Main topic




I look into assurance games in large groups (more than two players). After discussing a typical two-player example, I show the differences between the game in smaller and larger groups by focusing on the assurance that all the members of the collective will do the same. I discuss four examples: voting in committees, participation in street protest, electoral voting for smaller parties, and participation in a resistance movement. I claim that each of these instances of large group assurance games require different type of focal point to overcome collective action problem. Voting in committees requires a pivot, street protest require a specific type of participants, voting for smaller parties require political optimism among party members and voters, and joining resistance movement requires specific types of norms and communities that guarantee safety in number.

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PERIODICS Serbian Political Thought 1/2020 1/2020 УДК 519.83:316.64 103-128