

Dragan Stanar*

*Faculty of International Politics and Security, University UNION
Nikola Tesla Belgrade*

REVISIONISM AND NEW CONFLICTS: NEGATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR

Abstract

This paper aims to prove how revisionism of the traditional just war theory introduces a new generation of war. These new revisionist wars are actually theoretical and propaganda wars against the possibility of war and thus sovereignty of states. They criminalize the conflict, transforming it into global police action of large powers with mighty propaganda machineries and international influence against “criminal” smaller states which theoretically lose their right of self-defense. We offer an abundance of reasons why revisionism that postulates moral asymmetry of combatants is false and ill-founded, and analyze its implications on wars. By analyzing new conflicts from the perspective of revisionism, we prove that these conflicts lack the necessary elements and attributes of war, and that they cannot be defined as such. Finally, we express our belief that revisionism of the just war theory is an elaborate attempt to negate the possibility of war for sovereign countries, thus negating its freedom and an attempt to theoretically justify violent modes of globalization and neo-imperialism.

Keywords: just war theory, revisionism, moral symmetry, new wars, asymmetric conflicts, sovereignty

1. JUST WAR THEORY

The phenomenon of war has been occupying the greatest minds of human history since the beginnings of human societies and mankind’s first mass conflicts. War represents the harshest, most brutal and most

* E-mail: draganstanar@yahoo.com

deadly form of human conflict, in the majority of cases it is a large-scale clash between masses of people for an extended period of time. Naturally, war has been scrutinized by all aspects of human culture. Nevertheless, it seems that the most unyielding field of discussions regarding war is the one in which we question its morality, admissibility and justification. After all, as the famous Bertrand Russell once wrote, “The question whether war is ever justified, and if so under what circumstances, is one which has been forcing itself upon the attention of all thoughtful men”¹. For centuries, we have been unable to reach any type of a wide consensus when it comes to the question of the ethics of war. And, there is absolutely nothing neither strange nor surprising about the fact that we as human beings find it difficult to cope with the challenge of justifying mass killing. The idea of morally justifying such a phenomenon surely does strike an ordinary human being as virtually impossible.

If we would to collect all the writings about the morality of war, from the beginning of civilization, we would end up with what we today call the just war theory (JWT). It is precisely for this reason, i.e. that this theory represents a collection of different and very diverse attitudes towards moral problems of war, that a more suiting name for it would be just war tradition.² Basically, the modern JWT represents a collection and a “bold synthesis” of ancient Greek views and mainstream Christian values, further developed by many scholars throughout centuries. The theory is a product of Christianity, an elaborate attempt to justify killing in war and war in general. It comes as no surprise that the “founding fathers” of the JWT were Christian philosophers and theologians – Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Naturally, the reason behind such an attempt was to theoretically justify and allow Christians to fight wars, as they grew in numbers, and as great empires and kingdoms slowly became Christian states. At one point, the discussion about just war was spearheaded by clerics, who were followed by jurists, who were then succeeded by philosophers and sociologists. We shall not dig any deeper in the origins and evolution of the Just War Theory at this moment, despite it being extremely thought-provoking, rather we will turn our attention to its modern form.

JWT was fully revitalized in the late XX century, and now represents one of the most fruitful and lively fields of discussion in political

1) Bertrand Russell, “The Ethics of War”, *The International Journal of Ethics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Vol. 25. No. 2, January 1915, p. 127.

2) David Rodin highlights: “It is more accurate to talk of the ‘Just War Tradition’ rather than the ‘Just War Theory’, for it includes a large number of diverse yet related positions stretching from the theological writings of Augustine and Aquinas, via the legal treatise of Grotius and his contemporaries, to the modern secular account found in writers” David Rodin, *War and Self-Defense*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 103.

