



UDC 327+355.02(4-672EU):32(55/56+61)
Manuscript received: 27.02.2015.
Accepted for publishing: 29.03.2015.
Review article

Serbian Political Thought
No. 1/2015,
Year VII, Vol. 11
pp. 39-69

Slobodan Janković¹

Institute for International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

Aleksandar Gajić²

Institute for European Studies, Belgrade

EU Security Policy in North Africa and in the Middle East³

Abstract

The EU is a major trading power in the world and formally the largest economy. Yet, its security and foreign policy have minor weight in global affairs. The EU is trying to accommodate its economic interests, partnership with the USA and the promotion of the global political and economic policies aimed at the promotion and application of good governance, respect of human rights and democratisation. Although its documents contain popular proclamations and articulated aims towards a more assertive presence in world security, it has achieved modest results in the Middle East and North Africa, where it failed to provide unified action of its member states. Instead, NATO and the Franco-British entente frugale are indirectly taking over the functionality and efficiency of EU Common Security and Defense Policy in this region.

Keywords: EU, Middle East, Africa, CSDP, entente frugale, UfM.

Introduction

This study was undertaken just two years in the crisis of coloured revolutions, uprisings and wars that swept the North Africa and the

1 Research fellow
slobodan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

2 Research fellow

3 This paper was developed within the projects No. 179014 and 179029, funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.

Middle East (extended in Sahel) since 2011. In the chain reaction still ongoing we wanted to examine the security and defense policy of the major interstate integrated entity vis-à-vis changes in its vicinity. Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU (CSDP) is essential part of its overall foreign policy (External action). EU is relatively new player in the international relations and although many analysts, particularly from inside the Union, envisaged the coming heavy weight power of it in international relations, it is still hard to notice some success of it. World powers hardly can obtain some success if they fail in neighbouring countries. Analyses of the results of EU in its neighborhood will answer the questions over its possibility to project influence as an autonomous pole of power in the world. Hence, we will try to add some input in the examination of the efficiency of the EU in the part of its immediate neighborhood, in the Middle East and in the North Africa (MENA region).

The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean – North Africa and the Middle East, as the immediate European Union neighborhood are of the highest importance for the EU security. These regions are a significant strategic source of raw materials for the Union member's economies (source of fossil fuels and of number of ores and minerals), but they are also markets for services and final products from EU.

Back in 1972, the EEC (forerunner of the EU) underlined that the countries of Mediterranean basin are of utmost importance to it, which is why the EEC needs to engage them more. After the first commercial bilateral agreements in 1969 with the Maghreb countries, the Commission of the European Communities announced a Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1972 (Dagci 2007: 180). It resulted in the endorsement of a number of agreements: with Israel (May 11, 1975), Tunisia (June 25, 1976), Algeria (April 26, 1976), Morocco (April 27, 1976), Egypt (January 18, 1977), Kingdom of Jordan (January 18, 1977) and with Syria (18.01.1977). The EEC put effort into organizing the Euro-Arab dialogue in Luxembourg (May 1976), Tunisia (February 1977) and in Brussels (October 1977), which failed to provide significant outcome. The relations between the EEC and the Arab countries cooled down after the Camp David accords (1978). Certain progress was made at the meeting of the ministers of the foreign affairs of the Western Mediterranean countries in October 10th 1990.

The scheme of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries was drafted in Cannes (June 1995) and at the first Euro-

Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona (November 26-28 1995). Up until the 4th Euromed Foreign Ministers Conference (Marseille November 2000.), the desire to develop a partnership was repeated in various documents as well as the wish for encompassing a “just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question (Lisbon European Council 1992: 21);” A partnership with countries in the region was created in 2005 by establishing the European Neighborhood Partnership. Despite many agreements, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) did not have a stronger impact in the larger part of the Middle East (outside the Mediterranean and in particular – in Iraq, Iran, and the GCC countries). Except for cooperation with the USA in the economic isolation of Iran and now Syria, the security policy of the EU in this part of the world is reduced to participation in Middle East Peace process and sideline role in the stabilization of Iraq and Libya (and in Mali in Saharan Africa).

Security and Defense Policy of EU

Aside influencing social and political environment, since 1990s, and in particular with Saint-Malo meeting in 1998, European Union tends to articulate and eventually materialize military and security missions as an instrument of stabilization and maintenance of its influence in countries and in regions outside EU.

In the region the EU member countries unlike EU itself, are engaged in military missions. The interventions in Libya, in Côte d’Ivoire and in Mali are the latest examples of military missions of EU member states. Of 33 CSDP missions (Common Security and Defense Policy, before Lisbon known as ESDP – European security and Defense Policy) in 2010-2014 there were 22 ongoing CSDP missions of which 5 were in the Middle East (EUJUST LEX - Iraq, EUFOR LIBYA, EUBAM LIBYA, EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories, EUBAM RAFAH/ Palestinian Territories (CSDP: Missions and operations 2014).

At the EU summit in Helsinki in the year 1999 headline goal was the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force – ERRF consisting of 60.000 soldiers able to deploy in the theatre of war in 60 days. Fifteen EU member states decided to establish an armed force for rapid action (rapid reaction force - RRF) of 60.000 soldiers at the EU Council Meeting in Nice in 2002. The Defense Working Group presented a proposal

on the 16th of December 2002 to establish an agency which would enable closer cooperation between the EU member states with regards to arming and security. „The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg tried to establish the foundations for an EU military alliance” at the mini summit in April 2003 (EU Security and Defence Policy: 2011).

In the meantime the analysis of the former Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee by the Chiefs of Defense of NATO, Klaus Naumann, proved to be more realistic. Naumann claimed in 1999 that EU won't be capable to develop structure and logistics for the military intervention at least until year 2010 (Grevi at all 2009: 72). Projected number and the structure of the envisaged RRF were downsized to 19.500, and nevertheless even that turned to be out of reach for the EU (Jović-Lazić and Lađevac 2008: 98).

Finally, since 2007, officially “the EU Battlegroup concept reached full operational capability on 1 January 2007 and since that date, when responding to a crisis the EU is able to undertake two rapid-response deployments of limited duration if so decided by the Council, either as stand-alone actions or as part of a larger operation (EU Battlegroups, CSDP 2013).” EU battle group usually consists of 1500 members. France alone has been able to deploy more than 4000 troops in Mali with the logistic support of the British Army, so one may expect that EU battle groups may be effectively deployed if there would be an occasion and the political will. The EU battle group concept was based on a French-British-German initiative. Thus „the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the battlegroup concept, which was agreed by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in June 2004 (EU Battlegroups, CSDP 2013).” From the initially announced 60.000 RRF, EU ended with officially having at its disposal from three to four thousand rapidly deployable soldiers as of 2007. That is at the best 15 times smaller force than ideated in 1999.

In parallel with the initiative for the creation of the ESDP, Defense working group has suggested in December, 16th 2002 establishment of the agency that would allow closer cooperation of EU members in the field of the armaments and common security – EDA European Defense Agency. „ The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg attempted to lay the groundwork for an EU military alliance. However, the event was widely seen as divisive and conducive to a two-speed Europe...” is the mark of the mini summit in April 2003 (EU Security and

Defence Policy: 2011). United Kingdom and France (since 2010) were criticizing or being passive regarding functioning of the European Defense Agency – EDA (Jones 2011: 47).

