Global Environmental Issues and IR Theories: 
A Pluralist Theoretical Approach

Abstract

This article considers the English School as an underutilized research resource in the field of international relations (IR). Its defining attributes are its methodological pluralism, its historicism, and its interlinking of three main concepts: international system, international society and world society. Parallels are also drawn among the three IR traditions – international system, international society and world society – as the English School differentiates them. This paper points out that the current globalization process reinforces the transnational paradigm that focuses on non-state actors, with a new configuration emerging in which politics loses the hierarchical position implied by realism. Finally, a pluralist theoretical approach is proposed as the most appropriate for research in the area of international environmental politics.

Keywords: International relations, security, environment, realism, rationalism, revolutionism, the English School.
Introduction

Global degradation processes now occupy a prominent position in international relations and are recognized as a legitimate concern of security studies (Marković 2002; Đorđević 2002). Various perspectives (statist, humanist, and ecological) on linking environment and security reflect different values and aspirations (Miltojević 2002). Statists, or state-centric concepts (national security, extended national security, and intra/state security), consider the implications of environmental change within the framework that implies a dominant role of a state in security.

However, it does not mean that other approaches (ecologist or humanist) should be discarded (Newman 2001). Taken all together, they express the full complexity of the relationship between environment and security. Matthew (2000: 38) describes these mutual relations in this way: “Only a few people are likely to choose the condition of the environment [emphasis added], or the condition of humankind [emphasis added], or the condition of the state [emphasis added] as the single and unconditional point for all reasoning and action. We are more complex than that, and more appreciative of the simultaneous separateness and interconnectedness of things that make up our world. To make an unconditional choice, one has to deny the immerse power of the state, or the special status of the human species, or the transnational character of nature – denials that are not easy to sell or live by. “

How, then, can traditional International Relations (IR) theories explain this new reality? The complexity of environmental security presumably calls for a pluralistic theoretical approach in IR theory. In opening up the ontological basis for analyzing environmental security phenomena, we intend to complement rather than to supplement existing approaches, and to combine inductive/deductive or hermeneutical/scientific explanatory approaches.

The starting point for this reasoning may be the distinction among three main traditions. These are concepts of international system, international society, and world society, or Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism (Wight 1991), respectively. This, so-called English School discourse codifies these 3(R) as Hobbesianism or Machiavellianism, Grotianism, and Kantianism, respectively (Cutler 1991). The main authors of the English School (Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Adam
Watson) tended to create a third way between realism and idealism, consisting in the synthesis of the two currents (Czaputowicz 2003).

A comparative review of these three traditions is presented in Table 1. There is a general agreement that the main thrust of the English School has been to establish the Grotian/Rationalism element by developing the concept of international society. In the area of environmental affairs, the English School has been grafted to regime theory.

International regimes are “social institutions consisting of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and programs that govern the interactions in specific issue-areas” (Zürn 1998: 624). Defined in this way, regimes are distinct from international law in that they are more rooted in social practice than in general principles. Therefore, environmental problems are conceived of in terms of the interstate interdependence they generate, and analyzed as collective action problems. The key normative assumption of the regime approach is that the states system can respond to global environmental change, because of the premise that “there are no insuperable obstacles to cooperation under the basic anarchy of international politics” (Paterson 1999: 794).

However, a number of scholars during the 1990s questioned the assumption that the emergence of global environmental change does not involve any substantial challenge to the basic structure of international politics (Meyer et al. 1997). They all, hence, have criticized the regimes framework. This paper considers the three IR traditions and their ramifications on environmental security issues in some detail. It focuses especially on the transnational paradigm which points out individuals as international actors, emerging with a new structure of the world in which politics loses the hierarchical position implied by realism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Martin Wight</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Rationalism</th>
<th>Revolutionism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hedley Bull</td>
<td>Realism</td>
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<td>Form of international relations</td>
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Table 1. Tripartite division of IR theories.
Realism

The state-centric theories of Classical Realism that asserts that states struggle for power (Morgenthau 1978: 29) and Neo-Realism (or Structural Realism) that asserts that states struggle for security as the highest end (Waltz 1979: 126) have been for a long time dominant IR traditions. Realist theories of international politics are based on material assumptions that define the structure of the international system in terms of the material capabilities of state actors. It assumes that the distribution of these attributes creates the basic causal framework by which the range of outcomes in the international systems are determined, including also cooperative frameworks.

