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## **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF THE 1999 KOSOVO WAR\*\***

### **Abstract**

*The paper examines the changing relations between the U.S. and Russia since the end of the twentieth century, shaped by the experience of NATO's war with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. The first decade after the termination of the Cold War brought about the American 'unipolar moment', and with it the attempt of Russian political elites to approach the unipole and find a sustainable modus vivendi with it: the relationship between Yeltsin and Clinton administrations is a vivid example of such endeavors. At the same time, policies such as NATO expansion induced suspicion on the Russian side with regard to the possibilities of achieving an understanding and allowing Russia to become a legitimate part of European security architecture. When, in March of 1999, NATO began with the attacks against FRY (a country perceived as traditionally friendly towards Russia) without the consent of the United Nations Security Council, a long shadow was cast over the prospects of a Russian – American rapprochement. All subsequent episodes of cooperation and competition between Russia and the U.S. have been observed through the lens shaped by the Kosovo war. Drawing from contemporary Russian and western academic literature and memoir materials (Primakov, Guskova, Narochnitska, Baranovsky, Tsygankov, Sushenkov;*

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\*\* The article was developed within scientific research activities of the Institute for Political Studies, funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

*Wohlforth, Walt, Clarke, Hill, Galen Carpenter et al.) and building upon the traditional realist concepts of great power competition and balancing, the author assesses the development of U.S.-Russian security relations in the context the Kosovo war experience. It is argued that, in addition to being an attack against a country perceived as a traditional Russian friend or protégé, NATO bombing of FRY in 1999 posed a major concern to Russia because it was a signal that the alliance was ready to change its strategic posture and engage in out-of-area operations.*

**Keywords:** *United States of America, Russia, NATO, Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo War*

## INTRODUCTION: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Changes in the structure of the international system, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, provided a new context for reestablishing often fragile and turbulent relations between the United States and Russia. Political future of Russian Federation was yet to be determined over a decade of international wondering and domestic instability, and for the time being, the U.S. was *de facto* the only remaining superpower. These new circumstances were assessed by contemporary thinkers in more or less optimistic (Fukuyama 1989; Krauthammer 1990/1991) or pessimistic (Mearsheimer 1990; Huntington 1993) tones. Despite all the tumult caused by the shifts within the global system, at least during the first half of the 1990s, it seemed to many that it would be possible for the former rivals to reach a new understanding, build mutual confidence and kick off a new era of global relations.

In addition to turmoil in Russian domestic economic and political affairs, there were, of course, international issues to be resolved before the new era could actually commence. They pertained to the question such as German unification, arms control, NATO enlargement, and the Yugoslav crisis. On most of these issues, despite occasional frictions due to conflicting perspectives, Russia has proved to be relatively cooperative, which induced

some authors to treat the episode – especially with regard to the unification of Germany – as an instance of great power cooperation, thus significantly challenging the conventional wisdom about great power politics, while others were more skeptical and did not buy into the narrative (Shiffrinson 2016, 10). Initially, manifold formal and informal consultations have taken place, with the U.S. and its western partners reassuring Russia about the consolidation of Western institutions, soliciting, in return, Russian support for the German issue and for main Western-sponsored UN Security Council resolutions regarding the Yugoslav crisis (Guskova 1996, 51–349; Trapara 2017, 103–108). During roughly the same period, important arms control treaties, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990/1992) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, 1991/1994) were being negotiated, signed or enacted. The end of Cold War encompassed the disbanding of the Warsaw pact, and new fora and frameworks for security cooperation between East and West, such as Partnership for Peace (PfP, 1994) and NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) were established (Zagorski 209, 463–464, 474–475). During that period, direct relations between the U.S. President William J. Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin were exquisite (Talbot 2019), to the extent that they were sometimes referred to as ‘the Bill and Boris show’ in big media, such as the New York Times. It seemed that the optimists got it right and that the era of great power conflict and competition was bygone. However, subsequent developments regarding NATO enlargement, as well as NATO engagement in the Balkans, have vindicated the pessimists’ position to a large extent (Filimonović 2010, 36–37).

