, 26). Albin (1971, 88), on the other hand, points out three characteristics of organized crime: 1) use of force, intimidation, or threats, 2) group structure to provide illegal services, 3) securing protection from legal structures. Sellin (1963) compares organized crime with entrepreneurship organized with the rational goal of acquisition economic gain through illegal activities. He finds that the

problem in defining the term organized crime is the word “organized”, which he used to describe the cooperation between several individuals in criminal activity with the goal of material gain (Ibid.). Abadinsky (2010, 3) thinks that organized crime has the following features: 1) lack of political goals, 2) hierarchy 3), limited and exclusive membership, 4) unique subculture, 5) self-perpetuating, 6) willingness to use illegal violence, 7) monopolistic, 8) explicit rules and regulations.

Despite the lack of a consensus about a definition, some elements are common for most of them. The analysis of Hagan and Albanese showed that most definitions of organized crime contain four following elements: 1) continuing, organized hierarchy, 2) profit from illegal activities, 3) use of violence and threats, 4) corruption and immunity (Hagan 2006, 128). However, Albanese notices that we can see the emerging definitional consensus, and that definition would be: “Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities; its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials” (Albanese 2000, 411). Organized crime groups can be based solely on the mutual interest of gaining material gain, like in the case of Jamaican narcotic distributors, who are organized mainly around criminal activities, without any loyalty to the group (412). Finckenauer (2005, 66) also points out that it is widely recognized that the organized crime groups are oriented primarily on gaining profit by various illegal methods.

This profit-oriented motivation for organized crime is why we think that members of organized crime groups behave like *rational actors*. Being rational actors, they assess that the profit they get from illegal activities is higher than the potential cost they would have in case they got caught and arrested. The rational choice theory in criminology presumes that criminals make a rational decision before committing a crime, which is based on a cost-benefit analysis that the gain from the illicit activity is higher than the risk of being caught (Clarke, Felson 1993; Cornish, Clarke 2014; Piquero, Tibbets 2001; Akers 1990; Pratt 2008). Even though the criminals can make a decision that is based on wrong cost-benefit calculation, and under the influence of alcohol or drugs, they still make a rational decision based on their calculation, even if that calculation is wrong (Finckenauer 2007, 74-75). These decisions are always made in an organized crime group, like how the crime will be committed and which type of crime will it be (75). The instrumental nature of organized crime and its similarity with the legal enterprise makes the organized crime one of the best examples in favor of the rational choice theory.

Shvarts (2001, 31) points out that rationality presumes behavior that is consistent with someone's stable preferences, and that in organized crime "instrumental" rationality is used, as its goal is material gain. Cornish and Clarke (2014, 2) find that individuals who decide to participate in criminal activities are guided by a thought process that is based on a certain set of information, that is specific for every phase of making a decision. Factors that make the personal history of an individual, like psychological factors, upbringing, social and demographic factors, are not seen as indicators for anticipating someone's participation in crime in rational choice theory. However, these factors influence decision making and assessment of the cost-effectiveness of participating in criminal activity (3-4). In that sense, the rational choice theory is compatible with the behavioral analysis, which observes human behavior and finds that the consequences of that behavior are stimuli for repeated actions (Clarke, Felson 1993, 160). Building on that assumption, the consequence of organized crime group activities is the material gain which, as the feedback, influences repeating criminal activities to achieve more profit in the future.

It appears as organized crime groups, with their profit-oriented motivation, position themselves as opposed to politically motivated groups. Even though most definitions presume that organized crime is not driven by ideological and political goals, this problem is more complicated than it looks at the first sight. That is because the rise of cooperation between terrorist groups and organized crime groups on a global level, but mostly in Latin America and the Balkans, is blurring the line between organized crime and ideologically driven groups (Abadinsky 2010, 5).

That is why some authors don't make a clear distinction in defining terrorism and organized crime. For example, Albin and McIllwain (2012, 81-82) find that organized crime is "a form of criminal activity occurring within a social system composed of a centralized or decentralized social network (or networks) of at least three actors engaged in an ongoing criminal enterprise in which the size, scope, leadership, and structure of the network is generated by the ultimate goal of the enterprise itself", while the goal can be "financial profit and/or the attainment of some form of power to effect social change and/or social mobility via the leveraging and brokering of the network's social, political and economic capital". We can see that they expanded the definition of organized crime, so it includes also the groups which are driven not only by profit but also with political or ideological goals. Finckenauer (2007, 5) also finds that one of the main elements of organized crime is an ideology (or lack of), besides the other ones

like organized hierarchy, continuity, violence, restrictive membership, illegal enterprise, entering the legitimate businesses, and corruption.

