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Mladen Bajagic

Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade

Maja Ruzic

Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade

THE PLACE OF RUSSIA IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES: ‘THE WEST’ AS A FACTOR THAT INFLUENCES THE FORMULATION AND CONDUCT OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Summary

Drawing on the recent actions taken by the Russian Federation in regards with the developments in Ukraine, this paper aims to provide some insight into what has become the troubling question since the beginning of XXI century: *Is Russia a Reemerging Power?* The question is to be addressed through the analysis of influences that the European structures of security governance, meaning NATO and EU had on formulation and conduct of Russian foreign policy. The paper focuses on the effects that conceptualization of European security community as *the club of pro-Western, post-Westphalia, modern states* had on its foreign policy behavior. Considering that from the Euro-Atlantic point of view Russia was not perceived as a responsible security actor, the community adopted specific approach meaning cooperating with Russia on collective goals such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and arms control, but leaving it behind the integration processes. This approach, on the other hand, informed and co-constituted Russia's place in the emerging World Order.

Key words: European Union, Russia, NATO, European Security Architecture

With the Ukrainian crisis still making it to the top of international security agenda, the topic of the new Cold War in Europe seems to be keeping everybody preoccupied. The Russian annexation of Crimea and its role in further destabilization of Ukraine caught the western leaders by surprise. The level of inexperience and unreadiness on the part of the West can be seen through its simplification of the crisis by associating it with the mistakes of Munich. The dominant story is that Russia is on its way to reestablish itself as a great power by conquering Ukraine and other neighboring countries that have Russian minority. Consequently, the ruling that proscribed the full responsibility for the current situation in Europe to Russia was accepted with no objections. However the conduct of Russia in the Ukrainian crises represents just one side of the story. In order to completely understand the crises one has to take into the account the role of the expanding European security community in the Russian foreign policy conduct. The good reference to this point is the statement made by Russian president Vladimir Putin who stated: "if Ukraine was accepted to NATO, it would cease to exist"¹⁾. Ukraine did not become NATO member state but it has had certainly made some steps in order to integrate with the West. The ouster of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and the establishment of pro-Western government, followed by the fear that Crimea was to become a NATO naval base, and even more that the civil uprising from Ukraine will spread to Russia led the Russian political establishment to make a geostrategic move by occupying Crimea and making it a part of Russia. Furthermore, Russian involvement in Ukraine continued through the ongoing conflict in Southeast Ukraine.

Following the end of the Cold War the European security structures - the EU and NATO in the first place – have become instrumental in the project of constructing the new European security architecture. The aim of this project has been a creation of Europe within which the security understood in terms of hard military power and principle of sovereignty should give way to a security shaped by the notions of human rights, democracy and market economy. By its very nature this new security project is exclusionary – all those states who fail to adhere to these values internally, fail also to qualify as members of the new structure of security. In the past twenty years, this has proven to be a distressing environment for the flourishing of the Russian foreign policy. In terms of security assets it possesses Russia would be better off in the international context in which military security was prevalent. In the context of security premised on the notion of human rights and democracy, Russia

1) John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault." *Foreign Affairs*. N.p., 26 Jan. 2015. Web. 26 Jan. 2015. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-s-fault>>.

could only assume a role of the Western junior partner hoping to one day restore the relations on the equal-footing.

In the early 1990s the combination of Russia's vast military power and its willingness to embark on an all-encompassing internal transformation meant that the West was willing to cooperate, but with caution. The aim of this approach, which has come to dominate the contemporary relations between Russia and the West, was to prevent Russia from alienating by giving it a role of an outside partner through a series of cooperative arrangements, while denying it an opportunity of the full institutional integration with the West. Simultaneously, NATO and the EU have adopted, contrary to concerns repeatedly voiced by Russia, a policy of eastward expansion.