As the issue of NATO enlargement began to figure more prominently in the 1990s, the first hints of possible deterioration in relations emerged. This remains one of the crucial junctures in the analysis of post-Cold War relations between the U.S. and Russia, and while extensive literature has been produced on the topic, there is no consensus among scholars about many important aspects of the story: whether U.S. guarantees about the absence of the Atlantic alliance’s intentions to expand eastward were provided to the Russian side; whether it was prudent to break them even if they had been provided; and whether the enlargement policy contributed (and if so, to what extent) to Russian assertiveness in the

global arena since 2008. Once again, one set of scholars argues that, despite lack of a formal written agreement, the non-enlargement guarantees were indeed provided, and that the Western failure to fulfill such an obligations played an important role in subsequent Russian turn towards more aggressive policies (McCwire 1998; Mearsheimer 2014; Cohen 2016; Shiffrin 2016, 2017, 2020). Another group of scholars hold that the non-expansion deal is a myth, that it was in any case non-binding, and that Russian newfound assertiveness was predetermined regardless of NATO (non) expansion, and that it might have been, in fact, prudent to widen the territorial scope of U.S. security umbrella as much as possible (Kramer 2009; Sarotte 2014, 2019; Lanoszka 2020). Upon inspecting publicly disclosed archival documents from the first years of the post-Cold War era, one thing is abundantly clear: verbal non-expansion guarantees were indeed provided, most notably in return for Russian cooperativeness with regard to the issue of German unification (Savranskaya and Blanton 2017). The policy implications of subsequent change of course are still under scrutiny, but the claim that eventual eastward expansion (when, in the fourth and the fifth enlargement rounds in 1999 and 2004, ten former Eastern Bloc countries had become NATO members) contributed to Russian strategic and foreign policy shift during the first decade of the XXI century, seems highly plausible.

With Russia increasing its efforts to regain great power status since the beginning of the XXI century, it became clear that, in search for explanations of the transformation that ensued, one needs to look beyond the complexities of Russian society and economy or its regime type, and inspect a variety of external incentives which contributed to the transformation. Most of those can be traced to the period between 1998 and 2008 (with some important episodes, such as the 2011 Libya intervention exceeding the said timeframe). It is now clear that the Kosovo War of 1999 was one of the critical events which threw a particularly long shadow over the U.S.-Russian relations at the turn of the millennium.

## **THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND EMERGING DETERIORATION OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

The issue of Serbian province of Kosovo, with Albanian population comprising an overwhelming majority of population (functioning to a large extent outside the institutional framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), was seen by many as the unfinished final chapter of the ex/Yugoslav crisis after the Bosnian peace agreement had been reached in Dayton, Ohio, at the end of 1995. Frustrated by the fact that Kosovo Albanian grievances have not been addressed by the international community dealing with Belgrade almost exclusively with regard to Bosnia, certain fractions in Kosovo, eventually to be widely known as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) instigated an armed rebellion against Serbian rule in the province. Since the late 1997, attacks against Serbian police, other institutions, and, increasingly, civilian population (including Albanian civilians considered too loyal to Serbia) escalate significantly. This causes heavy responses by Serbian structures, including use of force which is often considered excessive by Western intelligence and political circles. Information emerges about civilian casualties on both sides.

By the spring of 1998, the province is deeply militarized and the international community, including the United Nations Security Council with full Russian participation (see UNSC Resolution 1199 from September 23 1998), is looking at the ways to resolve the crisis and curb the violence, signaling the possibility of the use of force should peaceful means of conflict resolution fall short. To say that Russia went along with Western approach to the Kosovo crisis, however, is not to claim that it did not have its own perspective on the issue. In August 1998, Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, uttered the Russian position in a conversation with German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel's envoy, Wolfgang Ischinger. It was framed in the form of "Four Nos": no to NATO armed operations against Belgrade, no to Kosovo's secession from Yugoslavia, no to escalation of the sanctions regime against Yugoslavia, and to status quo in Kosovo which does not provide sufficient autonomy to the province (Primakov 2002, 350; Guskova 2003, 327). In the autumn of 1998, on the verge of armed actions by U.S.-led NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the so called Milošević-Hol-

brooke agreement was reached, calling for the removal of excessive FRY military and police forces, installment of OSCE Verification Mission and creation of NATO air verification regime. New UNSC Resolution (No. 1203) was adopted on October 24 as a basis for the implementation of the agreement. Since the use of force against Yugoslavia was not explicitly ruled out as an option, Russia and China abstained.

