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The Budgetary Process: An Analysis of the Legislative Measures in Serbia and Croatia

Sažetak

This paper looks into the effects of political institutions on government fiscal policy. Our aim is to establish whether a legislative body has the power to influence the budget proposal tabled by the government. This leverage is measured in the analysis of the six indicators (so-called Wehner scale) which combined, make up the index of parliamentary power in Serbia and in Croatia. In the final section, the results obtained from our analysis are presented in a comparative perspective. Our assessment refers exclusively to legislative measures, not practice.

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Reference

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PERIODIKA Serbian Political Thought 1/2014 UDC 336.1/.5:342.95(497.11)(497.5) 5-17
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