In the course of all these processes, the officials of the Western states have maintained that the expansion of NATO and the EU does not consist in an attempt to win geostrategic gains over Russia, but are instead part of efforts of building a genuine security community in Europe. These messages have, however, failed to convince Russia. Although, theoretically, security dilemma arises from the concerns about intentions of the parties that choose to increase their military power, it can be argued that the expansion of the Western "security community" has made Russia uneasy about the true motives behind it. Accordingly, the expansions of the EU and NATO have prompted both sides to accuse one another of reverting to the Cold War style of international conduct. Whether their perceptions are correct or not is a question that cannot be settled easily. Nevertheless, these perceptions have a substantial influence on the concrete foreign policy decisions thus becoming something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the remainder of this paper we offer an overview of the Russia's post-Cold War relations with the NATO and the EU. We believe that a thorough revisiting of these relations is essential for the proper understanding of Russia's recent foreign policy actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

NATO AND RUSSIA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF UNEASY PARTNERSHIP

The post-Cold War survival of NATO was, and still largely is, one of the most puzzling questions in the contemporary international relations literature.²⁾ Contrary to widespread expectations, the desolation of Soviet Union did not lead to its gradual withering away. Instead, through an astonishing ability to transform, the Alliance has managed

2) Robert B. McCalla, "Nato's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (1996); Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997).

to supplement its traditional collective defense role with the role of the main builder of the new European security architecture. The defining characteristic of this new security order was its emphasis of the ordering capacity of the “domestic” principles, such as human rights, democracy and free market economy, rather than on the traditional principles of the international organization such as sovereignty and non-interference.³⁾ In this new international predicament of European relations Russia willingly accepted the role of the junior partner. Much like other Eastern European countries, Russia was on the “receiving end”, that is, its officials were well aware that the countries internal transformation according to the blueprint of Western values left it little space to take active part in the shaping of new relations in Europe. What is more, the expectation was that Russian position should be improved through its disciplined socialization along the lines of the Western values. During this time it was thus not rare for the Russian officials to deploy the discourse that emphasized the importance of human rights for the country’s foreign engagements.

Going along its new cooperative and indivisible security and foreign policy approach, Russia also accepted to follow NATO in its engagements in Balkan wars. Although disputes between allies existed, first and foremost because NATO started to enlarge functionally by advocating for the use of force in the process of peace enforcement, they should not be overstated given that Russia was largely on board with the West by giving its support to over fifty UN Resolutions relating to Balkan crisis. In sum, Russia accepted NATO’s lead in the early 1990s. It did not object its transform from the collective defense to the collective security arrangement and at some point Russia even expressed the desire to join the Alliance.⁴⁾ Nevertheless, in 1994 this cooperative climate started to change its course.

Between 1994 and 2001 two events contributed to the change of the Russian post-Cold War foreign policy discourse and of its attitude towards NATO. These are: (1) NATO’s 1994 decision to advance the “open door policy” consisting in a willingness to accept the Eastern European countries into its membership⁵⁾ and the first enlargement that materialized in 1999, when Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic became member states, and (2) the decision to conduct, without the UN

3) Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the “New Europe” : The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).

4) Arthur R. Rachwald, “A ‘Reset’ of NATO–Russia Relations: Real or Imaginary?,” *European Security* 20, no. 1 (2011).

5) See: Ryan C. Hendrickson, “The Enlargement of NATO: The Theory and Politics of Alliance Expansion,” *European Security* 8, no. 4 (1999).; Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Explaining NATO Enlargement,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (2000).

Security Council Resolution, a three-month long humanitarian military intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999. For Russia, instead of being a post-Cold War project aimed at the creation of the new European security architecture, this dual expansion of NATO, territorial and functional, had a particular geostrategic flavor reminiscent first and foremost of the old style *zones of influence* approach to international politics. Thus, it can be argued that these NATO's moves have, to a great extent, prompted Russia to abandon the willingness to play the Alliance's junior partner demanding instead that the relations be conducted on an equal footing. The important attribute of this gradual shift in Russian foreign policy was the revoking of the Great Power discourse by many among its political elites, accompanied with the greater emphasis on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Nevertheless, during this time some progress was made since in 1994 Russia joined Partnership for Peace program. Additionally, in 1997 the Permanent Joint Council was formed and NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security whereby both parties stated that they do not see each other as adversaries and will endeavor to cooperate in order to create a long-lasting peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.⁶⁾

