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Statistical Analysis of Executive Stability in Serbia 1990-2011

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to mesure the degree of executive stability in Serbia via possible correlation between two political notions: one being the fragmentation of the party system and the other the stability of the government, e.g. the length of the period during which the "cabinet" is in office. If the correlation is strong, we can conclude that this would not only permit us to follow further changes of their relationships, so to have some basic insights of their processual tendencies also, but it would also enable us to raise the Serbian political science to a higher level, which implies a relatively reliable prognostics through the use of the regression. Prior to that, an overview of all known formulas for the fractionalization is presented and one option is chosen, for even though the formula does not influence the coefficient of the correlation or the regression, we have wanted to clarify some counterintuitive inconsistencies which can emerge when bias toward under/overestimation of the fragmentation in the formulas is mathematically detected.

Key words: executive stability, cabinet durability, stability of the government, party fragmentation, Poisson regression, probability.

In our analysis, we shall use the rational choice approach in terms of the party standpoints and party discipline. That is, we will assume that the parties are unitary actors with the objective of maximising their power regardless of the ideological string of their partners or adversaries. We take into account only their power which depends on the share (percentage) in the total number of MPs. These are the *policy blindness* and *unitary actor* approaches (Dumont, Caulier 2011: 9, 19). We have no desire to diminish the ideological roots of the disputes among the parties which can influence the stability of the government, but rather to determine to what extent the quantitative indicators influence the category of stability.

Even more so because in the paper which represents the grounds for our work, Herman and Tailor have confirmed that there are no ideological type differences which could better explain the variability of the government stability from the degree of fragmentation of parties in a parliament. They have calculated, in the cross-national analysis of 196 post-war governments, the correlation coefficient with the negative sign between the fractionalization and stability (r = - 0.448). This value shows us that this is a strong negative correlation, and the coefficient square (r^2 = 0.201) shows that the parliamentary fragmentation accounts for one fifth of the government stability variation (Taylor, Herman 1971: 31) during which the correlation is significant at the (0,01) level. We will calculate the degree of the correlation, having in mind the mandate of each Serbian government from 1990 to 2011, however, before that, we choose the intuitively valid fragmentation formula with the minimal deviation.

Fragmentation Formulas

The Laakso-Taagepera index (Laakso, Taagepera 1979: 3-27), e.g. the effective number of parties (ENP) is most commonly used. As Lijphart points out, this index is nothing more than an adaptation of the fractionalization index offered by Douglas Rae (Lijphart 1990: 483). The formula for the Rae's index is:

$$F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} Si^2$$

where *n* is the total number of parties, *i* is an individual party, and *Si* is the share of each party in a parliament. Therefore, if five parties have equal share of 20%, the index value will be 0,80, thus implying greater fragmentation then when we have two parties with 50% share with index value 0,50. According to Lijphart, the advantage of the Laakso-Taagepera index is that it can also be interrpreted as a number of relevant parties, not only as an abstract value (Dumont, Caulier 2011: 6). The formula:

$$ENP = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} Si^2}$$

enables us to calculate the situation in which five parties equally share positions in a parliament with the value 5.00, because at that specific moment all five parties have equal chances of forming a government.

If four of them are at the quantitatively same level, then the number of effective parties is 4.00, etc. However, if we do have five parties in the parliament, and the ENP is 4.00, then this means that some parties (or just one) have more "political weight" than the others and that they dominate over the "smaller ones" due to a greater number of seats. We should keep in mind that, in this formula the sum of all share squares is in fact the Hirchman-Herfindahl concentration index (HH) which represents the probability that two randomly chosen MPs will belong to the same party (Kuster, Botero 2008: 5). Regardless of the fact that it represents the improvement of the previous formulas and that it is most commonly used, the ENP has had its share of criticism.

