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NEKI ASPEKTI EVROPSKIH I MEĐUNARODNIH INTEGRACIJA pr2/2017

DELEGIRANJE OVLAŠĆENJA DECENTRALIZOVANIM AGENCIJAMA EU IZ PERSPEKTIVE TEORIJE PRINCIPAL–AGENT

Sažetak

Polazeći od teorije principal-agent (p-a), autor u radu predstavlja delegiranje ovlašćenja decentralizovanim agencijama Evropske unije (DAEU) i uspostavljanje mehanizama kontrole nad njima. Prema teoriji p-a, jedna strana, koja je određena kao principal, osniva agenta i delegira mu ovlašćenja, a druga strana, koja je u ulozi agenta, deluje za principala, u njegovo ime ili kao njegov predstavnik, pri čemu se principal suočava sa izborom ovlašćenja koja bi trebalo delegirati agentu, i izborom mehanizama institucionalne kontrole nad njim. Decentralizovane agencije EU su u ulozi agenta, dok su institucije institucionalnog trougla (Evropski parlament, Savet i Komisija), između kojih postoji institucionalna ravnoteža, i države članice, određene kao principali. Cilj rada je, da u svetlu teorije p-a, objasni kako postojanje više principala, uz paralelno delovanje Suda EU, utiče na delegiranje ovlašćenja DAEU i uspostavljanje mehanizama kontrole nad njima, imajući u vidu načelo institucionalne ravnoteže i kombinaciju nadzora i sankcija radi kontrole delovanja DAEU. Rad se sastoji iz četiri dela. U prvom poglavlju su predstavljene glavne odlike teorijskog modela principal-agent. U drugom delu su definisane DAEU, i date su glavne odlike njihove organizacije i načina delovanja. U trećem delu, posvećenom delegiranju ovlašćenja DAEU, fokus je na dve teme, a to su: 1) predstavljanje principala i načela institucionalne ravnoteže EU kao konteksta delegiranja ovlašćenja DAEU; i 2) ograničenja u delegiranja ovlašćenja DAEU. Četvrti deo rada je posvećen mehanizmima kontrole koju principali ostvaruju nad DAEU.

Ključne reči:

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PERIODIKA Politička revija 2/2017 УДК 341.176(4-672EU) 29-44
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