philosophy and ethics. In an attempt to better understand and explain the complexity of war, theorists have recognized the necessity of separating two processes of moral judging, namely, the process of judging the morality of war itself, and the process of judging the morality of fighting in war. This process of separating two distinctly different aspects of war was gradual, but it is widely considered that the thinkers of the famous school of Salamanca were the ones who definitely made the distinction, particularly Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez. Since then, these two processes have remained logically separated both by jurists and philosophers who continued the JWT. By far the most acclaimed and respected author in the field of the JWT in the XX and the XXI century, Michael Walzer, famously stated in his seminal work *Just and Unjust Wars*, that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt”.³ In short, what this allows us to do is to separate our moral judgment about the decision to start or enter war from our moral judgment about the manner in which combatants from both sides behave in war. Furthermore, this necessary logical separation of moral judgment allows the possibility of a warrior fighting for a just side to fight unjustly and *vice versa*, a warrior fighting for an unjust side in war to fight justly and to be a just warrior. These two segments of the JWT are called *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello*; the first one dealing with the justness of the decision to wage war, and the second one with how war is actually fought. Naturally, the first one addresses those few men in every country who are in fact in the position to make the decision to go or not to go to war, while the other element concerns the overwhelming majority of people, those who actually fight wars. This represents the classical or the traditional JWT,⁴ according to which those who start wars are judged using one set of rules, while those who fight wars are judged using another.⁵

There is a plethora of reasons⁶ and powerful arguments why those who fight wars cannot be held responsible for the war they are fighting, why there is a necessary moral symmetry of combatants in war and why all combatants are *prima facie* equal. At this point, we shall only briefly touch upon and the most convincing and important ones. First of all, those

3) Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Basic Books, New York, 2006, p. 21.

4) In the last few decades, the Just War Theory has been supplemented with two more elements – *Jus ante Bellum* and *Jus post Bellum*, but they are still in their theoretical infancy.

5) Obviously, these are two separate groups of people – an extremely narrow circle of people who are actually included in the decision-making process, and an overwhelming majority of those who fight wars and who have absolutely no authority neither to start nor to stop wars.

6) More on these reasons in: Dragan Stanar, “Moral Equality of Soldiers in War: Necessity of Separating *Jus ad Bellum* from *Jus in Bello*”, *Vojno delo*, MC Odrbrana, Beograd, 8/2016, p. 33-41.

who fight wars, regardless on which side, are not the same people who had made the decision to start the war,⁷ and are not the people who can end them. When war erupts there is no possibility of free choice for future combatants. Duress seems to be ever-present in wars – people are forced to fight in various ways – from physical coercion to social pressure. Often those who refuse to fight face imprisonment or execution, not to mention marginalization and social exclusion of their families. Most importantly, the complexity of international relations is such that we simply cannot expect an average citizen to know which side is just – he or she simply does not have neither all the relevant information about the political background of the conflict nor the knowledge to make the decision with sufficient level of justification. All this, and much more, contribute to the traditionalists' claim that we cannot reasonably expect those who fight to know whether their war is just or not, and must therefore allow for all combatants to be equally non-responsible for war.

2. REVISIONISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

On the other hand, JWT revisionists assert that there can be no moral equality of combatants in war, and that only those who fight for the just side can be just, while all those combatants who find themselves on the “wrong side” cannot be just and justified in killing, regardless of the circumstances of war and their behavior in combat – they are unjust warriors simply because their side is unjust. This is the cornerstone of revisionism – moral asymmetry of combatants. As we said before, the aim of this paper is not to prove why moral asymmetry of combatants is false or why moral symmetry is necessary, instead we shall attempt to show how revisionism of the JWT introduces a new generation of war and how it challenges the concept of sovereignty. Revisionism of the JWT is yet another flywheel in the mechanism of globalization, as “globalization presupposes and demands certain de-sovereignization of states”.⁸ If we allow for the revisionist attitudes to be adopted and applied in real life, we are actually paving the way for moral exceptionalism, criminalization of enemies, transformation of wars into police actions, and ultimately, the elimination of the possibility of war, and thus sovereignty, for anyone who dares to confront those with powerful propaganda machineries. Let us elaborate further on this assertion.

Some of the most prominent advocates of revisionism offer a glimpse into this new hypothetical world of international relations, in

7) Interestingly, those who do make the decision are rarely, if ever, included in the fighting – the same usually goes for their children, relatives, close friends, etc.