One part of the criticism referred to the fact that the ENP does not provide higher values, and the other to the fact that it overemphasizes fragmentation. Here, the Kesselman-Wildgen hyperfractionalization and the Molinar index (NP) are concerned (Molinar 1991: 1383-1385). We calculate the Kesselman-Wildgen index (I) with the formula:

$$I = antilog\,(-\sum_{i=1}^{n}(Pi\ log\ Pi))$$

Where the *antilog* is in fact the Euler's number or the exponential constant (e2,71), since the exponential function is the inverse of the logarithmic. *Pi* is the share of each party, and the *log* is actually the natural logarithm with the base *e*, and not 10 as it would follow on the basis of this label. Therefore, we believe that in this formula *ln* should be used as a common sign for the natural logarithm instead of *log*. Just to remind ourselves, the natural logarithm of *x* is a number that we raise to the base *e*, in order to get that number *x*. The minus sign in front of the sum has been put to annul the negative value in the inner parentheses since the natural logarithm of each number that is less than 1 (shares of parties in decimals) can only be a negative number (!). Therefore, it is clear why this index is tied to hyperfractionalization. The lower the percentage of a party in a parliament, the higher the negative natural logarithm, which will increase the *e* base level with the same degree and thus automatically increase the number of relevant parties. To best see how this index is biased parliament we will imagine a hypothetical parliament in which one party holds 49% of the seats, ten hold 5% each and one holds 1%. The number of relevant parties at the time is even 6.55 (!). The ENP gives a value of 3.77 for the same hypothesis.

However, these formulas do not treat separately the power of the *biggest* party, as opposed to the Molinar index. Molinar correctly concludes that the number of relevant parties will be inversely proportional to the power of the party with the most votes. He also argues that both the ENP and the I react too sensitively *(overreact)* to even the smallest changes in the power of the leading party. His index yields the lowest value in relation to our hypothesis on 1.86. It is obtained by multiplying the ENP formula with the expression in which the difference between the sum of the share square of each party and the square of the strongest party is divided by the sum of squares and in the end we add one:

$$NP = 1+N\ \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^{n} Pi^2) - P1^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} Pi^2}$$

where the N is the Laakso-Taagepera index.

However, in order to rationally choose an index, it is not enough just to determine which produces higher, and which produces lower scores in order to fit our intuitive understanding of the nature of the party system. It is necessary to verify which of the NP and ENP indices show, more accurately and evenly, i.e. with less biased deviations and anomalies shown through their values the change in the power of the strongest party. We dismiss the I index from consideration immediately because it is exponentially biased. We adopt the Dunleavy-Boucek model of maximum fractionalization, which provides greatest possible distance between the biggest and the other parties (Dunleavy, Boucek 2003: 296). Thus, if the first has 45% or 30% of the votes, all others have 1% each (so 55 of them, i.e. 70). The reason for this is, that with such great discrepancies greater deviations from the formulas can be easily observed, and therefore the advantages/disadvantages of the individual, although the model itself has obviously no empirical value. The hypothesis says that with the reduction of power of largest the party (from 45% to 40% and 30% to 25%) the others do not win over more individual power, but only an increase in the total number (60 of them with 1% of the seats, i.e. 75 with 1%) in order to better detect the deviations.

The NP index does really undermine the fragmentation when measuring the decrease of power of the strongest party from 45% to 40%, since then we observe the growth of the fractionalization from 1.18 to only 1.21. The decrease of 5% in power produced the increase of the index for mere 2.54%. The fact that the Molinar index overrates the fractionalization on lower level of analysis (the fall from 30% to 25%) allows us to exclude the Molinar index from further analysis. Namely, index value shifts from 1.74 to 2.53 and thus increases by as much as 45.4% (!). This index is even more biased at the lower levels. We conclude that Molinar observed the importance of the largest party for the index very correctly, but however, he created a completely wrong formula.

The ENP index also shows anomalies, judging by the diagram in the paper of the aforementioned duo Dunleavy-Boucek. Although it does not shift from strict undermining to a strong overrating of fractionalization as Molinar's model, but rather gravitates to constant overrating, this index does not do so in equal intensity. In some segments of the strongest party power scale (<50%), which produces the variation in the values of ENP, we alternately observe: strong and growing bias toward fragmentation while approaching lower levels (<<50%) on one hand, and almost stagnation towards the same on the other. Dunleavy and Boucek named this anomaly *kinks in the lower anchor points* (Ibid: 302). In order to correct these distortions they developed the (Nb) index which singles out the power of the largest party strength as does the NP, but in a slightly different formula:

$$Nb = \left(\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} Si^2} + \frac{1}{S1}\right)/2$$

where the Si^2 is the square of the share of the party *i*, and the *S1* is the share of the largest party.