The normative and ideational phenomena are left out of the structure. Morgenthau, for instance, asserts: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by the considerations of interest and power. Moral principles and legal commitments may be invoked to justify a policy arrived at on other grounds, but they do not determine the choice among different courses of action” (Myers 1998: 320).

Since the normative and ideational factors are complex phenomena, realist “value-free” explanations of international politics rely on a strict positivist, analytically rigorous methodological model (McElroy 1992: 3). In most cases, the structure of the international system is an independent variable while the behavior of states is a dependent variable. Although Realism recognizes the possibility that actors may and do shape structures in the real world, this empirical fact is held out of theory in the interest of parsimony and the isolation of causal relationships (Keohane 1984: 78). Similarly, power is part of the independent variable, a cause but not an effect. Finally, the interests of states are either independent variables or fixed parameters in the causal equation and typically treated as constant, unitary and unproblematic (Sullivan 2001: 13). However, not all realists, including the most prominent ones such as Morgenthau, Kennan, or Lipmann are in favor of behavioralism in world politics. Morgenthau, for instance, was a consistent opponent of positivist reasoning and of the claim that moral reasoning had no role in the study of international relations (Renggger 2000: 757).

Many scholars, therefore, criticized basic assumptions of Realism (Cox 1981; Ruggie 1986; Keohane 1986; Ashley 1986; Putnam 1988;
The main objection is that the realist approaches do not incorporate domestic political variables and do not consider the power of ideational elements on the structure of the international system. The examination of domestic politics may, for example, provide the key to understanding the different types of responses to an environmental stress, especially demands for scarce environmental resources like water, and the ways of dealing with this specific “security dilemma” (Jervis 1976: 66).

Putnam’s (1988) “two-level game model” also links domestic agencies and international negotiation process. In short, any given negotiation, following Putnam, implies a simultaneous occurrence of at least two games, one at the inter-state level and the other at the level of negotiator’s domestic constituencies. The key point is the simple observation that a negotiator has to satisfy these two interdependent imperatives simultaneously.

Norms, as the end product of international negotiation process, may also be both “products of power” and “sources of power” in the international system (Sullivan 2001). States can actually gain more from cooperation than they can from discord. This is, in fact, the ontological premise of the other structuralist, state-centric approach – Neo-Liberal Institutionalism or Neo-Liberalism. Like Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism operates explicitly within the rational choice theory which assumes maximizing the utility function of political actors from a fixed set of preferences. If preferences are stable and outside of the process of choice, then “we cannot inquire into how preferences are formed” (Wildawsky 1987: 5). Due to these prepositions, Simon (1985: 293) is correct when he asserts that rational choice theorizing, paraphrasing Clausewitz, is a “continuation of political realism by other means”. Nevertheless, a generic power of this theory makes it applicable to a number of political phenomena. Contemporary environmental reality tends to be explained on the basis of rational choice models as well.

Barrett (1998), for instance, argues that the “free-rider problem” is the “hearth of the ecological problem”. He observes these two main features of the problem: (1) “free-riders” get the benefits from every else's restraints but profit from their own lack of restraint, and (2) if there are a large number of people in the group, every one is tempted to be a free-rider because the global advantages if restraint are negligible. Thus, as Barrett asserts, the environmental resources will be vastly overlooked.
and any agreement will be insecure. Soroos (1994), in an interesting article on the security aspects of two international environmental negotiations (the global warming and ozone depletion problems), used another rational model – “prisoner’s dilemma”. His study showed that, in the case of global warming, the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma could be a significant factor in environmental efforts to address the problem of environmental change.