EU was struck with the most serious crisis since its inception in 2003. It was centered on the issue of the participation in the Iraqi war (Second Persian Gulf War). This crisis preceded the elaboration of the European Security Strategy that was aimed to co-validate and confirm the European Security and Defense Policy as defined in Saint Malo in 1998 (European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003). Decision of the USA to intervene was taken without the approval of the UNSC and it was followed with opened row inside the EU.

At the moment when tensions were running high due to the Iraqi war, between France and Germany on the one side and the USA on the other, French president Jacques Chirac took the opportunity to launch the first fully autonomous EU military mission (crisis management operation) outside European continent. He did so, after consultations with the UN secretary general in May 2003. Effectively it was Franco-German operation with small contributions of other EU and non-EU members. It acted upon the UN mandate based on the SC UN Resolution 1484 of May the 30th 2003, and the first French forces landed in Ituri (DR Congo) on June 6th, in the French operation Mamba (Security Council Resolution S/RES/1484, 2003). Six days later Council of the European Union adopted decision to launch the operation Artemis—transforming the French military operation into French led EU mission ((Council decision 2003/432/CFSP). Combat troops were provided by the French (1000 soldiers) and 80 members of the Swedish army. Germans provided bulk of the engineers (350). Some countries provided medical, engineer and officer staff. Most of the rest participated through the representatives in the Paris headquarter (Homan 2007: 151-155). This short-time operation (6th June-1st September 2003) must be studied regarding to the specific international situation and Trans-Atlantic relations in that time frame. It cannot be mentioned just as the first ESDP military operation. Of course there are number of authors which continuously present this and many police missions, missions taken over by NATO after end of hostilities, border management and training as significant CSDP missions as proof of its ability.

Any examination of the EU security policy should emphasize that even after the Lisbon Treaty (entered into force on December 2009) this policy is still under primary competence of the member states

(Foreign and Security Policy 2011). This is officially stated even on the official internet presentation of the EU and it is also the conclusion of The Defense Committee of the European Security and Defense Assembly/WEU Assembly, of April 28th 2011 (CSDP: completely dependent on the political will of the member states 2011). French Ministry of Defense has the same conclusion (Le ministère de la Défense 2013).

For the understanding of the EU security policy in MENA region it is important to point out that it is primarily reactive. Hence, it is evolving as a response to the action of the foreign actors, primarily of NATO, and not as a pro-actively designed enterprise. As said above, this stems from the fact that security policy is predominantly in the sphere of the member states policies.

The EU has been constructing Defense policy since 1992 on the basis of the relations between EU, and WEU and NATO, as heightening of the collaboration with North Atlantic Alliance (The Daedalus European Security WEU 2001). French-British initiative of Saint-Malo (December 1998 when France was not in the NATO command) partially estranges from that collaboration. British officials have been publicly denying that Saint-Malo represents any alteration of the WEU-EU-NATO course (Ibidem). Saint-Malo initiative had several interpretations and two dimensions (St. Malo I and St. Malo II) of which the second one was aimed at accentuation of the military cooperation of British and French (Chafer, and Cumming 2010: 1132-3) (Dursun-Ozkanca and Mazzucelli 2011). It envisaged from the beginning common (bilateral) engagement in Africa. After 12 years these two countries – created new entente (Entente frugale) and by it they are substantially crossing outside the framework defined in Saint Malo. Aims of Saint-Malo are, is there a need to say, unaccomplished after 15 years. Now the two countries are employing the cooperation in the military defense sphere beside of the EU.

Thesis of the reactive policy of the EU is confirmed even with the fact that The Common Security and Defense Policy – CSDP, prior the European Security and Defense Policy –ESDP, was inaugurated after NATO military intervention on FR of Yugoslavia, in Cologne (June 1999). It is established in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — CFSP. European security strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World: EU Security Strategy was adopted in December 2003, after the proposal of the working group headed by Javier Solana

(Francisco Javier Solana de Madariaga). It represented reaction on the internal EU crisis, caused by the split over the military intervention in Iraq, in the year 2003. Solana, former NATO General Secretary was tasked to lead the EU team on security strategy and its reform (which resulted in 2008 report) (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World 2008). This, still valid strategy is confirming transatlantic trends in defining security and risks for it. Therefore, it considers as the main threats terrorism, proliferation of the WMD and regional conflicts (EU Security Strategy 2003). Migrations as security issue were not in vogue, back in 2003, despite the largest waves of the immigration in EU countries occurred in the last decade of the 20th century. They are mentioned by the way in the context of the movement of the population caused by climate changes (EU Security Strategy 2003: 6). At the pessimistic 30 May 2013 European Security Roundtable and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Conference “Perspectives for CSDP in the light of the December 2013 EU Council” basic conclusions were that collective defence is still NATO responsibility. As Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos of ISIS reported, the participants also “talked about the risk of CSDP disappearing, not in concept (as it is in the Treaties), but in practice.” (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2013).

EU approach to Syrian conflict since the inception was reactive following on the USA and Arab League initiatives. EU goal, as it was proclaimed, was to „stop the bloodshed” employing “(i) backing UN and League attempts to monitor the situation in Syria in an effort to restrain the Assad government; (ii) putting pressure on Damascus through sanctions; and (iii) using debates at the Security Council and the wider UN system to reinforce the case for pressure.” Effect of these policies may be deduced by answering the second of three test questions, posed by the Richard Gowan, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, regarding whether EU stance may be deemed as success: “if the economic situation does become intolerable, will Assad and his opponents finally come to talks or will they escalate to all-out war?” This question is the most important regarding the EU stated goal of stopping the violence and preventing an all-out war, which obviously was not prevented (Gowan 2012). All-out war in Syria endures for more than three years and several times it threatened to spill-over in Turkey and in Israel as it did in Iraq and in minor measure in Lebanon.

EU Strategy for MENA Region

Official strategy of the EU for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) still hasn't been formulated. Yet, there are a number of documents, of academic and expert studies on this issue indicating ideological EU approach. Many documents defining relations between EU and some MENA country or group of countries have been named strategic in its title, but mostly are dealing with human rights issues. Thus the site of the EU Parliament on July 29th 2013 had the notice that "A major step in enhancing the relations between the EU and Iraq is the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which will be the overarching framework constituting the legal basis for cooperation. The Agreement is expected to be signed in the first half of 2011." On the other hand the EU delegation in Iraq on July 29th 2013 was expecting this PCS to be signed "before the end of 2010" (Bilateral agreements: Iraq 2013 and Arab Peninsula, Iraq and Iran 2013).

Latest of the documents defining strategy toward South Mediterranean is A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, created as a reaction to changes in the North Africa in the beginning of the March 2011 (A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean 2011).

Broader document encompassing EU approach to the Middle East and North Africa is A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy of May 2011. This document was emphasizing concept of deep democracy. It proclaims that beyond EU itself and its partners "the ENP should serve as a catalyst for the wider international community to support democratic change and economic and social development in the region." (A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood 2011).

Key objectives of the EU in Africa, encompassing the North Africa and therefore the part of the Middle East are, according to official documents:

- Promotion of peace and security with conflict prevention and resolution along with the promotion of all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (The Africa-Eu Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy 2007: 2, 3, 5);
- Unrestrained access to raw materials and markets;

- Control of migratory movements, which is still mostly in the competence of the member states and involves sharp debate on the issue of national sovereignty and the competencies of the EU bodies. (now propelled by the migrants crisis) (Janković 2010: 233-4).