We will now compare the ENP and Nb. With the fall of 5% of the largest party's power, the ENP increases the fractionalization from 4.86 to 6.02, which is a 23.86% increase in the index. The Nb will increase the index from 3.54 to 4.26, which is an increase of 20.33%. We see that on this level, that the ENP is still biased. The same happens at a lower level (the decrease from 30% to 25%), because the ENP increases the index from 10.3 to 14.28 or for 38.64%, while the Nb does that with the increase from 6.81 to 9.14 or for 34.21%, however now the bias of the ENP towards fractionalization has increased when compared to Nb for an additional 1%. Finally, how do we account for the fact that the Molinar index (share of votes) for the post-war Japan and Sweden gives an average index below 2, even though the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan had, for a significant period, less than 50% + 1 of the votes, and the Swedish Social Democratic had above 50% of the votes only in 1968? On the other hands, Laakso-Taagepera, gives the average value of above 3 to the aforementioned party systems, which doesn't add up with the history of uninterrupted rule of Japanese liberals, i.e. the 50 years of rule of the Swedish SDP starting from the post-war 60s. In the second part we use the most appropriate formula for the relevant number of parties Nb and the Dunleavy-Boucek index.

However, it is necessary to point out one exception in which we will not be using the Nb formula. When one party has absolute majority, it is intuitively clear that the index has to be 1 because there is no other mathematical combination that would allow other parties to form a government without the first party. In this case the previously mentioned formulas never give the result 1. The ENP goes so far, that with the distribution between parties (53-15-10-10-10-2%) gives the index value of 3.00 (!). This inconsistency was recognized by Taagepera as well, who suggested adding an *additional indicator* of the largest share index (*largest component approach* - N∞) to the ENP (Taagepera 1999: 497). And according to a very simple formula:

$$N\infty = \frac{1}{p1}$$

where *p1* is the share of the largest party.

However, N ∞ just lowered the result below the 2. The NP is the closest to 1, but as Taagepera correctly observes in his work, once a party exceeds 50%, is it really important whether it has 53% or 57%? Over 57% and the ENP decreases below 2. Only the Dumant-Caulier *effective number of relevant parties* (ENRP) solves the problem as the quotient of 1 and the Banzhaf index (Dumont, Caulier, 2011: 19):

$$ENPR = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} ßi^2}$$

The first government after the multi-party elections in 1990 was formed by only one party – the SSP, and we can calculate that during their mandate the fractionalization was only 1.

Executive Stability in Serbia (1990-2011)

Lijphart pointed out that government stability can be measured by the average duration of the "cabinet" (Lijphart 2008: 176). We will calculate the mandate of the government in months (see Table 1). The end of one government and beginning of a new government can be measured in two ways. The first implies that the government lasts as long as its party composition does not change, while the second considers these events crucial in marking of the end/ beginning of a cabinet: elections, the change of the Prime Minister and the coalition status - the minimum, minority and majority win (Lajphart 2003: 162). The other way is specific and more precise, however we will mention two exceptions. The change of the Prime Minister without any constructive no confidence vote shall not be interpreted as the end of a government mandate. The first government in which Radoman Božović replaced Radoslav Zelenović belonging to the same party and the post-October government in which Zoran Živković (DP) replaced the deceased Zoran Đinđić (DP) we count as one. The changes in the composition of a broader coalition will be ignored, in case some parties have decided to leave the government, and they did not have the capacity to overthrow it in the parliament. The termination of the DPS and the DOP coalition has not led to the creation of a new government, and ultimately, the status of the coalition remained unchanged. Also, we will assume that the current government of the Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković lasted while this paper was updated, that is until April 15th, 2011. After the correlation we will conclude whether the extension of the deadline would seriously affect the research. The provisional government of Milomir Minić in 2000, will not be analyzed due to irregular circumstances.