Yet, due to a high degree of uncertainty, that characterizes many contemporary global environmental problems, reasoning in this fashion may be problematic (Waltz 1999). Simon (1985: 302) argues that where the facts are clear, we have some chance, by application of the principles of reasoning, to calculate what the choice will be; however, where evidence is weak and conflicting, especially true in the case of global warming, a rationality principle has little independent predictive power. Evidently, rational choice theorists tend to simplify human motivation in order to derive, according to Green and Shapiro (1994), coherent and unified theoretical view of politics. These authors, however, do not question its power as a general explanatory tool.

The classification of ontologies presented in this section (realism, neoliberalism and culturally/based approach) is similar to that suggested by Blatter et al. (2001: 12). The new element of this systematization is the notion of culture, including also “eco-culture” (Dyer 1993), understood as a socially constructed reality. Human behavior is seen as co-determined by social interdependence and interaction (Malešević 2002). The key variables are ideas, culture, and identity, as the ideational elements in the IR theorizing. This relativist ontology is reflected in the constructivist strand in IR theory, whose proponents (Wendt 1987, 1994, 1995; Wendt and Friedhem, 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Ruggie 1998) criticize the key assumptions of Neo-Realism, especially the concept of anarchy. Wendt (1992: 391) has argued that “anarchy is what states make of it”, and that threats are constructed, rather than being natural or inevitable. His main argument is that identity and interest formation derive from the social processes of interaction leading to expectations of costs and benefits attached to different types of behavior within a system. The constructivist theory of IR is closely related to the English School.

While Neo-Liberal institutionalists or Grotian rationalists focus their attention on the causal effects of ideas on policy and normative
elements, constructivists try to capture the structural quality of ideas in the forms of “intersubjective meanings” (Yee 1996: 102). The concept of intersubjective meaning, as Neufeld (1995: 77) defines it, is “the product of the collective self-interpretations and self-definitions of human communities”. Therefore, the key constructivist assumptions are ideational elements in the behavior of political actors, problem definitions, perceptions, communication, and shared understanding. Power is based on network centrality and communicative skills.

In the environmental domain, this ontology is recognizable primarily through the environmental equity (justice), or human security literature. The emphasis is on ethical issues associated with the economic relationship between Developed and Developing World and the struggle of marginalized minorities or indigenous groups within a society for their livelihoods (Shue 1981, 1999; Shiva 2002).

Finally, it is important to note that constructivists do not reject positivist thought or causal explanation. Their disagreement with mainstream IR theories is ontological; not epistemological. The last point means, as Checkel (1998: 325) observes, that constructivism has the potential to bridge the still vast gap separating the majority of IR theorists from postmodernists and critical theorists. With the latter, constructivists share many substantive concerns (for instance, the role of identity and discourse) and a similar ontological stance; with the former, they share a largely common epistemology. Constructivists thus find themselves in the middle ground between rational choice theorists and post-modern scholars.

Rationalism

Grotianism is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and Rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and institutions at the center of IR theory. However, the notion of an international society does not mean pure altruism; states are expected to act in accordance with their own interests as well. As a result, as Sullivan (2001: 23) observes, “norms must be seen as operating on a sliding scale”, or, in Walzer’s words (2000: 253), as a “map of human crises”.

Rationalism, therefore, should not be confused with the idealistic position that assumes common interests in institutions, or so-called
“harmony of interests”. In contrast, the principle of “self-interest rightly understood”, as Tocqueville (1990: 123) named it, is much better description for the international society: “The principle of self-interest rightly understood produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous; but it disciplines a number of persons in habits of regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command; and if it does not lead men straight to virtue by the will, it gradually draws in that direction by their habits. If the principle of interest rightly understood were to sway the whole moral world, extraordinary virtues doubtless be more rare; but I think that gross depravity would then also be less common. The principle of interests rightly understood perhaps prevents men from rising far above the level of mankind, but a great number of other men, who were falling far below it, are caught and restrained by it.”