The settlement is fragile and the violence resumes, after FRY forces respond heavily to ongoing actions by the KLA. Peace process is initiated in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999, with the mediation of Contact Group representatives from the U.S. (Christopher Hill), Russia (Boris Majorski) and the European Union (Wolfgang Petrich). The draft agreement is designed in such a way which makes it virtually impossible for the Yugoslav side to sign and by February 18 the talks are adjourned. After final and unsuccessful attempt of Richard Holbrooke to persuade Milošević to accept the Rambouillet Agreement, NATO airstrikes, in preparation since at least early October 1998, become imminent (Simić 2010, 142–152). With NATO accession of Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland impending (Mearsheimer 2018, 177; Sayle 2019, 237–238), the prospect of the Alliance's large scale out-of-area action rings quite a loud alarm bell in Russia. The shift in Russian strategic posture becomes indubitable, and the only questions that remain are how and when this transformations would play out.

Initial indicators, however symbolic, came right away: on March 24, 1999, Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, was on his way to Washington to take part in the work of so called Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on U.S.-Russian relations. Upon hearing about the beginning of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia, he instructed the pilot to change the route and return to Russia (Primakov 2002, 352–353; Medvedev 2009, 272). While obviously not prepared to abruptly sever important political ties with the U.S., Russia was adamant in its willingness to signal its own positions and influence. Despite all their differences with regard to relations with the West and otherwise, Primakov's decision had the support of Boris Yeltsin, who called the attacks “a blow to the entire international community” (Guskova 2003, 476). Russia was now resolute in its aspirations to be a part of political settlement, whenever it ensues. This involved bolstering diplomatic activities

during the conflict, as well as finding ways to remain a part of the security arrangements upon its termination (Posen 2000, 66–67).

NATO SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, expected a vigorous Russian opposition to the imminent bombing of Yugoslavia, of the kind that might eventuate towards open confrontation (Halberstam 2003, 565–566). Still, from the very beginning of the crisis, although officially severing most formal ties with the Atlantic alliance, Russia was – despite all the drifting still characteristic of its foreign policy (Guskova 2003, 383) – very active in diverse diplomatic activities (Lynch 1999), including shuttle diplomacy, with Prime Minister Primakov, Defence Minister Sergeyev and Foreign Minister Ivanov visiting Belgrade already on March 30. On April 14, Boris Yeltsin appoints former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to the position of peace envoy for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He and other Russian officials keep regular contact with the U.S. side (most notably Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott), OSCE and UN representatives, and, especially after the NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7, increasingly with the Chinese side. The latter made Galen Carpenter (2000, 86) observe that “a policy that alienated either Russia or China would have been bad enough, but NATO’s Balkan war succeeded in alienating both countries simultaneously. That intervention helped to intensify what had already been a worrisome development: the growing, tangible political and military links between Russia and the PRC”. In the midst of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia, Russian domestic political turmoil took another toll: the position of Prime Minister Primakov himself, who was brusquely removed from office by Boris Yeltsin on May 12 (Medvedev 2009, 278). Although dominantly the result of competition within the circles of Russian political elite and apparently not a direct result of foreign policy considerations, this move caused concern in some parts of foreign policy community, as well as many external actors - including Yugoslavia – who looked up to Primakov as a counterweight to Yeltsin’s overly enthusiastic towards the West (Milošević 2006, 193).

As the bombing was coming to an end, it became clear that it would be much easier for Belgrade to accept peace terms if the Russian side is involved in mediation; thus, Chernomyrdin was assigned a task of taking the proposal to Slobodan Milošević,

alongside the EU envoy, Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari (Posen 2000, 76–77). The mission reportedly made it clear to Yugoslav leadership that the proposal is virtually an ultimatum: i.e. in the case of Yugoslav refusal, Russia would probably fail to stop the adoption of a Security Council resolution sanctioning ground invasion (Yesson 1999, 24; Brudenell 2008, 33–34; Power 2003, 459). At the beginning of June (June 1 and June 3, respectively), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia announces that it has accepted both the G8 principles for peace, and the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin proposal. Still, controversies about the modality and extent of Yugoslav troop withdrawal remain, and the bombing ensues for almost a week more, before Military-technical Agreement is signed in North Macedonian town of Kumanovo on June 9. NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana suspends the airstrikes the next day, and the Security Council adopts Resolution 1244, announcing the end of hostilities and specifying the post-war security arrangements, while underlining the territorial integrity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It sanctioned international military presence in the province, a concept which included the participation of Russian armed forces in addition to those from NATO member states. Thus began a new phase of bargaining and mutual outmaneuvering between Russia and NATO.

