Accountability of European Regulatory Agencies Between the Delegation of Powers and Public Accountability Models

Slađana Mladenović

Abstract

The question of accountability of the European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs) has been the subject of the interinstitutional debate within the ‘institutional triangle’ of the European Union, but also the subject of the theoretical deliberations. In this paper the author is expounding two prominent standpoints in respect to the accountability of ERAs – the delegation of powers (principal-agent) and public accountability (actor-forum) models. The aim of the paper is to present the assessment of the EU agencies’ accountability through the lenses of these models, and to point out the troublesome accountability of the account holders. Finally, the author concludes that the two models are not mutually exclusive in assessing the EU agencies’ accountability, but that the actor-forum model provides a better framework for the implementation of the accountability mechanisms.

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