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СПЕЦИЈАЛ 2015

РАЦИОНАЛНИ ИЗБОР – ПРИМЕНА У ПОЛИТИЧКОЈ НАУЦИ

Сажетак

Текст објашњава значај теорије рационалног избора за политичку науку. То се ради на два начина. Најпре се указује на парадокс рационалности, тј. на неспособност демократских институција да произведу логички кохерентну одлуку (која не би кршила принцип транзитивности преференција). Сагледавају се и њене импликације на парламентарно одлучивање кроз Мекилвијеву теорему хаоса и могуће теоријске одговоре на њу. Текст се завршава прегледом теорија о формирању коалиција. Закључак је да политичка наука утемељена у теорији рационалног избора има половичан успех у погледу успостављања предиктивних закона у политици.

кључне речи:

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периодика Српска политичка мисао специјал специјал/2015 УДК 32.01:303.715 9-34
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