In order to mark a clear distinction between realist and rationalist traditions in terms of the interest concept, Watson (1992: 14) uses the terms “raison d’etat” and “raison de systeme”, respectively. Sullivan (2000: 23) has considered Watson’s idea of “raison de systeme” as an important one to “understanding in empirical terms how norms influence the behavior of states in the international system”.

Bull and Watson (1984: 1) defined the international society as: “A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognized their common interest in maintaining these agreements.”

This classical definition includes both the Hobbesian/Realist element of the international system and the Grotian/Rationalist element of a socially constructed order of the international society. Thus the international society perspective is less utopian, more empirical, and more state-centric than the cosmopolitan view of idealism. Although the English School scholars occasionally address the possibilities of a more cosmopolitan future, Sullivan (2001: 24) asserts that “their stance remains essentially Grotian, not Kantian”. Cosmopolitanism is, according to Wight, “theoretically the least important” form of radical thinking about world politics (quoted in Linklater 2002: 12).
Revolutionism

Finally, Kantianism takes individuals, non-state organizations, and ultimately the world population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities. Its central core is a transcendence of the state system as the center of IR theory; that is, the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of “universalist” cosmopolitanism (Buzan 2001: 475).

Cosmopolitanism rejects the idea of a security of states claiming that the only true international society is one of individuals (Dobson 2006). This is the most revolutionary branch of three revolutionist theories and it implies that total dissolution of international relations (Wendt 1991: 40). The other two forms are “doctrinal uniformity” and “doctrinal imperialism” (Buzan 2001: 478). The first, based on Kantian Perpetual Peace, argues that a world consisting exclusively of republican regimes would be a peaceful world. It calls for the ideological homogeneity. The second, which is attributed to Stalinism, is in favor of doctrinal unity through the efforts of a great power “to spread a creed and impose uniformity” (Linklater 2002: 323).

Although the English School has a great credit for synthesis of Realism and Rationalism, it is obliged to deal with the elements of Liberal Revolutionism. The relation between international society and world society is particularly important to English School theory. The general view is that world society (in the form of shared culture) is a prerequisite for international society. Namely, a common culture appears as a necessary condition for an international society. However, Buzan (1983) acknowledges that “a case can also be made that preceding world society is neither historically nor functionally a necessary condition for the formation of an international society”.

Cosmopolitans, however, argue than the doctrine should be more influenced now then it has been in the past, especially during the Cold War, since it is the obvious remedy for so many of the world’s problems, including environmental ones (Linklater 2001: 273). Although scattered references to harm and injury are plentiful, there is no distinguished body of literature which examines how harm to individuals has been understood, managed and controlled in different statesystems. In order to deal more analytically with the problem of harm in world politics, Linklater (2002: 327) identifies five forms which would be a sound reason for developing cosmopolitan harm conventions:
(1) deliberate harm caused in relations between independent political communities, (2) deliberate harm caused by government to their own citizens, (3) deliberate harm by non-state actors, (4) unintended harm, and (5) negligence.

The most striking example for unintended harm is environmental degradation. Linklater (2002: 329) acknowledges that environmental degradation is the “best contemporary example of how the repetition of everyday actions which are seemingly harmless in themselves can, with the passing generations, create outcome that no one desired”. On the other hand, under negligence Linklater lists examples such as “nuclear colonialism” (Diblin 1988: 205) – testing nuclear weapons in the South Pacific with seeming indifference to the health of local population – and “environmental apartheid” (Shue 1981) – the practice of exporting hazardous waste to societies where environmental safeguards are lower than in the West.