The tension that mounted in NATO-Russian relations in the second half of the 1990s was relaxed for a brief period between 2001 and 2004.⁷⁾ The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York was the main culprit for this shift since it brought on a new security agenda whereby military force started to play a far greater role than was the case with peacekeeping endeavors of the 1990s. This new context suited Russia since military force was among its strongest international assets. Also, it gave Russia a contextual and discursive leverage to speak of Chechnya in terms of international threat of terrorism. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that Russia did not protest much when the USA as part of its planes to invade Afghanistan started to establish military basis in the Central Asian countries including Georgia. In this new international climate, in 2002 the NATO-Russian Council was formed. Although Russian power in this new cooperative body was significantly watered-down when compared to what the country was pushing for, it nevertheless meant that parties now had a forum for "consensus-building, consultations, joint decisions and joint actions" on a multitude of security issues.

6) NATO, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Nato and the Russian Federation* 1997.

7) See: Timofey Agarin, "NATO–Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century," *Ethnopolitics* 7, no. 4 (2008).

However, the great degree of convergence in perception between Russia and NATO with respect to global threat of terrorism did not stop NATO from pursuing the politics of expansion in Europe.⁸⁾ In 2004 seven more countries joined the Alliance sparking once again mistrust, and even fear, among Russian elites. The “color revolutions” wave, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kirgizstan 2005, also contributed to Russian fear that Western counties were expanding their influence, albeit implicitly, ever closer to its borders. A decade of tension was ahead. NATO’s decision to consider Ukrainian and Georgian membership in the Alliance complicated the situation further. Russian involvement in Georgian 2008 war and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia should thus be read in this context – a destabilized Georgia is less likely to become a NATO member any time soon. Also, Russia’s fears and suspicion grew even more when NATO’s presented its plans to install a missile defense shield initially in Poland and Czech Republic and later in Turkey and Romania. Nonetheless, some instances of cooperation should not be neglected. For example in 2011 NATO and Russia conducted two joined military exercises.⁹⁾ Overall, from 2003/4 onwards Russian impatience with NATO grew steadily contributing to a large extent to a discourse of Russia as the Great Power and its reluctance to abide to Western standards of democracy and human rights. It is argued in this paper that the recent developments in Ukraine, which caused the suspension of all forms of official co-operation between Russian and NATO, cannot be understood properly without the historical context of their post-Cold War relations.

EU AND RUSSIA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Troubled partnership is perhaps the best way to describe the past, present and future relationship between the EU and Russia. The European Economic Community (EEC) at its beginnings did not express interest in dealing with the Eastern Block¹⁰⁾, while the Soviet Union

8) See: Alton Frye, “The New NATO and Relations with Russia,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 3 (2000).

9) See: NATO-Russia Council, “First Live Nato-Russia Counter Terrorism Exercises” www.nato-russia-council.info/en/articles/2011-06-06-nrc-statement-03/ (accessed 2 December 2014).

10) Paul Holtom, “The Kaliningrad Test in Russian-EU Relations,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 6, no. 1 (2005): 35.

rejected to recognize the EEC as an independent political actor¹¹⁾ seeing it only as an “economic wing of NATO”¹²⁾. For this reason Soviets preferred to maintain a bilateral relations with EEC member states which slowly led to a limited economic cooperation in the 1980s. Interestingly, this small-scale cooperation prompted the EEC not to compel with the United States’ pressure for imposing the sanctions to the Soviet Union in both 1980, when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, and in 1983 after the Soviet interceptor shot down the Korean Airlines airplane. Moreover, the EEC countries did not support the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic games.¹³⁾ After the USSR dissolved, Russian Federation was eager to integrate with the West, yet, the West was not as eager to welcome it. For the most part Russia was kept as an inside outsider, and that label is perhaps the best description of the recent EU-Russia strategic partnership.