8) Slaviša Orlović, “Država u procesu globalizacije“, *Savremena država*, (ed. Vukašin Pavlović, Zoran Stojiljković), FPN, Beograd, 2008, p. 103.

which wars are virtually impossible,⁹ because no one has the right to stand up to a powerful country that has the ability and resources to convince the enemy population and the world that it is “just”. Advocates of revisionism insist that all combatants must know, or at least that all combatants CAN know, whether their side is just or not, and that they must, as soon as they reach the conclusion about the unjustness of their side, instantly refuse to fight as there can be no inculpable ignorance in war. Moreover, it is not even necessary for them conclude this, it is sufficient for them just to doubt. As soon as the first doubt arises, one must refuse to fight, in order not to be an unjust warrior, given the fact that statistically, “it is more likely that most soldiers in the history of war have fought in the service of an unjust cause”.¹⁰ As McMahan claims, “our negative duty not to kill is in general stronger than our positive duty to prevent people from being killed”¹¹ and therefore “soldiers should be skeptical of their own sense that their war is just”,¹² and accordingly surrender or stop fighting. Strawser concurs with McMahan, and adds that “when the decision to go to war involves such uncertainty, people should remain agnostic as to whether their side is just and then err on the side of caution by not taking on the moral risk of fighting in a potentially unjust war”.¹³ In real world circumstances, this means that it would be sufficient for the “just” side simply to plant the seed of doubt into the hearts of enemy population before conflict even starts, to use media, corrupted public figures and social networks to persuade them that their leaders are “the bad guys”. As a result, the majority of this population will be expected to refuse to fight, because they cannot determine the justice of their side with certainty. Those who refuse to surrender will be treated as criminals,¹⁴ as they consciously took part in an unjust war. Therefore, we can no longer have war between two countries and two sovereign nations – we can only have either immediate capitulation of the “bad guys” or a military spearheaded intervention against “terrorists and

9) Seth Lazar writes that revisionism “cannot work in theory and makes just war impossible”, and we would add that it makes any war impossible. Seth Lazar, “The responsibility dilemma for killing in war”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 2/2010, p. 180-213.

10) Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War”, *Ethics International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 4/2004, Vol. 114, p. 701.

11) Jeff McMahan, “Can soldiers be expected to know whether their war is just?” in: *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War – Just war theory in the twenty-first century*, (ed. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans and Adam Henschke), Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, New York/London, 2013, p. 16.

12) *Ibid*, p. 17.

13) Bradley Jay Strawser, “Revisionist Just War Theory and the Real World: A cautiously optimistic proposal” in: *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War – Just war theory in the twenty-first century*, (ed. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans and Adam Henschke), Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, New York/London, 2013, p. 84.

14) Chances are that the term that would be used to describe these people would be terrorists.

criminals”. Schulte recognizes that in the “concept of Fourth Generation of Warfare... worldwide moral controversy consequently becomes a key theatre of war”,¹⁵ and that it becomes equally important to convince the world of the justness and even moral obligingness of your war as it is to actually win battles. As authors have recognized, international institutions are often “abused and instrumentalized in the service of particular interests of individual states...”¹⁶ using various means, “from military, across economic to ideological-propaganda ones”.¹⁷ If this battle for moral high-grounds and moral supremacy in the eyes of international community and in the eyes of enemy population is won, then war is impossible, because all those who confront the “moral winner” are simply terrorists and criminals, not warriors or soldiers.

In virtually all wars in history, all belligerent sides were convinced that they were the just and righteous side. Moreover, all warring parties believe that they are actually defending not only themselves, but human civilization and core human values, while their enemies represent dark forces of evil. If we apply revisionism to modern wars, it would mean that the side convinced in its justness, with better propaganda, more funds for lobbying, etc. would triumph before the physical conflict even starts, as it would transform its enemies into terrorists, oppressors and criminals, thus negating them the right to fight a war, even the right of self-defense. We know today that propaganda and covert subversive activities funds of great powers far exceed entire military budgets of most countries in the world. Gross offers a new formulation for these activities of soft power – “public diplomacy”. He defines it as “media efforts of any adversary to shape opinions and influence the behavior of domestic, enemy or third-party audiences”.¹⁸ It is important to point out that we live in a world in which truth has been relativized to such an extent that we need to coin new words in order to describe reality. The renowned English language dictionary, the *Oxford dictionary*, has a tradition of adding one new word to the corpus of English language each year. This “Word of the Year”, according to the *Oxford dictionary*, must “reflect the ethos, mood, or preoccupation of that particular year”,¹⁹ and it comes as no surprise that the word of the year 2016 was “post-truth”. The

15) Paul Schulte, “Morality and War”, in *The Oxford Handbook of War*, (ed. Yves Boyer and Julian Lindley-French), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 99.

