Marina T. Kostić

During the 2019 and 2020 US-Russia debate on the New START extension, both countries raised again the issue of multilateralization of strategic offensive arms control. However, while the USA called for China’s participation, Russia once again reiterated the Soviet Union’s Cold-War position and invited France and the UK to join first. Having in mind China’s refusal to join these talks, out of various reasons, the purpose of this article is to explore the attitudes of France and the UK, two European states and NATO members with strategic arms, vis-a-vis the Russian invitation and the prospects and preconditions for strategic arms control multilateralization through their involvement. In this endeavour, the author employs the concept of strategic stability, and analyses a variety of primary and secondary sources, including chronologies of negotiations and contents of strategic arms control treaties, and other relevant treaties, as well as French and British strategic documents, and statements by officials from these and other relevant countries. The author concludes that the UK and France would be more likely to enter into formal strategic arms control if at least three sets of preconditions are met – the US and NATO “permission”, equality, and an improved strategic environment.

Did the Biden administration pick up at least some of the pieces of the broken liberal international order caused in some part by his predecessor Trump? Has he been acting according to his and his party’s promises during the presidential-elections campaign or has he stood by his predecessor’s decisions? And especially how much was done or “repaired” in the realm of arms control? These are the questions authors will try to answer in this paper. They will draw their conclusion by analyzing theoretical assumptions that lie behind the Trump’s and Biden’s approach toward the international institutions, including arms control, historical analysis of Trump’s legacy regarding international institutions, content analysis of Biden’s and Democratic Party’s promises and their comparison with the Republican attitudes. In assessing how much was done in the first year of Biden’s mandate in the realm of arms control, authors conclude that the results are mixed – in some cases Biden followed Trump’s decisions and in some other he completely changed the approach.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.