Elections	1990.	1992.	1993.	1997.	2000.	2003.	2007.	2008.
Mandate	24	13,25	48	31	37,22	38,38	13,7	33,26

Table* 1

In calculating the index, we will take each party into account separately, regardless of the size and coalition agreements in accordance with the introductory paragraph on the study of the unitary actors and the political ‶indifference" approach. Although ideological moments in Serbia played a role in the formation of the government, there were unexpected turns such as when the far-right parties supported the socialist government, and MPs from DEMOS refused to bring down the government, through forming the government in coalition with the SSP and the New Democracy and the termination with DEMOS, the dissolution of the Coalition of Vojvodina, the current coalition with once used very antagonized DP and SSP. There are no arguments that would encourage us a priori to consider any coalition a unified actor and exclude the possibility of termination of the coalition after the elections. The stability of government is not affected only by the number of coalitions, but rather the number of parties *within* the coalition.[1]

1 Dijana Vukomanović uses the approach of calculating all mandates of all the parties individuall, even though she uses the ENP index, see more: Vukomanović, D. (2005) "Dinamika partijskog sistema Srbije (1990-2005)", *Srpska politička misao*, 14 (1-2): p. 36.
*from: Milan Jovanović, *Političke institucije u političkom sistemu Srbije*, IPS, Belgrade, 2008, pg. 320

*Nb1990	Nb1992	Nb1993	Nb1997	Nb2000	Nb2003	Nb2007	Nb2008
1	3.12	2.67	3.39	7.22	4	4.06	4.33

Table 2

Now, it only remains to cross-reference the data from the table and calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient (r). Then perform the guidance test of the null hypothesis (one tailed), as we started from the assumption that the increase in the fragmentation causes shorter government mandate and then to determine the level of significance of correlation. The average government mandate lasts for 29.85 months, while the average fractionalization is 3.72. On the grounds of these data we obtained the following coefficient:

$$r = +0.2$$

What immediately attracts attention is the low level of correlation that makes it weak. In order for the correlation to be at least moderately high, the value of 0.3 is required. Yet, what is most surprising is the positive sign of the correlation. At first glance it seems that the greater fractionalization of the party, the longer and more stable the government in Serbia (!). However, apart from low-value coefficient, which does not allow us to say anything more exact, the lack of statistical significance prevents us from the performance of the relevant statistical conclusion. In the guiding test we cannot reject the null hypothesis, or confirm an alternative, since the signs of the perceived and received correlation do not match. However, even if we did get a negative correlation of such low value, it would not have passed the significance test. Since the number of the relation is N = 8, and the degree of freedom is df = N - 2 = 6, the critical r value in order for the correlation to be significant at the 0.05 level, is 0.621, meaning that the coefficient must be higher than that number (Hinton 2004: 372). Even if we did perform the non-guiding test (two tailed test) the coefficient would not have reached the even higher critical r value of 0.7. We think that we could give tentative conclusions by pairing the deviation variables from the total average.

elections	1990.	1992.	1993.	1997.	2000.	2003.	2007.	2008.
mandate deviation	-5.85	-16.6	+18.15	+1.15	+7.37	+8.53	-16.15	+3.41
fractionalization deviation	-2.72	-0.6	-1.05	-0.33	+3.5 +	0.28	+0.34	+0.61

Table 3

Regardless of the fact that N is only eight, from Table 3, we can see best that in most pairs (5 / 8) both variables have the same sign. The negative correlation trends in the period before 2000 are even more emphasized, since we have two pairs with different signs. The decrease in the fragmentation of 14.4% in 1993 compared to 1992 existed with the 34.7 months long government, while the index growth of 27%, in 1997 compared to the previous one is connected with the government that lasted 15 months shorter. On the other hand, the fractionalization growth of 112%, in 2000 has been paralleled by the extension of the mandate for 6.2 months, and almost a double decrease of the fragmentation in correlation with a month longer government in 2003. It was only in 2007, that the slight increase of the index did exist along with a mandate reduction of well over two years (!). In 2008, 6% greater fragmentation resulted 19.5 months longer government term. As we can see, if we had full information about the Cvetković cabinet's term we would get a slightly higher value of the coefficient r (+), the statistically negligible for the correlation strength. But even if we did have a strong positive correlation, and passed all tests, yet we would not dare to accept it in any other way than as a complete anomaly in political life, because it is impossible for Serbia who is out of the framework of all organized and stable European political systems and practices and thereby regard its political life as sufficiently institutionalized. It's hard to explain a possible positive correlation with the inexperience of the new political elite in an uncertain period of transition. As demonstrated by comparison of fragmentation and the stability of governments in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, a small number of relevant parties produced stable governments, if we do not observe the Polish coalition *AWS - Electoral Solidarity Action* as an actor (Nikolenyi 2004: 132), just as we have done.