EU tend to achieve peaceful borders and peaceful neighborhood using: a) regional approach: Euro-Mediterranean partnership and UfM; and with the b) bilateral approach – creation of the belt of the associated countries in the East and in the South, of which those on the southern (but also on the Eastern) Mediterranean could progress up to the Advanced Status (Fischer, Lannon 2011: 3). Hence, as in the case of the countries aimed to join the Union, Brussels uses the conditionality policy by offering Association Agreement–AA, in some cases even the Advanced status-AS. Beside that, in the number of documents, EU envisages the possibility of intervention for the provision of peace and security.

Strategy of the EU in 2003 recalled the fact that (then) Union was the largest importer of the energy in the world and that it imports approximately half of the energy it consumes and that this dependency should be augmented to 70 percent of imported energy by the year 2030. In the march 2011, EU has expressed wishes for democratic, stable, progressive and peaceful southern Mediterranean (A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean: 2). Unlike the 2003 strategy, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean mentions gas and oil only once conceding just a little space to energy issues. Accent was on renewable sources of energy and de-carbonization by year 2050 with the perspective of the creation of the common energy market (A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean: 10). While the diminishing trade with Africa and in the constant trade deficit of EU in international trade outside Europe is yet no so visible, the grand project of turning Sahara to the provider of renewable energy by creating enormous solar factories – the Desertec project – has failed (Desertec abandons Sahara solar power export dream 2013).

The latest EU strategy repeats old objectives and partly old incentives for the reforms. Namely, the latest mentioned document discusses possibility of the partner countries to revamp the talks for the integration with the goal of acquiring the Advanced Status (AS) (A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern

Mediterranean: 5). However, since the year 2010 Tunis and Jordan have been negotiating for the Advanced Status with EU. Tunis was repeatedly praised by European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, Štefan Füle. In the letter addressed to Tunisian authorities on the March 25th 2010, Füle states that „Tunisia is undoubtedly in a strong position thanks to its economic and social achievements, and the excellent international cooperation it has with its partners... Such is the stability of the region that we should be able to set more ambitious objectives for the medium and long term, both in our bilateral relations and in regional cooperation... When compared to other Mediterranean partners, Tunisia is very well placed in most of these areas. However, in some areas more progress is definitely possible and necessary. The challenge is to achieve uniform progress in all sectors.” Füle has underlined extremely strong investments of EU in Tunis and defined the state of the relations as very positive. When speaking of the progress in other areas he refers to human rights and the rule of law (Tunisia and the European Union: a solid, confident and forward-looking partnership 2010).

Some may be surprised with the claim of Richard Youngs and Ana Echagüe that Brussels has neglected democracy, economic integrations and even energetic cooperation when it comes to relations with MENA countries. Only exception, according to these authors, was the cooperation in the field of the monitoring and control of the migrant movements — therefore EU is interested mainly in security cooperation (Youngs, and Echagüe 2011: 27, 31). Due to the control of the migrants EU was overlooking the violation of the human rights and the deficit of equity at the Tunisian presidential elections in 2009, when Zinedin Ben Ali was elected for the fifth consecutive time. During the 8th meeting of the EU-Tunisia Association Council in May 2010, this body has decided to form an ad hoc committee “to study the upgrading of the 1995 association agreement to the “advanced status”. Describing Tunisia as “an important and reliable partner”, Štefan Füle did not spare his words again and has said that perspectives for strengthening EU-Tunisia relations were “excellent” (Tunisia is a strategic opportunity for the EU 2011).

Since Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak have lost the power and the EU from the beginning of the military intervention against Libya was hoping for the coming end of the leader of the Libyan revolution, in the EU strategic document of March 2011 is emphasized „A commitment

to adequately monitored, free and fair elections...” as entry qualification for the Partnership with the EU (A Partnership for Democracy And Shared Prosperity with The Southern Mediterranean: 5). Except for the monitoring of the elections the EU obliges itself to support civil society, political parties, trade unions and associations, democratic reforms (Ibid)... After the changes in Egypt and the ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the EU, while waiting for the new elections, has announced through A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, and its follow-up documents, new policy in the North Africa in three dimensions:

- Democratic transformation and institution building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption
- A stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular focus on the young
- Sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development especially to support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health and education systems and development of the poorer regions (Follow-Up to the Joint Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity 2011).

EU and North Africa and the Middle East, Cooperation and Problems

EU on the one hand and the Middle East and North Africa on the other, have a similar population (2010. The MENA region with Turkey and Mauritania had a population of 463 million EU 501 million). Four fifth of the already mild increase in EU population is the contribution of the mechanical flow of immigrants, while the slowly diminishing rate of the population growth in southern and eastern Mediterranean, originates entirely from those regions (EUROSTAT 2011). Demographer David Coleman (David Coleman) believes that in order to maintain the proportion of employees and dependents, Europe needs 25 million migrants a year. This, argues Coleman, would lead to drastic cultural and political changes with possible implications for security (Dabbs Sciubba J 2008: 122). American research centers of migration

have suggested in the year 2008 an ideal model to replenish the lack of population in EU with the surplus population of MENA countries plus Turkey (Fargues 2008: 29).

Western European countries aside low birth rates have slow or null economic growth since the beginning of the 21st century. That is one of the reasons that their share of the world trade is diminishing. Good example is the EU share in the African trade. In fact in the year 1990, contemporary EU member states accounted for the 51 percent of the African commerce while in 2008 their share was only 28 percent. Similar is the case with Turkey. In the same period the Asian share in African trade, mostly due to China and India outpaced the EU with 29 percent of the African commerce. Russian export to Africa has been growing 25 percent per year in the period 2000-2008 and the Chinese export grew in the same period 39 percent per year (Schoeman 2011: 38, 39; Olivier 2011: 57). Trade volume between China and the WANA (West Asia and North Africa, term used by the Chinese to describe 22 Arab states plus Turkey, Israel and Iran) or the Middle East, was \$268.9 billion in 2011, with the year-on-year growth of 36.5 percent (Huber 2013: 11). Chinese trade with the sole Arab countries reached “\$ 222.4 billion, an increase of 14%, a new record.” (Sino-Arab economic and trade cooperation is still sustainable development 2013).

The EU has established relations throughout the region through the Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, succeeded by the Union for the Mediterranean, as of July 2008. Apart from the proclaimed goals of the UfM, the broader aim of the policy towards the Mediterranean is the creation of Free Trade Zone, which was anticipated by the Barcelona Process for 2010. This goal was not achieved whilst the negotiations on delaying its entry into force with Algeria failed (20th of June 2011.) (EU rejects Algeria proposal to delay free-trade 2011).

The Union for the Mediteranean

This initiative represents the continuation of the Barcelona Process – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (form 1995). The initial founding event of the Union for the Mediterranean was held in Paris in the 13th of July, 2008. Apart from the regional approach in tying the Mediterranean countries to Brussels, the EU also aimed at satisfying the

ambitions of Turkey for forging a closer bond with the EU whilst not admitting her to the EU as a full member state. The Republic of Turkey refused this offer while the initiative was still in the initial phase.

The UfM regularly invites representatives of the Arab League to its meetings and conferences. The basic aims of the initiative that brings the EU member states and the Mediterranean states which are not a part of the EU (27+16), from Monaco to Jordan, pertain to cooperation in: 1) ecology, 2) construction of transport infrastructure, 3) protection against natural and other disasters 4) planning the development of using solar energy (the Mediterranean solar energy plan), and 5) stimulating small enterprises (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2011). The effects of this initiative following a period of two and a half years are of lesser importance. The initial version was rejected by Colonel Gaddafi, who said „We are neither hungry nor thirsty so that you should throw a bone at us...” . The governments of Turkey and Algeria reacted in more or less the same way (Siemes 2009: 26). Furthermore, Algeria distanced itself from the EU Neighborhood Policy and from other means of cooperation with the EU, opting for direct bilateral cooperation with the EU member states.