However, although the connection between terrorism and organized crime has drastically risen, even to the point of intertwining, it would be contra-productive to mix these two terms, and it would create confusion in their theoretic positioning. Even though terrorism and organized crime share some mutual characteristics, as we will review in the next section, they are still two different phenomena. That is why we think that terrorism and organized crime should be defined as clearly as possible and separated in a conceptual sense, so the confusion would be avoided both in theory and in praxis.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TERRORIST GROUPS AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS

The connection between ideology and organized crime is best observed in the operative cooperation between terrorist groups and organized crime groups. By reviewing the main elements and functions of ideology and organized crime, we tried to make a foundation upon which we can build our explanation of cooperation between terrorism and organized crime in reality. Terrorist groups are motivated by political goals and they are supported by ideology, while organized crime groups are motivated by profit. It is considered that these different motives and goals represent the biggest difference between terrorism and organized crime, which also started the debate about the reasons for their cooperation, and led to redefining these concepts to be able to explain it. However, as we tried to show in this paper, we think that both ideologically driven groups and organized crime groups, behave like rational actors and that they are driven by their interests. On that presumption, acting in a way that maximizes their interests, is what makes the foundation for their cooperation, and therefore, it would be contra-productive to mix two concepts to explain their cooperation. We will now analyze how terrorism and organized crime cooperate in praxis.

Authors like Dishman (2001, 43-58) find that connecting these two concepts is overrated since terrorist groups and organized crime groups stay true to their original causes and they are not interested in cooperation. However, as we tried to show in the previous part of the paper, these different goals are no barrier to their cooperation, as they are driven by the same rational choice logic. Some literature also stresses the difference between methods used by terrorism and organized crime. However, more often we can see that terrorist and organized crime groups use the same methods in pursuing their interests.

At first, we need to define terrorism and make an overview of its basic traits, so we can spot the similarities and differences between terrorism and organized crime. Since there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, we will use the definition that Simeunovic (2009b, 80) lays out, and he says that *terrorism* is: “complex form of an organized group, and rarely individual or institutional political violence, marked not only with terrifying brachial physical and psychological, but also with sophisticated technological methods of a political fight, which usually during a political and economic crisis, and rarely during the economic and political stability in one society, are systematically used to try to achieve “big goals” in a morbid spectacular way, inappropriate to present circumstances, especially to social situation and historic opportunity of those who use it as a political strategy”. Terrorism is always political, which separates it from other forms of crime, even organized crime. Simeunovic (2009b) finds that the main method of terrorism is intimidation of the public and keeping the wide population in fear, by the constant threat of indiscriminate violence.

He also stresses that terrorists are always in conflict with the state since they want to change the social and political structures. The proclaiming of “big goals” is only a justification for the use of violence, which makes the ideological foundation of terrorism (Simeunovic 2009b, 70-74). Besides the justifying function of ideology in terrorism, we can see also the power of its *motivating* function, which is crucial in recruiting members and encouraging them to act in the interest of a terrorist group and its leaders. By analyzing ideology, we saw that it’s not based on altruistic goals, but rather expresses the interests of a social group that propagate it. Since ideology in most cases is in service of rational actors as conceptual support for achieving their interests, and terrorism is based on ideology, we, therefore, assume that terrorists act as *rational actors*, which use ideology as justification for their actions. Terrorists will, therefore, as rational actors, make arrangements that are in their interests and which increase the chances for them to achieve their political, ideological, or religious goals. They will cooperate, or even merge with organize crime groups when the utility they derive from that is higher than the potential conflict that would arise due to their differences.

The use of *violence* is the common element of both terrorism and organized crime, but the nature of that violence is different. The violence used by organized crime groups is mostly in the forms of murders, extortions, use of arson, beatings, and it is directed to the other crime groups which are their competition, or against the victims who owe them money (Finckenauer 2005, 66). Besides violence, organized

crime groups use the corruption of the officials to achieve their goals, which is an especially prominent problem in developing countries or in countries that experiences civil wars (66-67). On the other hand, terrorist violence is not selective and it is directed at the civil population to induce fear and shock.

However, this distinction is not very clear, which is indicated by the complex cooperation between these two groups. As some authors notice (Shelley, Picarelli 2005; Makarenko, 2004), it is a common occurrence that terrorism and organized crime use the same methods. For example, they share the same methods of collecting money – they use an informal money transfer system, which is used in the Middle East, known as the “hawala” system, they also use multiple bank accounts, and they use money laundering through legal businesses. Both types of organizations also forge documents that help them in illegal arms and goods trafficking, and they use cryptic emails and cellphones to protect their communication (Abadinsky 2010, 8). They even use the same methods of violence like kidnappings, murders, or racketeering in the form of revolutionary or protection taxes.