Finally, some schoolars are optimists since they rely on the “environmentally benign democratic peace” (Dalby 2000: 88). The Kantian notion of “perpetual peace” through spreading of democracy (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Diamond 1995) has its responses in the environmental security literatures. Larry Diamond (1995), for instance, reasons: “They [democracies] are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law; democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world of international security and prosperity can be built (cited by Newman, 2001: 248). “ Neumayer (2002) empirically demonstrates than “democracies exhibit strong international environmental commitment”.

The English School Pluralist Approach

As the previous sections suggest, all the three IR traditions should be invoked in studying of a particular environmental security phenomenon. This stems from the international character of many environmental problems as well. Although each element in this 3R-triangle is conceptually and methodologically distinct, they blur or merge into each other as the boundaries. For instance, Imperialism can be placed between Realism and Revolutionism (See Table 2).
In the English School perspective all three of these elements are in continuous coexistence and interplay. Buzan makes this clear, saying: “By assuming that all three elements always operate simultaneously (that is, methodological pluralism), it also transcends the assumption often made in the so-called inter-paradigm debate, that realist, liberal, and Marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable” (2001: 476). Many scholars advocate the methodological pluralism of the English School, that is combining the Hobbesian/Realist element of the international system with the Grotian/Rationalist element of a socially constructed order.

Table 2. Transformations of International Relations According to the English School

In the English School perspective all three of these elements are in continuous coexistence and interplay. Buzan makes this clear, saying: “By assuming that all three elements always operate simultaneously (that is, methodological pluralism), it also transcends the assumption often made in the so-called inter-paradigm debate, that realist, liberal, and Marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable” (2001: 476). Many scholars advocate the methodological pluralism of the English School, that is combining the Hobbesian/Realist element of the international system with the Grotian/Rationalist element of a socially constructed order.
Finally, the English School is not a coherent body of literature. Within this IR theory one can distinguish two currents – pluralism and solidarism. The pluralism strand (Bull) assumes that international relations between independent states are based on interacion and coexistence, focusing, thus, on these key categories: (1) sovereignty, (2) diplomacy, and (3) international law (See Table 3.). It is important to note that only sovereign states, according to pluralism, can become members of the international society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of international relations</th>
<th>Sovereignty of nation states</th>
<th>Common norms and institutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>International System</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Society</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Society</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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Table 3. Forms of international relations

The solidarist current of the English School (Wight) assumes solidarity of states in the introduction of international law and universal standards of behaviour. In this approach international society is rather a political society than a society of states. Solidarists claim that the subjects of international law are not only states, but also individuals. In short, states are obligated to respect the full range of human rights, including those relating on clean water, air and land. Whereas in the case of pluralism the dominant tendency was particularism, in the case of solidarism it is universalism. Thus, pluralism is closer to Realism, solidarism is closer to Revolutionism. (See Table 2).

Obviously, the English School is dominantly a state-centred and quasi-realist theory. Andrew Hurrell (2001) claims that the English School provides the adequate framework for the intellectual dialogue between law and politics. Yet, this general theory, in order to be applicable to a broader range of international issues (including environmental ones), could use the constructivist epistemology, and it should be combined with „comparative studies, governance studies and liberal theories“ (Jørgensen 2000: 8-9). Some of these alternatives are analyzed in the following sections.
The Other Pluralist Approaches

Moravcsik’s “new liberal theory” of international relations represents also a call for theoretical pluralism. However, his emphasis is on Liberalism. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics, not as realists claim, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists argue, the configuration of influences and institutions. The priority of liberalism in multi-causal model of state behavior implies that collective state behavior should be analyzed as a two-stage process of constrained social choice. Put briefly, as Moravcsik (1997: 544) argues in his “nonidealistic, nonutopian, nonmoralist, and empirically more oriented liberal theory”, states form first preferences – a stage explained by liberal theorists of state-society relations. Then they debate, bargain, or fight to particular agreement – a second stage explained by realist and institutionalist (as well as liberal) theories of strategic interaction. We would agree that contemporary international environmental policy gives proof for this statement. Thus, the American rejection to ratify the Kyoto Protocol could be explained using this two-stage process, in which American non-cooperative behaviour was driven by specific domestic preferences – a protection of corporations’ interests.