From the outset the EU-Russia relations unfolded through the inside-out format, that is, the EU has largely kept Russia at “the liminal position as both engaged outsider and partial insider”¹⁴⁾. Initially, the relations between the two were influenced by the extensive internal and external changes. The EEC was preoccupied with the 1992 Maastricht treaty, which introduced the European Union (EU), while Russia was struggling with internal transition towards democracy and free market economy. These internal changes were followed by the changes in the external environment. Former Eastern block countries were rushing to join the “Western Club”. The EU officially opened its doors for them in 1993 with the vision of establishing a new Europe “whole and free”.¹⁵⁾ At the time, this process found no opposition in Russia¹⁶⁾, since it too was hoping to obtain gains in a form of economic aid and technical support enabling it to join European institutions in a foreseeable future. The EU did not share this enthusiasm. It was willing to provide Russia with the technical assistance, but in 1993 it made a final decision against its membership in the Union.

11) Vitaly Merkushev, “Relations between Russia and the EU: The View from across the Atlantic,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 6, no. 2 (2005): 357.

12) Jackie Gower, “EU-Russian Relations and the Eastern Enlargement: Integration or Isolation?,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 1, no. 1 (2000): 79.

13) Merkushev, “Relations between Russia and the EU: The View from across the Atlantic,” 36.

14) Richard Sakwa, “Russia and Europe: Whose Society?,” *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 2 (2011): 198.

15) Andrew Monaghan, *EU-Russia Relations: Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007), 8.

16) J. Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 152.

In 1994 the EU and Russia established their first and only substantial framework for cooperation through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).¹⁷⁾ The agreement was signed after two years of negotiation and it laid grounds for economic and political cooperation and possible integration between EU and Russia. The biannual and annual summits and ministerials were established, as were the core principles of newly founded partnership. Yet, despite the enthusiastic start it took three years for the PCA to enter into force. This was due to the fourth round of EU enlargement and its criticism of the Russian conduct during the Chechnya conflict. The PCA offers the best tangible example of the EU's inside-out approach to Russia, as it is a "half-way house" between the agreements the EU signs with potential candidates for membership and the different agreements that it has with developing countries.¹⁸⁾ The implication of this type of arrangement is that it provides fewer incentives for cooperation, typical for the prospective EU members, while still prompting Russia to internalize many of the EU rules.

In 1999 both Brussels and Moscow invested more effort into furthering their mutual relations. The EU adopted The European Union Common Strategy on Russia (CSR), while Russia adopted the Medium-term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (MTS). The comparison of these two documents reveals different strategic approach of the two partners. The EU's Strategy was value driven and focused on the Russia's need for change, while the Russian Strategy emphasized the value of national interest, respect for sovereignty and economic cooperation without mentioning democracy and market economy.¹⁹⁾

During his first presidency, Vladimir Putin endeavored to make the EU-Russia relations less about Russia's internal transformation and more about economic and political cooperation on equal footing. For this reason Russia opted out from the European neighborhood policy framework (ENP). Through this new approach Russia obtained significant economic gains from the EU's dependency on its raw materials, restricting at the same time the space for the EU's criticism for its internal affairs. In this context, during the 2000 Paris Summit Putin stated that Russia does not perceive EU enlargement as a cause for concern but as

17) The ranking of Russian foreign policy priorities in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept was: Commonwealth of Independent States, arms control, economic reforms, the United States of America, the European Union.

18) Marius Vahl, *Just Good Friends? The EU-Russian "Strategic Partnership" and the Northern Dimension* (2011), 10.

19) Dov Lynch, *Russia Faces Europe* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 59.

an opportunity to increase exchange with enlarge EU, while the EU's invitation to Putin to attend 2001 EU Council Summit was interpreted by the administration as an indication of the Russia's high position on the EU agenda. Nevertheless, the relationship between two partners remained largely asymmetric since 50% of all Russian trade at the time was with the EU, whereas only 6% of all EU's trade went to Russia.²⁰⁾

Following the CSR and MTS strategies the EU and Russia expanded their cooperation to the field of security. After 2001 Summit the Joint Declaration on Stepping up Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters was issued. The declaration introduced Russia into European security structures by establishing monthly meetings between Russian representatives and EU's Political and Security Committee with the task of dealing with crisis prevention and joint crisis management. Also, the declaration enabled Russia to take part in the EU's civil and military missions.