This immediately opened the question of the scope and form of Russian military presence in post-war Kosovo. The Priština airport incident of June 12, when Russian troops arrived to the premises from Bosnia ahead of NATO troops, seizing control of the airport and causing a tense standoff (Latawski and Smith 2003, 104; Brudenell 2008, 30–33), certainly did not help. The incident came to the verge of proper armed conflict and was arguably avoided by British KFOR commander General Michael Jackson's refusal to follow SACEUR, General Wesley Clark's bellicose instructions (Klark 2003, 411–438). Although the Russian troops' maneuver was presented as a surprise to Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, it's reasonable to assume that it was considered a way of raising the stakes before the final agreement of Russian participation in multinational forces in Kosovo, to be headed by NATO. What Russia wanted was to be awarded its own sector; while its hesitant Western partners feared that this would lead to a *de facto* partition of Kosovo. Agreement was ultimately reached on June

18: Russia would participate with the force of up to five battalions, or something over 3600 troops in total, throughout the U.S., French and German sectors, according to a particular command and control model which would in practice circumvent NATO structures and make it (at least politically) directly responsible to the United Nations Security Council, through Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council, as outlined in Attachment #2 of Agreed Points on Russian Participation in KFOR. There was also a parallel command line leading to the Russian military delegation in Mons, Belgium (Gobarev 1999, 7). There were circles in both Russia and Yugoslavia which considered such an outcome “a defeat or Russian policy” (Milošević 2006, 204–205; Levitin 2000). The gravest commotion was left behind, but the coming years would prove to be far from placid. In July of 2003, some two weeks after withdrawing its troops from multinational forces in Bosnia, Russia pulled its military contingent from Kosovo, leaving the province under complete strategic control of NATO.

### **RUSSIAN POST-1999 STRATEGIC SHIFT**

Although it is reasonable to say that the Kosovo war ultimately did not change the overall paradigmatic understanding of armed conflicts (Lieven 2001, 98), there is no doubt that the experience induced significant change in Russian strategic posture, or at least contributed to it. Few authors disagree with such an assertion (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 197–198). As Russian military correspondent Alexander Zhylin has testified, “Generals have told me that we must build a monument to Clinton because the campaign over Kosovo drastically changed political attitudes here. Now there is no more opposition to the idea that Russia should restore its military potential” (Blank 2000, 1). Reinvigorated anti-NATO resentment Russian military elite kept persisting far beyond the Kosovo conflict and into the twenty-first century (Milošević 2006, 2019). The main issues related to this are what is the strategic shift comprised of, and how far reaching it is. Initial assessments of the issue emerged, both in Russia and the West, immediately after the conflict, in 1999 and 2000.

In the words of Andrei P. Tsygankov (2013, 110), “the clash over Kosovo manifested the depth of the Russian fears” because “it

was the expansion of NATO, rather than the ethnic war in the Balkans, that shaped Russia's perception of the intervention in Yugoslavia". Public opinion and large parts of the political elite were always skeptical about the possibility of transcending decades-long rivalry with the U.S. and NATO. The rise to power of Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin's successor and a man much more apprehensive to policies of conforming to Western interests, coincided to a large extent with the closing stages of the Kosovo conundrum. Open confrontation with the West had been avoided, but the change of general attitude was imminent. While keeping all necessary channels of cooperation and communication with NATO open – not least due to the fact that they were now partners in Kosovo – Russian strategic posture was inevitably being rethought.

Gobarev (1999, 10–11) states that “the war in Yugoslavia dealt a decisive blow against the Russian perceptions of NATO as the least likely adversary. At the very moment NATO bombs and cruise missiles rained down on Yugoslavia, the Russians altered their priority list of perceived threats to their national security drastically and literally overnight. Since then, Russia has prominently featured NATO as the primary and by far the most serious threat to not only Russian national interests but also to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent and sovereign state”. That is to say, if Russian behavior had not yet changed much, its perspective definitively did.