The founding declaration of the UfM states that the text remains susceptible to change due to the disagreement of the Palestinians with a part of the text calling for support to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in accordance with the Annapolis Process (Janković 2008).” The absence of any EU and UfM reactions to the Israeli military actions in the Gaza strip in 2008 and 2009 brought serious doubt into the purposefulness of their regional initiative. In the end, just like the Euro Med, the UfM and its policies envisaged in A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean leaves „little hope that these new initiatives are likely to achieve fundamentally better results than their predecessors, and their impact on shaping reform in the Arab world...” (Kirişci 2012: 2).

One of the core projects of the UfM was The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP), described as “a flagship initiative of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)” and “one of the priority projects of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).” It also failed with the mentioned Desertec project (Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012).

The Military and Security Component

With regards to the security component, it should be noted that the EU has three smaller missions in the broader region of the Middle East and North Africa: EUJUST LEX, (the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq), the mission to Iraq from 2005 to December 2013 with 66 members were tasked to train the Iraqi Police, prison guards and court employees; EUPOL COPPS Police Mission in the West Bank which was established with 99 mission members in 2006; and the EUBAM Rafah Mission (The European Union Border Assistance Mission), at the Rafah border crossing between the Palestinian territories and Egypt, with a team of 8 members. The EUPOL COPPS coach the Palestinian police on contemporary methods of work. Other contemporary method in traditional policing was managed by the American Lt. General Keith Dayton). (Dayton's mission: A reader's guide 2011).

Missions in Somalia (around Somalia) and since February in Mali are located in Sub Saharan Africa.

The involvement of the EU in the Mediterranean was intended to enable a peaceful environment, which was almost impossible, according to the Strategy from 2003 without the resolution of the Israeli - Arab conflict: „The resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict is a strategic priority of Europe. Without that, there is little opportunity to deal with other problems in the Middle East.” (EU Security Strategy 2003: 13). Proposals and suggestions from European academics and think tanks still insisted on the need to resolve the conflict (Álvarez-Ossorio Alvaríño 2004). Despite the fact that following vague statement is posted on the foreign affairs page of the EU “The EU's objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours..” EU regards the blockade of Gaza as unacceptable (which has lasted for the last few years) and supports the negotiations with Syria and Lebanon (The EU and the Middle East Peace Process 2011).

Whilst these are the proclaimed goals of the EU economic pressure towards Israel is envisaged by denying grants prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU, to the organization and for the activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. This application of new Guidelines for the Israeli entities and their activities although previously delayed should begin from 2014 (Official Journal of the European Union 2013). But there were even before attempts to influence

Israel by applying these types of economic sanctions. Even the latest Guidelines did not produce any change in the position of Israel regarding Judea and Samaria. In fact while “some of the Israeli industries situated in the territories at that time relocated into the pre-1967 Israeli borders, but at the same time, many Palestinians who used to work for these industries lost their jobs.” (Munin 2014: 1). EU action even created the situation in which not only Israeli, but also “Palestinian businesses and populations in these areas are not entitled to the benefits of any of the Association Agreements.” (*Ibid.*: 4).

It may seem that this differs from the USA policy, but it comes in the moment that USA is reviving the idea of the Arab-Israeli Peace process. Other regional policy are aligned with the American as it is in the case of Iran, Syria, the Hamas and other states and actors on the international scene who oppose the USA. Shortly after the Hamas government was constituted (March 2006) on the Occupied Territories, the USA and the EU enforced measures to prevent the supply of aid top Palestine through its elected representatives, apart from the president, under the condition that he does not cooperate with the Hamas. The EU re-established the system of supplying aid through the government, since June 2007 when Abbas proclaimed the minority government formed by the Fatah by violent means (The EU and the Middle East Peace Process 2011: 36). This is of great significance considering that the EU is the single largest donor to the Palestinians (European Neighbourhood Policy 2008). The EU has also reacted towards the sides at war by condemning the Palestinian terrorists for their attack on Jewish seminarists in Jerusalem on the 6th of March 2008 and the rocket attack from Gaza on one side and the statement of remorse for the civilian victims in Gaza (over 100 dead) (Declaration by the Presidency 2008).

The EU has, up until now, together with the USA publicly supported the intentions of the Fatah to return its armed forces to the Gaza strip (Moran 2008). This kind of public diplomacy has created an additional rift between the local Arab population and the technocratic government in Ramallah (Palestine Papers 2011).

It is clear today that the EU strategy towards the peace process in the Middle East has not achieved any significant results, which is the view of numerous European Analysts and research institutes (Bulut Aymat 2010; Kirişci 2012 from Behr and Nieminen 2010:43). One of the most perspective analysts from the EU Institute for Security Studies Daniel Keohane, predicted in the winter of 2012-2011, that NATO might as-

sume an even more important role in the European Neighborhood, including North Africa and the Middle East, as support to the EU for stimulating political reforms. Keohane notices that NATO has experience in encouraging others to reform their security sector. Nevertheless, he stated that “in case of a future crisis in the European Neighborhood which would require a military response, if the USA cannot or refuse to respond, then the EU will most probably have to respond and not NATO.” (Keohane 2010/2011: 26, 27). Occasion for the fulfillment of this statement soon emerged in Libya. But the outcome was quite different than wished by Keohane.

Franco-British Entente and the Case of Libya

Bilateral defense cooperation between UK and France started with two agreements signed on November 2nd 2010: 1) on common defense policy and 2) on joint X-Ray and hydrodynamic infrastructures for nuclear cooperation – more precisely the modeling of the performances of nuclear warheads (Reuters 2012). United Kingdom and the French Republic are essentially passive regarding the function of EDA (European Defense Agency – EDA) (Jones 2011: 47). UK has blocked the establishment of operational headquarters (OHQ) in Brussels for EU military missions in 2011 having preferential for the bilateral or NATO arrangements (Rettman 2012). Although France accounts for some of the most ardent EU integration promoters, in the sphere of the defense it is opting for the solutions independent of the EU like bilateral cooperation with UK and in minor measure multilateral initiatives as in recently incepted Weimar Plus (France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Italy).

When Sarkozy’s France and Great Britain initiated a military cooperation in November 2010 — ‘entente frugale’ — they brought all the inadequacies of the previous EU common defense policies and joint military engagement to the surface. This cooperation is not focused on forging a new European military force. On the contrary, the sole aim of the initiative is to maintain and strengthen the military capacities of the sovereign states of France and the United Kingdom with the purpose of ensuring the continuity in the military influence of these two countries. Apart from aiming to maintain and strengthen their own military capacities in a period of economic crisis, the Franco-British cooperation is aimed at forging a partnership with the USA and Germany has, as

an unreliable partner, been deliberately left out under the excuse that it has a different political orientation towards the external projection of force. „The Franco-British cooperation offers no direct path to a more coherent, rational future for fragmented European defense. Indeed, it is a project with its own significant challenges.” (Jones 2011: 47). „The New Entente“ had its first test of cooperation with the USA in Libya in March 2011. The Libyan war has become the testing ground for European military alliances since the end of the Cold War and that is why the British Prime Minister, David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Libya together on the 15th of September 2011. The Center for European Reform published an article in October 2011 in which it called upon the UK and France not to give up on the defense cooperation at the level of the EU (O’Donnell 2011).