Prospects for Government Stability in the Poisson Model

Even though we still hadn't had a chance to use regression to *predict* the duration of the mandate of the Serbian government, in this section, we will show which mathematical - statistical formula we could use when in Serbia the relationship between stability and the fractionalization of a government was properly correlated, as a start.

One of the first political scientists primarily tried to measure the stability of the government only in a stochastic manner (randomness). That is, government stability is a phenomenon that does not depend on some explanatory (independent) variables that are known *ex ante*, but only from the moment of coincidence, which can be caused by war, assassination, major economic crises and the like (Warwick, T. Easton 1992: 123). First, we should determine the probability distribution curve *f(t)* in which in one place at the moment *t* an event occurs. It can be shown in the form of function integral:

$$\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f(\mathrm{t})\, dt = 1$$

and its values shift from 0 to 1 in time intercepts ∂t.

The cumulative distribution function F*(t)* is associated with this, which is in fact the probability that the fall of the government will occur at some point in time $T \leq t$, and can be present in the same form as the integral distribution *f(t)*, except that its span is from - ∞ to *t*, e.g. from 0 to *t*. Then the function of ''survival'' (*survival function*) of government is S*(t)* = 1 - F*(t)*, if the probability that the government will fall before time *t* is little, the probability of survival after *t* is higher. The quotient between *f(t)* / S *(t)* | f*(t)* / 1 - F *(t)* is the hazard rate *λ (t)*, which we will explain later. The stochastics measures the probability of ''time'', which is based on the exponential distribution. It is similar to Poisson ''event'' distribution in some interval *t*. If you want to know the probability that the government will fall three times in a span of 6 years, if the average number of governments that fall within this range is 4, we use the Poisson formula:

$$f(x; \lambda) = \frac{\lambda^x}{x!} e^{-\lambda}$$

Where the *λ* is the number of government collapses on average, so it is 4, and the *x* moves in the range (0-3) and represents each collapse individually, conclusive with the final collapse whose probability we are interested in most. When all probabilities for every individual collapse, we get the probability of our case which is P ≈ 43,3%.

Unlike the Poisson, the exponential distribution does not measure the probability of the number of events (*events count*), but rather the probability of time flow to or from an event (single) in the moment t, so it has a slightly different form:

$$f(t) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t}$$

which is a commonly known expression for the exponential distribution of probability. Here λ *is the hazard rate*, an average rate of events (in this case) per time unit and has the value $\lambda = 1/\mu t$, where μt is the average event time, and since in our research t i*s a*lways more than 1, than the value is less than 1(!). The proof for this equation is the MLE statistical method, (*Maximum likelihood estimation*)[21] which finds the hazard rate in the form of a coefficient. If we have the average of samples of the government mandate, than that coefficient is the one that maximizes the probability of our sample which can be written like this:

$$f(t1,t2,...tn) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t1} \lambda e^{-\lambda t2} ... \lambda e^{-\lambda tn} = \lambda^n e^{-\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Ti$$

So we write this function in the *ln* form, then we take the derivate according to λ and equate the expression with 0, because if we have no curve slope according to $\partial\lambda$, we know this is the maximum:

$$\text{In}L(\lambda) = \text{n In}(\lambda) - \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} Ti \;\;|\;\; \frac{n}{\lambda} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} Ti = 0$$

And we add, under the condition that the other derivate is negative, which is the case:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \text{In}\, L(\lambda)}{\partial\lambda} = n - \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} Ti = -\lambda$$

from which follows, by substitution from the penultimate expression that the $\lambda = 1 / \mu t$, because the sum $Ti = n \cdot \mu t$. If the μt of the Serbian government is 29,85 months, then $\lambda = 0{,}033$. This unit is constant regardless of the t in the exponential distribution which is derived from $\lambda(t) = (t) / 1 - F(t)$, and if the formula for the cumulative *exp* distribution is:

$$F(t) = 1 - e^{-\lambda}$$

than

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t} / 1 - (1 - e^{-\lambda t}) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t} / e^{-\lambda t} = \lambda$$