Rethinking military doctrine and increasing defense-related expenditures were the logical steps to make (Walt 2018, 32–33). As Baranovsky (2000, 123) observes, “in light of the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, Russia announced its intention to reconsider a number of key elements of its policy concerning military aspects of security. Several ambitious ideas have been developed in this context: increasing military expenses; focusing upon modern military technologies (including those that might be used in outer space); highlighting the role of nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to NATO conventional preponderance; changing the approach to the deployment of nuclear weapons (with suggestions of deploying them in Belarus, the Kaliningrad ‘special zone1’ and in the Navy); reconsidering unilateral pledges with respect to tactical nuclear weapons as well as other arms control agreements; proceeding from an assumption that Russia faces major military threats from

the Western strategic direction; promoting a CIS-based military alliance; and so on". Some of the policies were genuinely new; others had been announced for months and year, but obviously had to wait for a specific incentive – the like of which has just been provided by NATO. "After the war in Yugoslavia", stipulates Tsygankov, "many now viewed Kosovo as a template of NATO's future strategy" (2013, 211).

Kanet (2020, 5) notices that "Russia's security concerns during the early 1990s focused on internal threats resulting from economic decline, instability and societal problems (Military Doctrine 1993; National Security Concept 1997). External challenges to Russian security were to be addressed in collaboration with the West". It is without question that things have changed fundamentally. Nobody had to wait particularly long before Russian political and military elites took up the job of reframing national strategies; significant developments transpired while the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was still ongoing. Baranovsky (2000, 123) notices that "it was in the middle of NATO operations against Yugoslavia that President Yeltsin decided to introduce changes into the National Security Concept (which had been adopted less than 18 months earlier). A draft of the new Military Doctrine was published some months later. Both initiatives were politically inspired by the desire to develop an adequate 'conceptual' response to the Kosovo case; and both documents clearly reflected Russia's re-emerging concerns about 'increasing external military threats', as well as its readiness to react to them with all available means (including nuclear weapons)".

According to Oksana Antonenko (1999, 124–125), "from the Russian perspective, the Kosovo crisis Yielded three important lessons. First, even if nuclear deterrence continues to make a Russia-NATO war unlikely, the prospect that Russia and NATO will find themselves of opposite sides in other regional conflicts cannot be ruled out, bringing with it worrying possibilities of escalation. [...] A second lesson is that much-touted institutions for confidence building and cooperation between Russia and NATO – including the Permanent Joint Council – failed when tested by their first real crisis. [...] The third lesson is that, despite Russia's present weakness and its rupture in relations with NATO, it still retains some influence over European security".

Not all hopes for future cooperation have been abandoned. The new millennium was approaching, and although many of the issues persisted, personal changes in leaderships of major actors, such as the U.S., Russia, or NATO, were obvious. By the end of 2000, many key actors of the Kosovo conflict (including NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, U.S. President William Clinton along with members of his administration, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, or Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević) would all become parts of political history. “Russia would have to learn (again) to live with NATO on the European stage” (Latawski and Smith 2003, 106) and at the meeting in February 2000, the new NATO Secretary General and Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed willingness to intensify the dialogue (Kurth 2001, 90). Soon afterwards, “in a widely noted television interview with David Frost in March 2000, Putin had said that ‘we believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner’” (Weber and Sperling 2012, 133).

For better or for worse, to Russia, the recognition of its great power status was one of the key principles of communication (Naročnicka 2008, 482; Tsygankov 2012). According to Sushentsov and Wohlforth (2020, 14) “Russia’s dissatisfaction with the status quo concerning Europe was linked to its the longstanding preference for what it called ‘multipolarity’—a world order reflecting its core preference for great-power parity in setting the global agenda”. In other words, security cooperation, especially with rivals, was for Russia a means to achieve acknowledgement and position itself as a member of the club; not the other way around. The “War on Terror” and the Afghanistan conflict which ensued after the 9/11 attacks, provided a golden opportunity of this type of cooperation, and Russia seized it. As subsequent episodes with the Iraq invasion, European Interceptor Site (EIS) plans about the installment of a missile shield in Poland, U.S. support to unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo or the call for NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 have shown, Russian willingness to cooperate on security issues since 1999 might have been misinterpreted by the U.S (Tsygankov 2009, 1–20; Primakov 2010, 101–127; Galen Carpenter 2017; Gunitsky and Tsygankov 2018, 4–5; Schake 2018, 38–39; Smith 2019, 32).