Defense and security cooperation between two countries that had been allies in the First and Second World War continued even after new government and new president took office in the France. New French Minister and the British counterpart signed two new agreements on the July 24th 2012 for the development of Future Combat Air System, or FCAS, unmanned air system and on the Watchkeeper – Tactical unmanned air system, which provides the British armed forces with surveillance and reconnaissance (Defence cooperation 2013). As Chatham House engaged security expert Benoit Gomis observes: “Progress has been achieved since 2010 at the institutional level. Frequent meetings and liaison between the two defense ministries, Senior Level Group, High-Level Working Group and the UK-French Defense Parliamentary Working Group on Defense Cooperation have been held. Preparations for the forthcoming Combined Joint Expeditionary Force in 2016 are being made, with a number of joint military exercises (like Corsican Lion) already carried out.” (Gomis 2013). Last joint operation is being made in Mali, where UK was assisting French Army sending 330 personnel (Rusi org). What about Libya?

At the beginning of the crisis, European Union had an obviously undefined policy towards the intervention in Libya. The EU lifted its sanctions towards Libya in 2004, when the European Council identified two priority areas of cooperation, both of which were concerned with internal crisis situations in Libya which had their implications on the EU: the Benghazi crisis (related to AIDS) and the illegal immigration which impacted the EU via Libya, which is why negotiations were held in November 2008 regarding a draft Agreement between the EU

and its member states on one, and Libya on the other side.. During the entire pre-war period in Libya, this state made it clear that it had no intention of joining the Union for the Mediterranean or the European Neighborhood policy.

The EU stance and attitude towards the war in Libya in 2011 represents an ambiguity. The EU initially “expressed concern about the situation in Libya, harshly condemning that violence and use of force against civilians and exerting repressive measures against peaceful protesters and called for an immediate stop to the use of force and taking the legitimate requests of the population into account.” (EU Humanitarian Assistance in Libya 2011). The European Council supported the implementation of the UN SC Resolution 1970 on the 3rd of March and readdressed the demand for an immediate stop to the hostilities and readiness to support the humanitarian efforts under the coordination of the UN on the 17th of March. The same body reached an agreement on the Concept of Crisis Management as a potential response and means of support to the implementation of the UN SC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 where the European military forces would assist the representatives of the UN and the evacuation of refugees in the border regions between Libya and Tunisia and Egypt, on the 24th of March (Ibid). The statements issued by Catherine Margaret Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union, confirming that the EU supports dialogue (immediately after the commencement of the air campaign on Libya) and the statement given by Herman Achille Van Rompuy, the president of the EU Council, saying that the goal of the campaign in Libya is the change of the regime and France and the UK could not initiate the campaign without the support of the Council of Ministers just continued the confusion and ambiguity already present in policy of the EU. In order to initiate negotiations, Catherine Ashton opened and EU representative Office in Benghazi on the 22nd of March (the stronghold of the rebels). Responding to the questions of members of the European Parliament regarding these contradictions, the president of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, stated that it was impossible to adopt the UN SC Resolution 1973 which affirms the historical principal responsibility to protect (Nigel Farage 2011) without the support of the EU The European Parliament requested that a “no-fly” zone be established over Libya and called for j „an immediate end to the brutal dictatorial regime of Colonel Gaddafi” on the 10th of March 2011 (European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011).

Prior to that, the EU considered a military campaign towards the end of February (UK urges pressure on Gaddafi 2011). Finally, the Council of the EU brought down a decision to draft and design plans and other essential means and measures for initiating a military campaign in Libya under the name EUFOR Libya. All of these decisions would be implemented in the case that the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA requested them from the EU, as stated in paragraph 5. Nevertheless, the Commander of the Operation was appointed, an Italian Vice Admiral as well as the Operations Headquarters— Rome. The budget of the military mission was estimated and 7 million 900 thousand Euros over a four month period over which the goals would be reached (Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP 2011). Denmark refused to participate in covering the costs of the mission. Considering that the UN Office did not address a request and that there was no EU military mission, the readiness of the EU to initiate the EUFOR Libya mission was repeated at the meeting of the Ministers of Defense of the EU Council on the 3rd of May, should the UN call upon them (Meeting of EU Chiefs of Defence 2011).

If we bear in mind that the military campaign of France, the UK and the USA called Operation Odyssey Dawn was already in place since the 19th of March and that NATO took over the command and initiated the Operation Unified Protector on the 22nd of March, and then all of the facts listed above seem like a delay. In addition to that, the date of the Decision (first of April) on bringing down the Decision, add a dose of humor.

Regardless of the requests of certain European politicians, the EU did not conduct its first humanitarian intervention so that it could evacuate its civilian workers in the Libyan Jamahiriya. This was done by some of the member states because there were hundreds of Special Forces soldiers from France and the UK already stationed in Libya in February 2011. The New York Times and other global Medias announced on the 20th of April that the British military advisors and officers in Libya would be joined by their Italian and French colleagues (Cowell and Somaiya 2011). Towards the end of March, there were reports in the press on the actions of British SAS Officers in Libya (Defence Correspondent 2011). It was reported at the beginning of March 2011 that members of the Egyptian Special Forces were active in Libya, that they were arming and training rebels. The 777 Unit was mentioned as it was practicing with the German and American anti/terrorist units (UPI 2011).

Six members of the British Army Special Forces and two members of MI6 were caught by one of the rebel groups in Libya at the beginning of March 2011 (CBSnews 2011). Reporters recognized British Special Forces in one of the video clips broadcasted by the Qatar Broadcasting Network Al Jazeera, who they claimed were engaged by private military companies so that the British Army would not officially participate in the ground campaign (Hughes 2011). Towards the end of the war, CNN reported that British, French, Jordanian and Qatar Special Forces took part in the ground operations in Tripoli and other parts of the country in order to overcome the last efforts of resistance by Gaddafi's forces (Starr 2011).

The War in Libya and the EU

Libya is a country with the richest oil resources in North Africa, which exports oil and gas to Italy and other European countries. As one of the ten countries with the largest confirmed oil resources of the highest quality, it primarily supplies Italy, France and other EU member states. Managing Libyan cured oil resources brings an annual profit of at least 70 billion dollars. It is important for the control of the supply of oil&gas and indirectly for the control of the industrial and technological powers that purchase this oil. Italy was the single largest importer of Libyan oil (376.000 barrels per day) and France, Spain and Austria were also great importers. Apart from Libya's key trade partner – Libya, China also imported oil from Libya despite the fact that it covers only 3% of its needs for oil.

The importance of Libya at the regional level was also reflected in the bilateral agreement on readmission with Italy under which this EU member state was able to return illegal immigrants who reached its shore via Libya. Libya enjoyed an exceptional position in the North Africa because among other things, it led its internal and foreign policy independently which grouped her among the rare truly sovereign states in the last 20 years. The Libyan Jamahiriya and Syria are the only two states in the Union for the Mediterranean which did not sign a Free Trade Agreement with the EU.