16) Бранислав Ђорђевић, Владимир Трапара, „Инструментализација међународних институција у успостављању новог светског поретка“, in: *Српска политичка мисао*, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, 1/2017, vol. 55, p. 30.

17) *Ibid*, p. 33.

18) Michael L. Gross, “Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Just War” in: *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War – Just war theory in the twenty-first century*, (ed. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans and Adam Henschke), Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, New York/London, 2013, p. 155.

19) *Oxford dictionaries*, Internet, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year>, 1/10/2018.

proportions of propaganda and the amount of truth distortion had reached such levels, that the most important world language had to implement a new notion to describe this phenomenon. *Oxford dictionary* defines this new word as an adjective, “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”.²⁰ Another influential English language dictionary, the *Collins dictionary*, has chosen the formulation “fake-news” as its Word of the Year for the following year 2017. This dictionary defines “fake-news” as a noun, “false, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise of news reporting”.²¹ Obviously, the power of propaganda and the influence of media today are unparalleled in human history, as research indicate that “the new media are more addictive than the old ones”,²² meaning that the wide-spread internet allows for a much deeper and effective subversive influence on masses who are “hooked”. If a country has the economical and political power to invest in large-scale “public diplomacy”, then it will be able to transform all of its future conflicts into something that cannot be war, against people that cannot be warriors, against countries that have forfeited their right to defend their independency. This inalienable right of self-defense that every state enjoys represents the foundation of its statehood, as the external aspect of sovereignty “is manifested in the possibility of a national state to defend its independence”.²³ In conclusion, the new generation of war is actually an attempt to negate the possibility of war, and an effort to transform potential conflict into global police action against a “rogue state”, a “failed state”, a “terrorist state”.

3. THEORETICAL TRANSFORMATION OF WAR AND NEW “WARS”

From this perspective, it is interesting to observe the nature of *The Bush Doctrine*, more precisely, the proclaimed War on Terrorism. This war on terrorism is actually a “war on war”, or better put, a “war against the possibility of war”. Practice has shown that all those who confront USA’s war on terrorism are immediately dubbed as terrorists, meaning that war on terrorism spawns more terrorists, and prevents the possibility

20) Ibid.

21) *Collins dictionary*, Internet, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fake-news>, 1/10/2018.

22) Ljubisa Bojic, Jean-Louis Marie, “Addiction to Old Versus New Media”, in: *Српска политичка мисао*, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, 2/2017, vol. 56, p. 41.

23) Miša Stojadinović, Petar Matić, “Desuverenizacija nacionalnih država u procesu globalizacije” in: *Globalizacija i suverenost – sa osvrtom na Bosnu i Hercegovinu*, (ed. Braco Kovačević), Evropski defendologija centar, Banja Luka, 2014, p. 91.

of classical war.²⁴ Kashnikov correctly observes that “the violence of the strong is immediately legitimated and the violence of the weak is immediately called terrorism”.²⁵ In this conflict with terrorists, there is obviously no moral symmetry, no equality of values and rights being defended and fought for.²⁶ This is a global police action using military means and personnel. In this new relationship between sides in conflict, one side has all the rights and privileges, as they are the police, and “they do nothing to forfeit their right not to be attacked or killed”,²⁷ while the other side has absolutely no rights, not even the right of self-defense against the “police”, as they are but criminals. Authors notice that in such situations “the distribution of power and entitlement is totally asymmetrical: all legitimate power and authority are exclusively on one side”²⁸ while the other side has the duty to surrender. Some revisionists, such as David Rodin, even insist that those who oppose just combatants should even be “held responsible for unjust killing *post bellum*”,²⁹ meaning that all those who dare to fight against a “just” side, face post war imprisonment in some secret prison or perhaps even execution!

So, if these new propaganda wars serve to negate the possibility of real war, what kind of a conflict do they produce? We believe that morally asymmetric conflicts, more specifically conflicts in which there is no moral symmetry of combatants, cannot be wars. This symmetry is an inherent and intrinsic attribute of war, and every conflict that lacks it cannot in fact be war. There are numerous implications of revisionist approach to JWT that corroborate our claim that there can be no war without moral symmetry. As we already mentioned, if one side is denied the right to fight, even in self-defense, and has a duty to obey, then we can draw a powerful analogy between this side and a criminal in everyday life. Criminalization of war produces such a relationship in which it is impossible for the “criminals” to win, as it is impossible for the police to “lose” in everyday life. Accordingly, there is no uncertainty of outcome,

24) We shall argue later that it prevents the possibility of any war, as it is impossible to wage war on terrorists.