The relationship between these groups is often based on the exchange of knowledge (like passport forging or bomb-making) or the exchange of goods (arms or drugs). An example of knowledge exchange would be forging the documents by Al-Qaeda which helped them to perform a terrorist act against the USA on September 11, 2001. This is the best example of how terrorist groups adopt the skills originally used by organized crime groups (Sari 2015, 477). The example for the exchange of goods, on the other hand, would be the exchange of drugs for arms between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Colombian narco cartels. A similar example is an exchange between Italian organized crime group Camorra and Spanish terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) when Camorra sent heavy arms to terrorists in exchange for a large amount of cocaine and hashish (Ibid.).

The data also indicates the cooperation between terrorist groups ETA and Irish Republican Army (IRA) and criminal groups from Croatia in arms trafficking after the breakup of Yugoslavia (Sari 2015, 477-478). The utility of cooperation between terrorism and organized crime can be seen also in the case of the terrorist attack on Madrid in 2004, which was estimated to have cost the terrorist group around 8.000 euros, while the cost of the attack with logistical and operative support would have cost between 40.000-50.000 euros, without the help in arms and routes which was provided by the criminal groups (Makarenko 2012, 21). This shows the operative and material gain which terrorists have by cooperating with criminal groups.

One of the strongest forms of cooperation between terrorism and organized crime is seen in *illegal drug trafficking*. It is observed that a great number of terrorist groups either cooperate with narco cartels or are involved in illegal drug trafficking themselves, especially from the end of the 20th century. In Latin America, there are examples of designated terrorist groups FARC in Colombia, and Shining Path in Peru, which are involved in drug trafficking. Also in Asia, there are examples of influential terrorist group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has connections with narco groups from Afghanistan, and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is directly involved in the narcotics trade.

The important factor that brings closer terrorism and organized crime is *globalization*, a significant characteristic of modern society. Globalization led to border opening, fast and frequent transport, and easy communication via the internet, which all speeds up and strengthens the bond between terrorism and crime. Besides that, factors like economic underdevelopment of societies, great social inequality, poverty as a consequence of wars, weak state institutions, and violation of the rule of law, also have a great impact on their cooperation. Societies with those traits are more likely to become the fertile ground for the rise of terrorism and organized crime, and their cooperation.

One more similarity between these groups is their *organization*. Terrorist groups have a similar organizational structure as organized crime groups, which are made of networks of connected nodes with minimal dependence on group leadership. The purpose of this type of organization is to minimize the possibility of detection from the police and to decrease the risk of capturing the leaders of the group, in the case of the arrest of some group members. One more positive trait of this kind of organizing is the flexibility of the group, which allows it to act quickly and easily, to use financial funds, and to make quick decisions without being in constant contact with the base of the group. This flexible organization is in opposition to the rigid and hierarchical structures of law enforcement and security services (Sanderson 2004, 54).

Since terrorism and organized crime have so many similarities, it should be no surprise that they decide to cooperate. For that reason, Schmid (2005, 6-7) thinks that the reasons why terrorist groups cooperate with organized crime groups are following: 1) access to greater financial resources for terrorist attacks, 2) independence from state sponsorship, 3) the possibility of building an economic base, compensating for lack of public support, 4) access to specialist skills (e.g. forging of travel documents), 5) facilitation of cross-border movements (use of smuggling routes), 6) substitute activity during armistices or at

end of hostilities, 7) coming into contact with a wider range of potential recruits, who are already outlaws, 8) access to expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of money for foreign operations.

From an organized crime standpoint, the benefits of cooperation are following: 1) drug traffickers benefit from terrorists' military skills and obtain protection for illicit drug cultivation or trafficking in areas under guerrilla/terrorist control, 2) terrorist destabilization of political and economic structures may create favorable environments for organized crime activities, 3) law enforcement preoccupation with countering terrorism may divert attention from organized crime activities, 4) political-terrorist label provides an extra degree of 'intimidation' (Schmid 2005, 7).

Besides many similarities, there are also some differences that we should take into account. One of them is that terrorists want to gain attention from a wide audience by using spectacular forms of violence in public places, while the organized crime groups want to be out of the media spotlight to operate clandestinely and efficiently. Organized crime also uses the corruption of the state officials to gain immunity from criminal prosecution, while terrorists are mostly positioned against the state and the government (except in the cases of state terrorism) and are oriented to produce profound social and political change.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we tried to deconstruct the concepts of ideology and organized crime to see which are the preconditions for cooperation between terrorism and organized crime. Most of the papers about the connection between these two phenomena find paradoxical the fact that these groups can cooperate, because of their different goals and motives. However, by defining ideology, which makes the foundation of terrorism and which separates it from organized crime, we have tried to show that justifying and motivating functions of ideology make this cooperation possible.