All the evidence suggests that material, that is military and economic power, institutional, and cultural element, all need to be considered simultaneously in assessing an anarchical society’s propensity for conflict and in designing strategies to promote change. This is a debate of compelling intellectual and practical importance. Snyder contends (2002) that assessing the future of the international system needs thinking in terms of mutual feedbacks among material, institutional, and cultural elements. Yet, he acknowledges that changing the ideas, norms, and culture of an anarchical system is not sufficient condition for the transformation of the system.

On the other hand, Wendt and Friedhem (1995: 692) believe that this debate (material versus non-material factors) is often muddled by two misunderstandings:

„First, it is not about relative explanatory power of ‘power of interests’ versus ‘ideas’ but about whether material forces can explain international politics stripped of social (and thus ideational) content. Idealists are not saying that states do not act on the basis of power and interests but rather that this is contingent on the social structure in which states...
are embedded. In a conflictual system power and interests matters, but what makes a system conflictual is an underlying nature of common knowledge. Second, and relatedly, this debate is also not about how much conflict exists in the system. Material forces may cause cooperation and shared knowledge, conflict. Neorealists have confused matters by treating conflictual systems as realist worlds."

In line with this, Grundmann has shown that the power of ideas may be of great importance for explanation of international environmental security problems. According to Grundmann (2001: 19), ideas serve as symbolic resources” (scenarios or alarm signals) or are part of world-views (norms and values of proposed solutions), and thereby pre-structure a discourse. Environmental hazards that are abstract (for instance, radiation) call for symbolic representation. Since most environmental degradation processes occur under uncertainty, it is principally symbolic resources that make a decisive difference: scientific scenarios and writings, interpretations of the situation and proposed solution.2

Undoubtedly, Revolutionism/Kantianism should be part of this theoretical pluralism. In fact, the relationship between international society and world society is particularly within the international environmental policy arena. The question is: Where should the organized but non-state components – for instance, environmental organizations, scientific communities, media, or industry – of the global civil society be placed? If transnational3 companies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are part of world society, it is far from clear, as Buzan (2001: 477) observes, “how they relate to world society conceived in terms of shared identity at the individual level”. Clearly, analyzing the role of transnational networks in international governance involves similar difficulties to those of study of shared norms, ideas, and institutions amongst states within the international society.

This is especially important for the new age of globalization, or the age of “glocalization”.4 Dyer (2001: 446) neatly observes that the local-

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2 For Grundmann (2001: 17), the term ‘information’ is not a good one to describe these forms of representation. Namely, “knowledge is not just information but interpretation, judgment and understanding”.

3 Transnational relations denote regular interactions beyond national borders which include at least one non-state actor. In contrast, international relations are relations between states (Grundmann 2001: 217).

4 Glocalization, a combined notion of ‘globalization’ and ‘localization’, refers to the fact that the current explosion of interterritorial linkages and communications is not just
global characteristic of environmental stress is what presents the greatest challenge to state-centric IR theories. He explains this challenge: “Where once the great issues of world affairs could only be conceived of and addressed through the mechanisms of inter-state relations, these mechanisms now appear to be playing ‘catch-up’ to globalized political practices. Thus, while not everything is necessarily an ‘international’ issue, that in itself has little or no bearing on relative importance”.

The variety of views in terms of international relations in the area of environment can be summarized and classified, as Paterson (1999) did, taking as a primarily criterion the role of a state in this process. Paterson identifies these three different scenarios: (1) international governance, (2) global governance, and (3) “resisting the global, reclaiming the commons” approach. Advocates of the first approach argue that the environmental problems should be conceived of in terms of the interstate interdependence they generate, and thus should be analyzed as collective action problems.