In 2003 further deepening of EU-Russia relations was announced with an enthusiastic tone. The ST Petersburg EU-Russia Summit set a goal of establishing a genuine strategic partnership through Four Common Spaces under existing PCA framework: economy, freedom, security and justice, external security and research, and education. The Common Spaces were to classify and order the areas of cooperation by setting specific goals, procedures and requirements. As it can be noted from the formulation of Common Spaces, the focus of EU-Russia cooperation drifted to some extent from economy and trade to external and internal security.²¹⁾

The 2004 EU enlargement brought complexity to already not so simple EU-Russia relations. The new member states, with their traditional mistrust towards Russia, made it more difficult for the EU to agree upon the common strategic approach. Consequently, the EU became more aggressive in its dealing with the Eastern neighbor. Russia, on its part, was becoming more and more worried about the new line of division, so much so that the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister at the time Vladimir Chizhov underlined that the "EU enlargement is a far more serious and far-reaching challenge to Russia than even expansion of NATO, among other things because we are... competitors in some spheres of trade and economic relations"²²⁾.

Nevertheless, by 2006 the EU-Russia partnership had made some progress. In 2005 the Four Spaces Road Maps were signed as part

20) European Commission to Russia, *The European Union and Russia* (Brussels, 2005).

21) Monaghan, 17.

22) *Ibid.*, 20.

of the implementation framework as the attempt to restate the strategic partnership. However, the 2006 EU-Russia Summit failed to lead to an agreement on the start of negotiations for the new PCA due to the Polish veto. This drawback was further followed by the gas crises, when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 and Belarus in 2007. With these crises the EU's became increasingly aware on its dependence on Russian gas supplies, thus prompting it to insist that the new PCA incorporates Russia's adherence with its Energy Charter. When Moscow rejected the offer, the EU came with the new proposal – the division of ownership between gas production and gas transit infrastructure. Again, Russia refused to play along.²³⁾ Meanwhile, the 1997 PCA expired in 2007, while the negotiations on the new framework were going nowhere.

The opportunity for the yet another restart in EU-Russia relationship presented itself in 2008 when Dmitri Medvedev was elected as the new Russian President. Following his inauguration, in the attempt to bypass little less than two decades of NATO-EU inside-out policy towards Russia's place in European security architecture, Medvedev proposed the European Security Treaty (EST). The Treaty did not go as far as to imply the thorough change of existing security structure, rather it suggested the change in predominantly Western ownership. Medvedev argued that in this way the structure could be seen as a common endeavor and not something that was imposed on Russia. The reaction of the EU was to wait and see, considering that proposal was without any specification or implementation mechanisms.²⁴⁾

Additionally, the Russian-EU relations were shortly improved during the 2008 EU-Russia Summit when the negotiations on the new PCA agreement started. However, any prospect of a serious re-start was undermined by the Russian intervention in Georgia. Although, the conflict was settled thanks to the EU peace mediation efforts, the scope of the EU-Russia cooperation was markedly shrieked. The focus of cooperation was now on trade and energy, while the political dialogue was significantly undermined.

At the 2010 EU-Russia Summit, which was the first high-level meeting between the two parties after the ratification of Lisbon Treaty, the EU-Russia strategic partnership concept was replaced by the Partnership for Modernization agreement. This document was a particular technical agreement focused on rather pragmatic issues, such as trade,

23) Mankoff, 162-163.

24) Sandra Fernandes, "European Security through EU- Russian Relations: Towards a New Multilateral Order?," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 7, no. 2 (2011): 207-208.

investment, innovation. It had no normative side, a common place in previous Russia-EU agreements. This was the first time, since the end of the Cold War, that the EU perceived its partnership with Russia “as a requirement, rather than a choice on the basis of shared values or norms”²⁵⁾. The main outcome of the newly established EU-Russia Partnership was the Energy Roadmap 2050 agreement.