25) Boris Kashnikov, “The Lost Victory”, *Српска политичка мисао*, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, 1/2016, vol. 51, p. 38.

26) We do concur that terrorist are not legal combatants, and do not enjoy equal rights. But we cannot simply refer to all those who oppose us as terrorists, regardless of the methods and political circumstances of their fight. Sadly, we are still to reach a global consensus regarding a precise definition of terrorism.

27) Jeff McMahan, *Killing in War*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 14.

28) Jovan Babić, “The Structure of Peace”, *Filozofski godišnjak*, Filozofski fakultet, Beograd, 2008, 21, p. 196.

29) David Rodin, “The Moral Inequality of Soldiers: Why jus in bello Asymmetry is Half Right” in *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*, (ed. David Rodin and Henry Shue), op.cit, p. 45.

as only one side has the right and theoretical possibility to win. Uncertainty of outcome is another inherent attribute of war³⁰ – if eliminated, we can no longer define a conflict as war. In practice, if the “just” side in war cannot lose, it implies that it can use everything necessary to secure triumph, even if it means completely disregarding the *Jus in Bello* demands. The use of nuclear weapons, if the “just” side has it, could be justified as a means of preventing an impossible defeat at the hands of the “bad guys”. As a matter of fact, there is a notion in the JWT, called the argument of “Supreme Emergency”³¹ that allows for the *Jus in Bello* to be ignored, under adequate circumstances. If a potential triumph in war is theoretically reserved only for one belligerent side, the “police”, then in practice every threat to this triumph would be considered an adequate cause to invoke the supreme emergency argument. On the other side, all those who fight for the “criminal” side, would *de facto* have no possibility of surrendering. If we deny a side the possibility of victory in war, and hold them responsible for mere participation in war in *post bellum*, we are giving them no other option but to fight till death. They cannot surrender and there is no possibility of an honorable defeat, because it would mean prison, torture, or even death in the post-war period, regardless of how they behaved and how they fought³² in war. Conflicts in which there is no moral symmetry of combatants and no equal right to victory are doomed to be understood as Manichean conflicts by both sides, as fights till death with no white flag option.

To continue, the “just” side would no longer have to have any type of respect for its enemies, as there is no place for a “warriors code” in a conflict against criminals. We claim that this is another necessary element of war, without which a conflict cannot be war. Shannon French notices the presence of a warrior code in virtually all societies in history and explains its utmost importance. She also writes, “the moral requirements become much murkier when warriors must battle murderers”,³³ meaning that much more is tolerated if we dehumanize and “de-warriorize” our enemies. If our enemies are not soldiers, but rather criminals and terrorists, we have no problem killing them with no human respect. This killing can take the form of high-altitude unselective air strikes, the use of cruising missiles launched thousands of kilometers from their targets,

30) See more about the necessity of uncertainty of war’s outcome in: Јован Бабић, *Теорија праведног рата и морални статус неизвесности његовог исхода*, Internet, <http://www.nspm.rs/savremeni-svet/teorija-pravednog-rata-i-moralni-status-neizvesnosti-njegovog-ishoda.html>, 07/10/2018.

31) The notion was coined by Winston Churchill, and introduced into the Just War Theory by Michael Walzer in his book *Just and Unjust Wars*.

32) Perhaps they didn’t even fight, perhaps they were just ‘pacifists in uniforms’

33) Shannon French, *The Code of the Warrior*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2003, p. 12.

or even drone strikes. This elimination of risk for one side also questions the possibility of defining such a conflict as war, as it is highly problematic and counter-intuitive to refer to riskless conflict as war. In the case of a drone operator, flying and firing a drone from an air-conditioned office in a military base deep in his own territory, there is literally no risk involved in his killing and “soldiering”. As some authors noticed, this type of killing resembles pest control and man-hunt³⁴ more than war. Some go as far as to say that this type of killing eliminates crucial martial virtues, such as courage and loyalty, introducing post-heroic militaries.³⁵ In conclusion to this argument, we would add that this type of conflict introduces not only post-heroic, but also post-warrior militaries, resembling heavily armed police forces much more than warrior-like bands of brothers. Thus, these new conflicts without warriors and without risk cannot be defined as wars.