## CONCLUSION

“If any collective consciousness characterises contemporary Russia after the Cold War, it is the feeling of being left out. NATO expanded, leaving Russia out. The EU will soon expand as well, also leaving Russia out. NATO ignored the UN Security Council during the Kosovo crisis, once again leaving Russia out. The US negotiated Moscow’s participation in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, but the Kosovo crisis has shown that this body offers Russia little input on high stakes issues. This is not a short-term diplomatic problem but a longer-term institutional problem” (Yesson 1999, 25). The way for Russia to overcome the frustration of being left out (Hill 2018, 142–143) was to make itself an indispensable part of many key security arrangements in crucial regions. The way for the West not to alienate Russia in a way that would make it anxious not only about its status (Walt 2005, 15–16), but also about its very security, was to try and integrate it as firmly as possible into wider European security architecture, while taking into account its legitimate grievances. Increased Russian trepidation about its position since the Kosovo conflict made such an undertaking significantly more complex, but the reset of relations, attempted by both Bush Jr. and Obama administrations, never seemed too carefully crafted to begin with. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent comprehensive sanctions regime against Russia (Lišanin 2018; Mueller 2018, 204–205) made the prospects of a sustainable U.S.-Russian rapprochement rather low – but not entirely unachievable – in the short to middle term.

Antonenko’s (1999, 141) analysis today seems as ominously prophetic as it is insightful: “In the first years of the twenty-first century, EU enlargement may take precedence over the second wave of NATO enlargement. The formal adoption of the OSCE European Security Charter, by reaffirming the principles of the Helsinki Act, could go some way to defuse Moscow’s fears about unrestrained violations of state sovereignty. Finally, agreement on CFE adaptation could help ease Russian anxieties about the military consequences of the first wave of NATO enlargement. The West should actively explore all of these mechanisms. Otherwise, Russia’s sense of eroding security and international isolation will drive its military and foreign policies for many years to come”. Today we know which of these scenarios has actually played out.

More than two decades since NATO attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite the fact that, auspiciously, the security situation does not resemble that of 1999, political future of the Kosovo issue is far from clear; so are the prospects of a true U.S.-Russian understanding. And, to make things even more uncertain, in addition to Russia, yet another – possibly more assertive – power, perceived by the West as revisionist, is emerging as one of the key players in the region and beyond (Legvold 2018). Both the U.S. and Russia will undoubtedly have to include China in their strategic calculations, should a path towards a truly sustainable great power relations be sought out.

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## **АМЕРИЧКО-РУСКИ ОДНОСИ У СЕНЦИ КОСОВСКОГ СУКОБА 1999. ГОДИНЕ**

### **Резиме**

У чланку се истражују промене у односима између Сједињених Америчких Држава и Русије, обликованим искуством сукоба НАТО савеза и Савезне Републике Југославије поводом Косова и Метохије. Прва деценија након окончања Хладног рата донела је амерички „униполарни моменат“, а са њим и покушаје руских елита да се приближе једином преосталом центру поларности и са њим пронађу одржив *modus vivendi*: односи између администрација Јељцина и Клинтона представљају живописан пример таквих напора. Истовремено, политике попут проширења НАТО-а изазивале су код руске стране сумњу у погледу могућности постизања разумевања и омогућавања Русији да постане легитимни део европске безбедносне архитектуре. Када је, у марту 1999. године, НАТО отпочео са нападима против Савезне Републике Југославије (перципиране као државе у традиционално пријатељским односима са Русијом) без сагласности Савета безбедности Уједињених нација, ма могућност руско-америчког рапрошмана бачена је дуга сенка. Све потоње епизоде сарадње и надметања између Русије и Сједињених Америчких Држава биле су посматране кроз оптику обликовану косовским сукобом. Ослањајући се на савремену руску и западну академску литературу и мемоарску грађу (Примаков, Гускова, Нарочницка, Барановски, Циганков, Сушенков; Волфорт, Волт, Кларк, Хил, Гејлен Карпентер и други), и крећући се у оквирима реалистичких концепата надметања великих сила и међународног уравнотежавања, аутор истражује развој америчко-руских безбедносних односа у контексту искуства косовског сукоба. Његова је тврдња да је, уз чињеницу да је представљало напад на

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*државу перциптирану као руски пријатељ или иштићеник, НАТО бомбардовање Савезне Републике Југославије 1999. године изазвало дубоку забринутост Русије као сигнал да је алијанса спремна на промену свог стратешког држања и на ангажман у операцијама изван сопствене територије.*

**Кључне речи:** *Сједињене Америчке Државе, Русија, НАТО, Србија, Савезна Република Југославија, рат на Косову*

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\* Овај рад је примљен 12. априла 2020. године, а прихваћен за штампу на телефонском састанку Редакције, 13. априла 2020. године.