Gaddafi used the oil wealth to force foreign companies to leave the greatest portion of their income in Libya (the EPSA-4 Agreements — usually over 90%) if they wished to continue of to conduct research in

order to exploit. After the sanctions were lifted in 2003, Libya stated opening up to foreign investments primarily in the energy sector, which were followed by investments in infrastructure and tourism. The opening of to major iron mines was announced in 2010. The Libyan Oil Corporation retained the best oil resources for itself while the foreign companies had great expenses due to a limited number of minor deposits (27) compared to the number of wells (approximately 600). Companies that already had contracts to exploit from 2007 were forced to renegotiate and sign new EPSA-4 agreements under much less favorable terms.. According to Reuters, one of the WikiLeaks files claimed that Gaddafi and his sons forced western oil companies to pay 1,5 billion dollars which is the amount Libya paid into the Fund for the victims of Libyan terrorist from the 1980s. The Italian ENI was compelled to pay a billion dollars in 2007, to receive a contract until 2042 (Ledwith 2011). On the other hand, Libya invested in numerous western companies after the US lifted their sanctions: Repsol (Spain), Edf, Exxon, Siemens, British Petroleum, GlaxoSmithKline, Royal Dutch Shell, bank Standard Chartered, Vodafone, Pearson, Alcatel Lucent, Chevron, Pfizer, Xerox, Halliburton и Honeywell (which operates in the military aero-astronautic industry), EADS (the European military industry), Unicredit (7,8% share of the bank), Nestlé (Courrier International 2011). Libya invested 100 million Euros in the leading Italian arms manufacturer Finmeccanica. It was announced at the end of January 2011 that Libya would buy more shares in the company. Freezing Libyan assets which are assumingly, freely managed by the states in which Libya invested (approximately 33 billion dollars, only in the USA) gave the impression of grand theft. Mahmoud Jibril El-Warfally, the interim Prime Minister (5 March to 23 October 2011) and head of the National Transitional Council of the Republic of Libya (the Rebel Government) was marked as an acceptable leader to lead the Libyan “fighters for democracy” by the European Parliament in Strasbourg (ALDE 2011). In an article published by the New York Times on the 12th of May 2011, he commended the USA and the international community for its assistance and asked for a continuation and intensification of the NATO air raids as well as increased aid in the protection of civilians. He also called on the USA to join France, Italy, Qatar and Gambia in their recognition of his Government. After Jibril, (“a political scientist trained at the University of Pittsburgh”) the interim government elected the electro-engineering professor Abdel Rahim Al Kiba, who has been residing in the USA since 1976 (The New York Times May 5. 2013). On the 22nd

of August 2011, Richard Hass stated that Libya needs the support of NATO in order to prevent chaos and a civil war between the various groups who are aiming to impose their power after Gaddafi (FT Times August 22, 2011).

Under the auspice of the concern for civilians, the Anglo-French coalition together with the USA began its air campaign against Libya which turned into a NATO military intervention.. The rebels used fighter planes, tanks, other heavy and light arms. NATO and EU state officials publicly announced that their goal was to change the regime. NATO representatives complained that they could not always distinguish Gaddafi forces from the rebels on the ground which occasionally caused “collateral damage” by means of destroying rebel tanks. In other words, NATO anticipated in the civil war in Libya and was assisted politically by the EU during its course. Resolution 1973 made no mention of protecting rebels, which became NATO’s mission.

Similar to the issue of participating in the intervention, the participation in the “post crisis management” is an issue over which there were opposing views within the EU, that is, an independent stance and action of some member states contrary to that of the Union. This is primarily the result of the degree of dependence on oil resources of some member states: Italy satisfied 22% of its needs from Libya before the conflict whilst France covered 16% of its needs. If we take the trade exchange into consideration, the predictions, such as the one given by the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Wauquiez, the continued instability on the territory of post-conflict Libya as well as the unsuccessful reconstruction would imply a new influx of 200-300 000 immigrants in the EU, the motives for engagement in Libya are more that evident (Conley 2011). The EU member states with the largest individual engagement were the United Kingdom and France (which covered $\frac{3}{4}$ of the total costs of the intervention), Italy, and Turkey, as the most significant non-EU partner, whilst at the same time, German engagement lacked significantly in the post-conflict activities.

The EU as a whole, declared to provide support to Libya in the final phase of the armed conflict between Gaddafi’s loyalists and the rebels in three priority areas: assistance to the new Government to establish peace and safety on the territory of the entire state (failed), enabling the administration of humanitarian aid, and providing assistance in building new institutions (Ibid). The Committee that was supposed to be tasked with the responsibility for evaluating the reconstruction needs

in Libya, arrived in Tripoli on the 31st of August 2011, two days after the Humanitarian Bureau was established (EU Mission Arrives at Tripoli 2011). EU services for reconstructing the Libyan Security forces were offered and sanctions were lifted for 28 of the most important Libyan companies (EU offers to reform Libyan Security Forces 2011). A permanent Mission of the EU was opened in Tripoli on the 13th of November 2011 (eubusiness.com 14 November 2011), while the frozen accounts of the Libyan Central Bank in the European states were released under an EU Decision on the 21st of December 2011 (eubusiness.com 21 December 2011). In the meanwhile instability, occasional breakthrough of the news from Libya told the story of a destroyed country with clashing militias, using even heavy weaponry (as in the Bani Walid siege in October 2012) or factional fighting that is ongoing living dead people in Tripoli and elsewhere two wars after the NATO intervention (CNN June 27. 2013).

Another reflection of the EU policy in the region is the fate of the Italian naval mission Mare Nostrum (2013-2014). It was established after series of tragic shipwrecks in which illegal immigrants directed toward EU costs lost their lives, in particular after the tragedy near Italian island Lampedusa in which more than 360 people died in Mediterranean. Operation costed Italy 10 million euros per month (Mare Nostrum 2014). After Italy repeatedly asked for the EU to take charge and divide the costs, EU declined due to insufficient capabilities. As former EU justice and home affairs commissioner and current Trade commissioner Cecilia Malmsröm explains: “We can’t have an operation like Mare Nostrum when member states continue to shrink their financial contributions to the EU. We simply don’t have the finances, machinery and manpower to match an operation like Mare Nostrum, because we depend on member states for their contribution and we cannot force them to do so if they don’t want to” (Malta Today 5 November 2014). Instead EU launched much more limited operation Triton, guarding only the Italian waters with yearly budget of mere 5 million euro (Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ 2014).

Conclusion

If one can talk about foreign policy of the EU and therefore of some EU interest, than it is surely stability at the borders, in the first line for the control of the migratory movements and the energy influx.

Further pauperization of the population in the Middle East, scarcity of the potable water, and eventual new wars are whetting new migratory pressures on the EU member states. The continuity and possible intensification of waves of immigrants would undoubtedly have an additional impact on the demographic and cultural characteristics of the local population and potentially, the political culture.

The basic problem that arises between the urge for stability on one side, and the US's intent to secure the survival and stability of its ally – Israel, implies a weakening in Israel's position in the long term with the increasing economic and military power of the Islamic states that surround it. Only a radical change in the Islamic religious practice amongst the majority of the Islamic population, or the same, amongst the Jews, would diminish the problem stated above. At the same time, the antagonism between the urge for ensuring stability and enforcing Israeli military supremacy, is leading to clash between the interests of the USA and the EU. This has become more than evident at the time of the announcement of initiating a Court case against NATO for the bombing of Serbia. The Jewish Israeli organization Almagor announced in 2009 that it would pursue a Court case as a reaction to the Spanish investigation of the Israeli bombing in the Gaza strip in 2002 which resulted in 15 victims (Beck 2009). Clearly this was only part of the Israeli tactics to stop the initiative in Spain.