Since ideology offers terrorist groups the rationalization of their actions, it will therefore adjust to the change in their interests and align with them. Sometimes the interests of the terrorist groups completely change from ideological to material, and in such a way that those groups become more like criminal groups than terrorist groups. Because of this orientation of terrorist groups to their interests, we find that they behave like rational actors. Organized crime groups are also seen in this paper as rational actors, which is more obvious than in the case of terrorists since organized criminals are openly oriented to their material gain. For

that purpose, they will make cooperative arrangements with terrorists to achieve profit.

In the reality, many similarities between these groups make their cooperation possible. Both terrorism and organized crime operate illegally and clandestinely, and therefore they share the same transport routes for illegal smuggling. Both groups use violence to achieve their goals, even though the nature of the violence is different. While the violence used by terrorists most often targets innocent civilians and infrastructural objects, the organized crime violence is used against their competition and the people that owe them money. The cooperation between these groups often resides on the exchange of knowledge, like the forging of documents and bomb-making, or the exchange of goods, like arms or drugs.

An example of the exchange of knowledge is when the Al-Qaeda members used forged documents to enter the country during the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11, 2001, which illustrates the incorporation of organized crime methods by the terrorist groups. On the other hand, an example of the exchange of goods is the cooperation between FARC and Colombian narco cartels, which was based on the exchange of arms for drugs. Since the 1990s, we can see the rise in the number of terrorist groups that cooperate with narco groups or participate in illegal drug trafficking, like the FARC in Colombia and Shining Path in Peru. In Asia, there is also terrorist group IMU, which cooperates with narco groups from Afghanistan, and PKK which organizes the illicit drug trade.

One more similarity between these groups is their organization. Terrorist groups are now organized much like organized crime groups, in a flexible network made of a large number of nodes, and with minimal connection with the group leaders. This type of organization decreases the risk of detection from the police and of the arrest of the group leaders. The advantage of this kind of flexibility is the speed of making decisions, as the parts of the networks are not dependent on the hierarchical top of the group.

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Косара Стевановић
Факултет политичких наука, Београд

СПОНА ИЗМЕЂУ ИДЕОЛОГИЈЕ И ОРГАНИЗОВАНОГ КРИМИНАЛИТЕТА

Резиме

Спона између тероризма и организованог криминалитета је једна од највећих претњи глобалној безбедности од краја 20. века, што је највидљивије у сарадњи између терористичких група и група које се баве илегалном трговином дрогом. Главни теоријски проблем у истраживању овог споја је објаснити разлику у различитим мотивацијама терористичких група и организованих криминалних група. Наиме, мотивација за тероризам је увек идеолошке природе и он је оријентисан на изазивање дубинских политичких и друштвених промена. С друге стране, мотивација за организовани криминалитет је материјална добит која се остварује помоћу илегалне активности. Питање које извире из ове концептуалне разлике је – како ове групе, које се толико разликују у оријентацијама и циљевима, успеју да успоставе успешну сарадњу? У овом раду, аутор ће пробати да понуди одговор на то питање из позиције теорије рационалног избора. Из перспективе рационалног избора, актери се понашају на такав начин, који ће им донети највише користи, уз што мањи трошак. С обзиром на то, аутор сматра да и припадници терористичких и организованих криминалних група доносе своје одлуке на основу анализе добити и трошка. Да бисмо тестирали ову хипотезу, у раду смо најпре усмерени на деконструкцију концепта идеологије и осветљавање њених главних функција у рационализацији и мотивисању актера на делање. Идеологија је контроверзан термин, чије значење варира од скупа уверења у генералном смислу, до лажне свести чији је циљ да одржава интересе владајуће друштвене класе. Наш циљ овде је да осветлимо ове функције идеологије и да покажемо да је идеологија увек била, и остала, алат за остваривање интереса неке друштвене групе, било владајуће или неке мањинске политичке групе. С друге стране, сматра се да је организовани криминалитет илегална активност вођена од стране рационалних актера ради остваривања материјалне добити помоћу илегалних метода као што су насиље, претње насиљем и корупција. Након анализе

концепата идеологије и организованог криминалитета, рад осветљава природу и типове веза између терористичких и организованих криминалних група у пракси. Аутор сматра да оба типа ових група, посматрани као рационални актери, имају много разлога и интереса за сарадњу, као што су размена знања и добара, али и истих транспортних рута.

Кључне речи: идеологија, организовани криминалитет, тероризам, теорија рационалног избора, интереси, сарадња

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