2 Procedure described at: http://www.weibull.com/hotwire/issue33/relbasics33.htm (11.2.2011);

Finally, when we are calculating the probability that the Serbian government will collapse in the 20th month (having in mind that λ = 0,033, then by using the exponential F(t) we get P ≈ 48%, and when we are measuring probability S(t), that the government will last through a full mandate than P ≈ 20%. These methods, apart from providing us with the probability in percentages, do not enable us to predict the mandate variables of the government in the unit of time, they have not shown the more significant complementarity with the practice, since they were confirmed in only 4 systems even though they were used in twelve systems (Warwick, T. Easton 1992: 125). In order to predict the length of the government mandate, we use regression analysis. However, linear regression is not a good solution since it could produce negative results, if we have negative regression coefficients (like in the case of the negative correlation), while the solution of this problem by logging the regression variables produces much larger standard errors in relation to the Poission regression (King, 1988: 845, 852).

Poisson regression is somewhere halfway between the linear regression and stochastic models we described. Authors who have applied this procedure for the first time in political science - King, Alt, Burns and Laver wanted to include the random fall of the government through punctual events and to include in the regression model the influence of familiar variables that affect the dissolution of the cabinet, such as the polarization, the length of post-election negotiations to form a government and party system fractionalization (King et al. 1990: 848). Instead of the regression formula, the impact of any future independent variables Xi (fractionalization) on the dependent Yi (government mandate) has to be linear and equal to the product $Xi\beta$ (the regression coefficient β), these authors suggest that the impact should be expressed in the formula for the Poisson regression:

$$E(Yi) \approx e^{(xi\beta)}$$

Where the Xi, is the i value of the fractionalization, while β obtained in the same manner as the hazard rate, and the quotient of number 1 and the average fractionalization from the sample is negative only if there is a negative correlation between the variables. The stochastic trail lies in the similarity with the S(t) *survival* formula that we have shown previously, with the difference that Xi doesen't have to be only a time variable, and β does not need to be negative like the S(t)λ. The full form of the Poisson regression:

$$Yi \approx e^{(\beta 0+\beta 1x1+\beta 2x2\ldots)} \approx e^{\beta 0}e^{\beta 1x1}e^{\beta 2x2\ldots}$$

Is actually a linear regression as a degree of the *e* constant and since the Poisson regression is written in the *ln* form as well $ln(Yi) = (\beta 0+ \beta 1x1+ \beta 2x2\ldots)$, the Poisson regression is also called *log linear.* Our work is based on the study of relations of the party parliament fractionalization and the government stability as dependent variable, thus the aforementioned formulas may be simplified and represented as:

$$Yi \approx e^{(\beta 0+\beta X\mathrm{i})}$$

where $\beta 0$ is the regression constant and is found from the upper expression as an unknown, if we have an average mandate of a governments μY, average fractionalization μX, and we know that $\beta = 1 / \mu X$. If we had data on the negative correlation, β would be negative. Finally we make a simulation. If we assume that the data μY =29,85 and the μX = 3.72 we got the second part are highly negatively correlated, we have to ask how long the new government will last, if the current fractionalization of the parliamentary parties is 3? Using the formula above we get that Y ≈ 36 months. The second formula offered by the authors *(King et al.)* indicates how long or how short the next government in relation to the previous will be:

$$\Delta Y \approx \beta \cdot \Delta X \cdot \mu Y$$

where the ΔX is the difference between the new and the previous fragmentation index. If the new index is 4, and the previous one 2,5 then $\Delta Y \approx$ - 12. The new government will be approximately a year shorter.

Concluding Observations

On the basis of the results of this study, we conclude that the parties could provide high stability of political institutions such as government, only by previously strictly dividing the departments between themselves, by becoming the absolute masters in their work domain. It seems that the thesis on the feudalization of government is really true. For, in these circumstances, the probability that a real conflict should break out within the government about the harmonization of government policies rapidly reduces. This constellation has no direct effect on the stability of the government, but it certainly has broader structural effects on the environment of the political system (to remind ourselves that the political relations of medieval feudalism were very stable, but then the societies were behind in many areas, especially economic). The solution is not to form a government with two largest parties by using election laws, not only because there are no structural conditions for the existence of the bipartite system (like in the U.S.), but also due to the fact that we got a government composed of two fiefdoms (which is even more dangerous because of the reduced possibility of control). As long as the number of parties is really not the reason for the ongoing crisis and overthrow of governments, governments and their work methods should be improved. The Prime Minister would have to have greater authority to coordinate departments to lead a coherent and systematic policy.

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