The EU has been occupied with the process of economic, legal and political integrations for over a decade and as of recently, the financial structural and economic crisis. The problems associated with the coordination of common foreign and defense policy have shed light on different visions on the development of the EU, especially the UK and Germany which represent that bearers of these differences. European Security has not shown any significant improvement even 13 years after St. Malo, and the formalization of a Anglo-French Alliance has emphasized the division with regards to security policy as well as the dependence of the EU on transatlantic structures (such as NATO) in the areas of defense and security. The air campaign on Libya, regardless of the motives has additionally hampered the EU principals and enabled the Anglo-American companies to take action in order to exert control over Libyan energy resources. This would imply a greater transatlantic influence on the EU in the field of energy safety. Due to internal divisions and discrepancies between NATO and EU policies, the EU has not been engaged in these areas according to its

nominal potentials so far. For now, EU foreign and especially security policy shows signs of stagnation.

Bearing everything in mind, we can conclude that EU security policy towards North Africa and the Middle East shows three trends:

- EU foreign and primarily defense policy outside of the Europe has failed. Unlike in the south of the Sahara, where occasional successes have been noted, (partially with the EUNAVFOR mission in the Somali waters — the number of pirate attacks has increased in the period 2009-2010 whilst attacks on ships carrying aid in food have reduced) (Partnership for Peace Review 2011), the EU hasn't managed to achieve a position of a significant, not to mention, leading factor in security policy in the Mediterranean Neighborhood. At present, the EU remains an economic giant and military dwarf. In other words, the EU is acting as the political and economic wing of NATO.
- NATO and other bilateral and multilateral ad hoc initiatives have a tendency of forming even formal alliances among the EU member states (as Franco-British Entente), independent and sometime in direct opposition to the intent of establishing a common defense and security policy. This is preventing and disabling the EU from taking a stronger stance and achieving a stronger impact as a military power and therefore hampering its image as a potential global player.
- The EU continues to promote political, legal and social reforms in compliance with the USA, NATO and international economic and financial institutions which are increasing the complexity of economic cooperation with the countries in the region. This has resulted in a decrease in the share of the EU in trade with the Middle East and North Africa and given the EU the image of the younger partner and the ally in the joint action through NATO.

Bibliography

Documents

A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy, Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee Of The Regions, COM(2011) 303 Brussels, 25/05/2011.

A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Joint Communication To The European Council, The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions, COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8.3.2011.

“Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP”, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 89/18 5.4.2011.

“Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Middle East”, P/08/32, Brussels, 14 March 2008, [online] Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/08/32&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, [accessed on: 28/03/2008]. 24

Defence cooperation, French Embassy in London, [online] Available at: <http://ambafrance-uk.org/Defence-cooperation>, [accessed on: 25/02/2013].

“European Neighbourhood Policy – The Occupied Palestinian Territory”, MEMO/08/213, Brussels, 3 April 2008, [online] Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/213&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, [Accessed on: 28/03/2008].

“European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, Internet, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, [Accessed on: 28/03/2011].

“European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya in particular”, P7_TA(2010)0246, 10 March 2011, [online] Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0246&language=EN>, [Accessed on: 10/04/2011].

“Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted efforts to manage migration in the Central Mediterranean”, European Commission Memo, Brussels, 7 October 2014, [online] Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_en.htm, [Accessed on: 05/11/2014].

“Follow-Up to the Joint Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010”, Brussels, 25/05/2011 SEC(2011) 638, [online] Available at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:4AfkCRL6Eu4:ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2011/sec_11_638_en.pdf+European+Neighbourhood+Policy+joint+Communication+in+April.&cd=2&hl=sr&ct=clnk&source=www.google.com, [Accessed on: 20/06/2011].

“Foreign and Security Policy”, *European Union: Foreign & Security Policy*, [online] Available at: http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm, [Accessed on: 17/06/2011].

Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards, (2013/C 205/05), Official Journal of the European Union C 205/9, 19.7.2013.

- “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean”, Paris, 13 July 2008, [online] Available at: http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/0713_declaration_de_paris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf, [Accessed on: 08/08/2008].
- “Libia: Rapporti paese congiunti Ambasciate/Uffici Ice estero 1^ sem. 2010”, [online] Available at: <http://www.ice.gov.it/paes/pdf/libia.pdf>, [Accessed on: 14/05/2011].
- Mare Nostrum*, Marina Difesa, [online] Available at: http://www.marina.difesa.it/attivita/operativa/Pagine/Mare_Nostrum.aspx, [Accessed on: 12/11/2014]. 25
- “Meeting of EU Chiefs of Defence”, Consilium EU, [online] Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=261<=en>, [Accessed on: 20/05/2011].
- “Mediterranean Solar Plan”, 19/01/2012, [online] Available at: <http://ufmsecretariat.org/mediterranean-solar-plan/#>, [Accessed on: 26/07/2013].
- Palestine Papers*, January 2011.
- “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World –”, S407/08 Brussels, 11 December 2008.
- “The EU and the Middle East Peace Process”, *European Union External Action Service*, [online] Available at: http://www.eas.europa.eu/mepp/index_en.htm, [Accessed on: 19/06/2011].
- “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, *Euromed*, [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm, [Accessed on: 15/03/2009].
- “Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.”
- “Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation”, London, Cm 7976 02 November 2010.
- “Tripoli Declaration”, Tripoli, 30 November 2010, [online] Available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc_tripoli_declaration_en.pdf, [Accessed on: 28/03/2011].

Books and Articles

- ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, “Verhofstadt congratulates Mahmoud Gebril on being nominated as Prime Minister of the Libyan Interim Government”, 24 Mar 2011, [online] Available at: <http://pr.euractiv.com/press-release/verhofstadt-congratulates-mahmoud-gebril-being-nominated-prime-minister-libyan-interim>, [Accessed on: 03/04/2011].
- Álvarez, I. – Alvaríño, O. (December 2004), “The European Strategy for the Middle East”, *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 4 No. 19, pp. 12.

- “Arab Peninsula, Iraq and Iran”, [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.4.6.html, [Accessed on: 29/07/2013].
- Archer, T, Behr, T, and Nieminen, T. (eds.) (2010), “Why the EU fails: Learning from past experiences to succeed better next time, Helsinki, *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*.
- (FIIA Report No. 23/2010), [online] Available at: <http://www.fiaa.fi/en/publication/131>, [Accessed on: 12/02/2012].
- “Almagor to sue NATO over Serbia”, *Jewish Post*, [online] Available at: <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1239710862408&pagename=JP%20ost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>, [Accessed on: 06/05/2009].
- “Bilateral agreements: Iraq”, [online] Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/eu_iraq_political_relations/agreements/index_en.htm, [Accessed on: 29/07/2013].
- Bulut Aymat, E. (ed.) (December 2010), *European involvement in the Arab/Israeli conflict*, Chailot papers.
- Chafer, T. and Cumming, G. (2010), “Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French security cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo”, *International Affairs* 86: 5 1129–1147.
- Conley, H. A, Dukkipati, U, (2011) „Leading from the front –Europe and New Libya”, [online] Available at: <http://csis.org/publication/leading-front-europe-and-new-libya>, [Accessed on: 02/02/2012].
- Cowell, A. and Somaiya, R. (2011), “France and Italy Will Also Send Advisers to Libya Rebels”, April 20, 2011 [online] Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/world/africa/21libya.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all, [Accessed on: 24/11/2011].
- Dabbs Sciubba, J. (2008), “The Defense Implications of Demographic Trends”, *Joint Force Quarterly* Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008.
- Dagci, K. (2007), “The EU’s Middle East Policy and Its Implications to the Region”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No.1&2, Spring & Summer.
- “Dayton’s mission: A reader’s guide”, (2011) *The Palestine Papers*, Al Jazeera 25 Jan, [online] Available at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011125145732219555.html>, [Accessed on: 19/02/2011].
- Defence Correspondent, (2011), “SAS ‘Smash’ squads on the ground in Libya to mark targets for coalition jets”, [online] Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1368247/Libya-SAS-smash-squads-ground-mark-targets-coalition-jets.html>, [Accessed on: 24/04/2011].
- Dursun-Ozkanca O. and Mazzucelli C. (2011), “Veto Players Inside and Out: The Future of EU-NATO Security Relations as Explained in a Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis of French and Turkish Grand Strategies”, Paper prepared for delivery at the 5th Annual *Research 27 Conference of the EU Centre of Excellence (EUCE)*, 10-12 April, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, 2011.