The enthusiasm in EU-Russia relations brought by the newly founded modernization partnership suddenly dropped after Vladimir Putin announced that he will run for the office in 2012 presidential elections. His election turned Russian foreign policy back to a more assertive stand. On the side, the EU’s focus shifted to internal consolidation due to the international economic crisis. In this context the 2012 EU-Russia Summit was predominantly centered on pragmatic issues, such as modernization, visa and mobility, trade and it contained only the promise of a new comprehensive PCA agreement. Although the both sides stressed the importance of the strategic partnership, controversial issues such as Ballistic Missile Defense system and Russia’s ban on the meat import from EU were kept off the table. It thus can be argued that the purpose of the Summit was for the EU to re-acquaint itself with the new Russian president.

Due to both the EU and Russia conceptualized their external security as internal, the shared neighborhood continued to be one of the foremost points of contention between the two. Through ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) programs, the EU was endeavoring to persuade the countries of the shared neighborhood to adopt its norms, values and good governance principles in order to make them stable contributors to rather than challengers of the EU security. Russia perceived these initiatives as offensive considering its strategy of establishing a periphery of friendly states as a main requirement for internal and regional security. Thus in its effort to restore and keep what was once its sphere of influence Russia initiated the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). The proposed ECU was a novelty in Russian foreign policy approach and it implied that Russia was not relying only on its energy resources and military strength “but also on an institutional, rule-based regime for asserting its position in the post-Soviet space”²⁶⁾. In a way Russia was playing the game in which the EU had the upper hand, and the battleground became Ukraine.

25) Tom Casier, “The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 7 (2013): 1380.

26) Katarzyna Wolczuk, Rilka Dragneva, *Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the Eu: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?* (Chatman House 2012), 9.

CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War brought to light the promise of the new European security architecture that was to be ordered on principles and values such as of human rights, democracy and market economy. Consequently, by its very nature this new order appeared and performed as a restrictive club of alike, meaning only states that embrace those principles and values are to be privileged with the membership. Russia, having its security and foreign policy grounded on hard power and principles such as sovereignty and non-interference, never fully adapted to this new environment. In fact, during the past twenty years Russian relation towards Western security actors fluctuated between the position of the junior partner and the desire to be treated on equal footing. With this in mind, and by relying on the concept of an “engaged outsider”, this article aimed to offer a brief overview of the relations between Russia and the West, perceived through its leading political and security organizations – the EU and NATO.

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Младен Бајагић, Маја Ружић

**МЈЕСТО РУСИЈЕ У ОКВИРИМА
ЕВРОПСКИХ БЕЗБЕДНОСНИХ СТРУКТУРА:
'ЗАПАД' КАО ДЕТЕРМИНАНТА У
ФОРМУЛАЦИЈИ И РЕАЛИЗАЦИЈИ
РУСКЕ СПОЉНЕ ПОЛИТИКЕ**

Резиме

Крај двадесетог века, када су у питању односи на међународној сцени, значајним дијелом је протекао у знаку успона нових центара моћи, који су својим успоном покренули питање о оправданост тезе о униполарном пост-хладноратовском поретку.

Као једна о регионалних сила у успону, на међународној сцени се појавила наследица Совјетског савеза – Руска федерација. Њен неочекиван економски успон, заснован прије свега на успону енергетског сектора, пропратила је и жеља за активнијом и одлучнијом улогом на међународној сцени. С тим у вези, циљ овог рада је да покуша да пружи одговор на питање које је обиљежило ову нову фазу у међународним односима: Да ли је Руска федерација сила у успону? Рад одговор на наведено питање пружа кроз анализу спољне политике Руске федерације од распада Совјетског савеза до догађаја који су условили сукобе на територији Украјине. Узимајући у обзир поменути сукоб, рад се бави међузависним односом спољне политике Руске федерације и структура које су познате као западне безбједносне структуре, односно Сјеверноатлантским савезом и Европском унијом. На основу увида у односе између поменутих актера, у раду се закључује да је заснивање западних безбједносних структура на пост-Вестфалским принципима и вриједностима које се препознатљиве као западне вриједности утицало у значајној мјери на циљеве и ток спољне политике Руске федерације како са краја двадесеток вијека тако и данас.

Кључне речи: Европска унија, Русија, НАТО, Европска безбедносна архитектура

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