4. CONCLUSION

New generation of war propelled by JWT revisionism represents a bloodless and soldierless war. New wars are theoretical and propaganda wars which aim to transform the following conflict into a police action of the righteous global police against the rightless criminals/terrorists. This type of a conflict cannot be war, as it lacks several crucial elements and attributes of war. Therefore, the final goal of this new war is to establish moral asymmetry between belligerent sides before the physical conflict, such an asymmetry that would preclude the possibility of war for those who dare to stand up to the self-proclaimed and exceptionalism-fueled global police force. Their resistance could no longer be a noble and chivalrous struggle of warriors on a battlefield, it could only be an unjust and illegal rejection of their duty to obey. The option of war is, and must always remain, *a conditio sine qua non* of sovereign nations. If we theoretically deprive a state of its right to wage war, we are effectively depriving it of its sovereignty, and “a state that loses its sovereignty ceases to be a state”.³⁶ *Ergo*, to eliminate the possibility of war for a nation means to negate its freedom of choice and its sovereignty. As Babić writes, “the *possibility* of war, not its reality, is an implication of freedom and a part of its price”,³⁷ and as long as we wish to live in a

34) Uwe Steinhoff, ‘Killing Them Safely: Extreme Asymmetry and Its Discontents’ in: (ed. Bradley Jay Strawser), *Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 207.

35) Robert Sparrow, ‘War without Virtue?’ in (ed. Bradley Jay Strawser), *Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military*, op. cit.

36) Радослав Гаџиновић, „Национална безбедност као кључни фактор у функционисању модерне државе“, in: *Војно дело*, МЦ Одбрана, Београд, 1/2017, p. 89.

37) Jovan Babić, *Moral i naše vreme*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 1998, p. 148.

world of sovereign and free nations, we must not allow the theoretical elimination of the possibility of war for any nation in the world. If we accept this revisionism of JWT, we open the door for its disturbing transformation into an elaborate theoretical apology of illegitimate global policing of superpowers with colossal propaganda machineries, which will use their powerful militaries and sophisticated weapons against all those who defy their will. The new generation of war is a war against the very possibility of legitimate resistance and against freedom.

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Драган Станар

РЕВИЗИОНИЗАМ И НОВИ КОНФЛИКТИ: НЕГАЦИЈА МОГУЋНОСТИ РАТА

Резиме

Теорија праведног рата развија се више од десет векова, а модерна верзија ове теорије представља сублимацију најзначајнијих ставова и закључака о питањима праведности и оправданости рата и ратовања. Традиционална теорија праведног рата раздваја суђење о праведности рата од суђења о праведног вођењу рата, дозвољавајући тако свим странама могућност да праведно воде рат, без обзира на природу рата. Са друге стране, ревизионизам традиционалне теорије праведног рата, који се појављује у последњих неколико деценија, негира један од основних постулата класичног разумевања рата – моралну једнакост свих бораца у рату. Представници ревизионизма сматрају да не може постојати морална равноправност бораца у рату, већ да су сви они који се налазе на „погрешној“ страни неправедни ратници, тј. криминалци, и да се морају третирати као криминалци, чак и по завршетку рата. Овакав приступ теорији праведног рата отвара врата криминализацији сукоба и трансформацији рата у полицијску акцију „праведне“ војске против „неправедних“ криминалаца који имају дужност да се предају. Једна од најпроблематичнијих импликација оваквог приступа јесте негација права одбране државе и народа који се пропагандним деловањем прогласи „неправедним“. Технолошки напредак средстава медијске манипулације, у синергији са механизмима глобализације, додатно олакшава пропагандно деловање и демонизацију противника. Сукоб који би проистекао из оваквог односа не може се дефинисати као рат, јер би му недостајало више кључних атрибута инхерентних рату. Уколико се ревизионизмом теорије праведног рата омогући и теоријско оправдање милитантног интервенционизма, отварају се врата и за теоријско оправдање десуверенизације модерних држава, поготово оних мање развијених и мање моћних.

Кључне речи: теорија праведног рата, ревизионизам, морална симетрија, нови ратови, асиметрични конфликти, суверенитет

* Овај рад је примљен 11. јануара 2019. године, а прихваћен на састанку Редакције 7. марта 2019. године.