- “Egypt ‘aids Libyan rebels against Gadhafi’”, UPI, [online] Available at: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/03/09/Egypt-aids-Libyan-rebels-against-Gadhafi/UPI-42161299696518/, [Accessed on: 24/11/2011].
- Elwarfally, M. G. (2011), “What the Libyan Resistance Needs”, *The New York Times* May 12, [online] Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13elwarfally.html>, [Accessed on: 19/05/2011].
- “EU Mission Arrives at Tripoli”, European Union, [online] Available at: <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict.bxt/>, [Accessed on: 02.09.2011].
- “EU offers to reform Libyan Security Forces”, EUbusiness, [online] Available at: <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict-aid.bxy/> [Accessed on : 02.09.2011].
- Fargues, Philippe, “Emerging Demographic Patterns across the Mediterranean and their Implications for Migration through 2030”, *Transatlantic Council on Migration, The Migration Policy Institute*, November 2008.
- Fischer, S, Lannon E. (May 2011), “The ENP Strategic Review: the EU and its neighbourhood at a crossroads”, *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, ISS Analysis.
- Gilles, A., Bertram C. and Grant C, (2001) “Europe’s military revolution”, *Defenceinsides, The Centre for European Reform* 14/2/01.
- Gomis B. (2013) “*France-UK Defence Cooperation and Mali*”, Chatham House 31 January.
- Grevi, G, Helly D. and Keohane, D. (2009), *European Security and Defence Policy – The First 10 Years*, EU Institute for European Studies, Paris 2009, pp. 448.
- Homan, K. (2007), “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic Of Congo”, in EC, *Faster and more united?*, 2007, pp. 151-155, [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifp/publications/book_1_en.htm. 21, [Accessed on: 15/07/2013].
- Huber, D. (and all), “The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World: Evolving Relations with Russia, China, India, and Brazil”, *Mediterranean Paper Series*, February 2013, The German Marshall Fund of the United States and The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), p. 11.
- Hughes, C. (2011), “Britain’s Secret War in Libya: British Special Forces uncovered on the ground”, *Mirror* 1/06/2011, [online] Available at: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2011/06/01/britain-s-secret-war-in-libya-british-special-forces-uncovered-on-the-ground-115875-23170485/#ixzz1eczmq61e>, [Accessed on: 24/11/2011].
- Janković, S. (2010), Contemporary migration trends: Consequences for Serbia, National Interest N. 2, year VI, vol. 8, Belgrade (Јанковић, Слободан, „Савремени миграциони трендови: последице по Србију”, *Национални интерес*, бр. 2, год. VI, vol. 8, Београд).
- Janković, S. (2008) „Middle East Before and After Annapolis”, in: dr Nevenka Jeftić (ed), *Aktuelna pitanja međunarodnih odnosa*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, pp. 349-377.

- Jones, B. "Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?", *Occasional Paper, European Union Institute for Security Studies*, February 2011, Vol. 88.
- Jović-Lazić A. and Lađevac I. (2008), "Izgradnja bezbednosne strukture Evropske unije i NATO", in: *Aktuelni međunarodni odnosi u međunarodnim oblastima: bezbednosti, ekonomije, prava, religije*.
- "Kadhafi impose sa loi grâce au fric", *Courrier International* 08.03.2011, [online] Available at: <http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2011/03/08/kadhafi-impose-sa-loi-grace-au-fric>, [Accessed on: 18/05/2011].
- Keohane, D. (2010/2011), "The EU and NATO's future", in: *EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, CSDP newsletter, Issue 11, Winter, pp. 26-27.
- Kirişçi K. (2012), "The EU, Turkey, Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Integration", *Global Turkey in Europe*, Working Paper 01, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.
- Ledwith, S. (2011), "Cables show Libya pressed oil firms to reimburse terror costs", *Reuters* Feb 23, 2011, [online] Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/23/us-gaddafi-oilcompanies-wikileaks-idUSTRE71M5Y420110223>, [Accessed on: 27/02/2011].
- "Malmström: We'll never have a Mare Nostrum unless member states decide to finance it", *Malta Today* 5 November 2014, [online] Available at: http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/comment/blogs/45824/well_never_have_a_mare_nostrum_unless_member_states_decide_to_finance_it#.VHx3mjHF-So, [Accessed on: 07/11/2014].
- Moran, D. (2008) "Hamas wins this round" *ISN Security Watch* 25/01/08, [online] Available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18566>, [Accessed on: 25/01/08].
- Munin, N. (2014), "EU Guidelines Regarding Activities by Israel in the Occupied Territories: A Diplomatic Achievement or a Pyrrhic Victory?", *UACES 44th Annual Conference* Cork, 1-3 September.
- O'Donnell, C. M. (2011), "Britain and France should not give up on EU defence co-operation", *The Centre for European Reform*, 24 October 2011, pp. 6.
- Olivier, G. (March 2011), "From Colonialism to Partnership in African-European Relations", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 46, *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, Rome, pp. 53-67.
- Patterson, R. (2013), "EU SanctionS on Iran: The European political context", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XX, No. 1, Spring, pp. 135-146.
- Rettman, A. (2012), "Five EU countries call for new military 'structure'", *Euobserver*, [online] Available at: <http://euobserver.com/defence/118226>, [Accessed on: 25/02/2013].
- Schoeman, M. (March 2011), "Of BRICs and Mortar: The Growing Relations between Africa and the Global South", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 46, No. 1, *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, Rome, pp. 33-51.
- Siemes, T. (2009), "Mare nostrum? L'Union Européenne et L'Union pour la Méditerranée", *Documents, Revue du dialogue franco-allemand*, 2/09.
- Starr, B. (2011), "Foreign forces in Libya helping rebel forces advance", *CNN* August 24, 2011, Internet, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/08/24/libya.foreign.forces/>, retrieved on: 24/11/2011.

- “The British Military Contribution to Operations in Mali: Is This Mission Creep?”, *Rusi org*, [online] Available at: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C51093FC497623/#.Ust_xE6VOSSq, [Accessed on: 25/02/2013].
- “The Daedalus European Security: The Interactions of NATO, EU, WEU”, (2001) [online] Available at: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/hatjiadoni.pdf>, [Accessed on: 18/05/2011].
- “UK, France agree on more military co-operation”, *Reuters* Jul 25, 2012, [online] Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/25/uk-france-britain-idUKBRE86O02920120725>, [Accessed on: 24/10/2012].
- “UK urges pressure on Gaddafi, EU weighs intervention”, [online] Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/24/us-libya-britain-idUSTRE71N6M920110224>, [Accessed on: 13/03/2011].
- “Van Rompuy leads EU’s go-ahead to military intervention in Libya - Nigel Farage”, [online] Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2JZwFhwsqQ>, [Accessed on: 25/04/2011].
- Youngs, R. and Echagüe, A. (March 2011), “Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Need for Triangulation”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 27-39.