Main topic




During the 2019 and 2020 US-Russia debate on the New START extension, both countries raised again the issue of multilateralization of strategic offensive arms control. However, while the USA called for China’s participation, Russia once again reiterated the Soviet Union’s Cold-War position and invited France and the UK to join first. Having in mind China’s refusal to join these talks, out of various reasons, the purpose of this article is to explore the attitudes of France and the UK, two European states and NATO members with strategic arms, vis-a-vis the Russian invitation and the prospects and preconditions for strategic arms control multilateralization through their involvement. In this endeavour, the author employs the concept of strategic stability, and analyses a variety of primary and secondary sources, including chronologies of negotiations and contents of strategic arms control treaties, and other relevant treaties, as well as French and British strategic documents, and statements by officials from these and other relevant countries. The author concludes that the UK and France would be more likely to enter into formal strategic arms control if at least three sets of preconditions are met – the US and NATO “permission”, equality, and an improved strategic environment.

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Serbian Political Thought 3/2021 3/2021 UDC 341.67(4) 27-56