On the other hand, there is an increasing number of authors arguing that the basic framework of international politics is inadequate to deal with the challenge of global environmental change and, hence, new patterns of global environmental governance are emerging. They break down the traditional dominance of states in this policy arena. Within this approach, there are three distinct senses to environmental politics: (1) global governance as primarily an interstate phenomenon (Young 1997); (2) global governance in relation to “glocalization”, assuming a simultaneous shift of authority up to international/transnational institutions and down to local organizations (Rosenau 1990; Hempel 1996); and (3) global governance as essentially a transnational phenomenon (Wapner 1996; Lipschutz 1996).

The third approach to evolving forms of international environmental politics assumes that the dominant forces driving patterns of environmental governance are those tied to economic globalization (Finger and Chatterjee 1994; Karliner 1997). Karliner, for instance, coined the term “grassroots globalization” (1997, 13). Unlike Wapner and Lipschutz, who viewed environmental activism (mobilization) in terms of networks and learning, the advocates of this school conceptualize a phenomenon of increased ‘horizontal’ interaction, but also has to be understood in its ‘vertical’ dimension, characterized by direct mergers of local and global processes. What ‘glocalization’ contributes is a recognition of the greater importance of the local and global levels compared with the interposed national level (Blatter et al. 2001: 6).
mobilization in terms of resistance. Namely, local groups, threatened by global forces (transnational corporations), organize precisely to preserve their traditional livelihoods.

Paterson’s classification of forms of international environmental governance is in agreement with the “triangular game” (state ←→ transnational actors ←→ identity entrepreneurs) elaborated by Badie (2001: 255). Badie asserts that international relations are more and more structures by the autonomy of each of these interacting players – acting simultaneously. Their autonomy is the main source of tensions. Namely, following the logic of the triangular game, “identity entrepreneurs obviously deny the legitimacy of the social contract and jeopardize the political autonomy itself; transnational networks go against the exclusive social relationship on which is based identity mobilization and promote an inclusive conception of the social game” (Badie 2001: 255-256). Obviously, Badie’s new configuration does not fit neither into realist theories nor the “dualistic theory”, which distinguishes between the state-centered and the multi-centered world (Rosenau 1990). Yet, it is still appropriate for many international environmental policy issues such as involvement of transnational actors (for instance, epistemic communities).

Haas (1992) introduced a distinct explanatory approach in international relations dealing with the effect of experts and knowledge-based communities on governmental learning and the development of new state objectives. Scholars from this tradition look at policy-making process in terms of nonsystemic variables such as: ideas, knowledges, beliefs, experts and scientists. Thus, a knowledge-based group is an “epistemic community”.

An epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the same „cause-and-effect” relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values. However, learning process can only begin after an epistemic community has established its channels of communication to government. The outcomes of this learning process can be various, starting from the simplest to more sophisticated ones: (1) pursuing new policies (new means) in order to accomplish given objectives within the same framework of cause-and-effect relationships; (2) adopting new objectives; (3) the acceptance of entirely new cause-and-effect relationships and reasoning patterns; and (4) transcendental learning.
Conclusion

In conclusion, one can say that the studying of international environmental politics, and, in particular, global and regional environmental security phenomena (conflict and cooperation), should be based on the theoretical pluralism that incorporate all three IR traditions: Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism. Realism and rational choice models do not consider the role of normative and ideational factors in international politics. Consequently, our suggestion is not to complement but to combine realism with other approaches.

The complexity and interdependency features of any particular environmental security problem simply have called for the multi-dimensional approach to explain the full range of observed effects. To capture the environmental realities, it is not necessary, to integrate disciplines into interdisciplinary systems analysis and other methodological frameworks. A more plausible explanation often emerges from a number of theories, each of which delves deeply into the aspects of problem using the analytical tools best designed to examine the specific problem.

Bibliography


